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Summary 
 
This thesis contributes to theories about aid negotiations by researching how 
development assistance for state-building has been negotiated in a fragile state, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Using qualitative methods, mainly in 
the form of semi-structured interviews, I explore how, in the context of the various 
structural factors that surround the negotiations, the different actors have tried to 
influence these factors to their advantage and what strategies the donors and the 
government have used to reach their objectives. In contrast to countries such as 
Rwanda and Uganda, I found that the Congolese government hasn’t tried to use 
image management to ‘sell’ itself to the donors. Instead, its strategy has been to 
increase its negotiation capital by taking an aggressive approach in discourse 
with the donors. Donors have struggled to have a constructive dialogue with the 
government and have been reluctant, due to international norms of ownership 
and previous experiences, to use conditionality as a negotiating strategy. 
To see how the strategies employed by donors and the government varied 
depending on the sector and level (central – district) at which engagement was 
taking place, I reviewed two large donor-funded programmes; one in the health 
sector, the other in the justice sector. I found that the strategies used in the two 
sectors did indeed vary quite substantially, with the consequence that the donors 
had more influence in the health than in the justice sector.  
To add to the complexity, Congo is what researchers have described as an 
archetype for a hybrid state, where the state is sharing its authority and legitimacy 
with a large number of non-state actors, such as customary chiefs and faith-
based organisations. In this thesis I explored what this meant for donor efforts to 
build state-capacity and how it affects aid negotiations. I conclude with the 
recommendation that donors would benefit from working more closely with non-
state actors in their efforts to build state-capacity. 
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Map 1: Democratic Republic of Congo with provinces prior to July 2015 (source: 
ezilon.com) 
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Map 2: Democratic Republic of Congo with current provinces (source 
comersis.com). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Introducing the research topic 
The first time I visited the bustling city of Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC)1, was in September 2011. I was there to work in the 
development section of the Swedish Embassy and was excited by the opportunity 
to get to know this vast country. I was also looking forward to working with other 
donors and the government hopefully to improve, if even only in a small way, the 
situation in Congo. However, one of the first things that struck me was the 
considerable tension between the donor community and the Congolese 
government. I had worked in other countries before and knew that the relationship 
between donors and governments was not always smooth, but I had never 
experienced the degree of hostility I observed.2      
From my very first day I was told by colleagues that the government lacked the 
political will to develop the country and that I should be cynical in my views on 
the Congolese state when reporting back home to Headquarters. In both formal 
and informal meetings between the donors, there were plenty of references to 
how cunning and manipulative the government was – and how it was taking 
advantage of the donors. Despite this, the donors continued to support activities 
intended to deliver a number of reforms aimed at building capacity in a state that 
they did not trust. Even more confusing was that despite the lack of trust most of 
the aid being provided was without conditions attached. To paraphrase one 
Congo expert: ‘they (the donors) seemed determined to rehabilitate the state at 
all costs, with or without Congolese involvement’ (Trefon, 2011 p. 7). It soon also 
became clear that they felt rather alone in this process and rather powerless in 
delivering reforms. Curiously though, I rarely heard the donors reflecting on their 
own shortcomings and their possible responsibility for reform failures.  
The government, with its deeply embedded patrimonial system, seemed unwilling 
or incapable of implementing reforms promoted by the international community. 
                                            
1 Throughout the text the term ‘Congo’ is used to refer to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), although for the 
period 1971 to 1997, when the country was called Zaïre, this term is used. 
2 I have been working and living in Lao PDR, Zambia and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
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It often took a tough stance with the donors. As a consequence, the relationship 
was constantly fraught with tension that occasionally erupted into open 
confrontation. The government’s tough stance was especially interesting 
considering that the government was so dependent upon aid: aid represented 
between 30-40% of the state budget.  
Any observer would wonder why the relationship was so hostile, and why the 
donors continued to engage with Congo, despite the government’s tough stand 
against the donors and its repeated failures in implementing the reforms 
suggested by the donors.  
As many scholars have already noted there are some major contextual factors 
as to why Congo matters for Western donors, and they feel that they can’t 
abandon it. It is the second largest country in Africa and it has a population of 
approximately 80 million people. The poverty rates are extremely high, with 
around 80% of the population living on under 1.90 USD per day 
(wdi.wordbank.org). It has immense natural resources with around 1 300 different 
minerals (Trefon, 2016). It borders nine other countries and what happens in 
Congo has the potential to impact the region, including countries like Angola, 
Rwanda and Uganda to which many donors have close ties. Hence, donors are 
keen to see a stable Congo. They also want transition from the provision of 
humanitarian aid, significant levels of which have been provided for the last 25 
years, towards longer term development assistance.  
Given this specific context and the donors commitment to staying in Congo, I was 
intrigued by how they within this context were trying to secure as much as they 
could for their state-building effort through aid negotiations, and what strategies 
they were using to convince the ruling elite to implement their agenda. I was also 
curious to discover what strategies the government used to secure a continued 
inflow of aid and how they tried to maintain autonomy in this process by avoiding 
donor-imposed conditionality. I decided to focus my main research question on: 
 What explains the strategies that Western donors use when engaging with 
the hybrid and predatory Congolese state to advance their state-building 
agenda and how does the Congolese government respond? 
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To answer the question, I have used qualitative research methods mainly in the 
form of semi-structured interviews with people involved in or with insights into aid 
negotiations, such as donor officials, diplomats, government officials, civil society 
representatives, academics and consultants. In total, I interviewed 117 people 
during three field-visits over 2014 – 2016. Some of these interviews were used 
as background information, whereas others were used to cast light into the actual 
negotiations and engagement between the donors and the government. 
This chapter will start with contextualising state-building and aid relationships in 
fragile and hybrid states, before presenting the research aim and the research 
questions. I then go through considerations on terminology and key limitations 
and challenges of the study, before presenting the research design and methods 
that I have been using. I will also go through issues related to positionality and 
reflexivity.  
1.2. Contextualizing state-building and aid relationships 
State-building in fragile states has increasingly become a key priority for the 
international community following the end of the Cold War and the fight against 
terrorism (Marquette & Beswick, 2011, p. 1704). There is increasing recognition 
that global security and poverty challenges are concentrated in fragile and 
conflict-affected states. By 2030 it is estimated that 50% of the world’s poor will 
be living in fragile states (World Bank, 2017, p. 41). This has led donors to 
considerably increase their support to conflict - and post-conflict countries (IPI, 
2012, p. 1; OECD, 2011, p. 1). 
This increased focus on fragile states and state-building has given rise to a 
heated debate around these terms. The concept of fragility has been questioned 
by academics who have highlighted the potential of abuse of the category of state 
fragility, legitimising external intervention at the expense of local agency (Grimm, 
Lemay-Hébert, & Nay, 2014). The analytical utility of the categorization effort itself 
has also rightly been disputed. It is argued that the grouping together of a wide 
range of diverse countries leads to highly standardised development responses 
that do not take into account often highly divergent political, economic and social 
conditions (OECD/DAC, 2007; Putzel, 2010, p. 1). In this thesis I will focus more 
precisely on so-called ‘predatory states’, which arguably is a rather extreme form 
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of fragile state. I will discuss the term predatory state in more detail later in this 
section. Researchers and practitioners are also struggling with what is meant by 
‘state’ and ‘state-building’; the most widely used definition being from Weber, who 
defined the state as ‘an entity that successfully claims a monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 6). 
Tilly in his important work on the state formation in Europe made the famous 
aphorism ‘war made the state, and the state made war’, and that war can 
sometime be the basis for state-building. He identified four different activities of 
the state: a) war making; b) state-making by which he meant the act of eliminating 
internal rival forces and insurgents from within its own territories; c) protection 
meaning the elimination of potential threats to the their population; and d) 
extraction of securing means to execute the previous three activities, such as the 
collection of taxes or revenue. There has been some debate regarding the 
applicability of the war-making/state-making beyond Europe. Research by, for 
example, Taylor and Botea (2008) seems to indicate that in the absence of a 
relative ethnic homogeneity war is more likely to break than make the states in 
developing countries  (p. 27). One should keep in mind though, that state-building 
is a long process and the state-building process in Europe often took many 
centuries before the state managed to impose the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of force within its borders. Many of these states were, just like some 
contemporary states in Africa, originally diverse and lacked cohesion. Hence it 
may well be too early to say that Tilly’s aphorism doesn’t apply to Africa. In more 
recent academic literature on state-building in contemporary fragile states there 
has been a focus on alternative and more non-linear ways of state-building with 
an understanding that one need to work alongside informal power structures, 
including actors with decidedly illiberal aims (Allouche & Lind, 2013, p. 18; 
Menkhaus, 2006).3  
What most donors see as the tasks of the state are often much wider than 
enforcement of physical force, and state-building efforts frequently go much 
                                            
3 Contemporary research has also shown that states don’t have to have legitimate governing institutions 
to be effective, which can be argued to go against the Weberian idea of a state. Research on neo-
patrimonial states in Asia and Africa has shown that some neo-patrimonial states have indeed managed 
to produce outcomes that are good not only for the elite, but also for the general population. Research 
by Fukuyama (2014) on the USA has also shown that the country was built on a patrimonial system. Not 
all neo-patrimonial systems are effective though, as I will describe in the section on predatory states. 
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further than just the capacity to control a territory. Fukuyama offers a useful 
definition of state-building as: ‘the creation of new government institutions and 
the strengthening of existing ones’ (Fukuyama, 2004, p. ix). This also includes 
the development of new constitutions, the holding of elections, the establishment 
of an independent judiciary, development of a regulated market economy and the 
expansion of effective and accountable state institutions across the entire 
geographic boundaries of a country (Coyne & Pellillo, 2011, pp. 36–37; Englebert 
& Tull, 2008; IDS, 2010, p. 1). In this thesis I am examining how donors in a broad 
sense are trying to build effective state-capacity in the health and justice sectors.4 
As a consequence, I have excluded humanitarian aid and aid that by-pass the 
state by going directly to UN agencies or international and local CSOs as this 
type of aid are usually not being negotiated with the government.  
Despite donors increased engagement with fragile states the effectiveness of aid 
has nonetheless been rather limited (Zürcher, et al, 2013, p. 570), and as 
Allouche and Lind have pointed out the international community is lacking tools 
and guidelines for how to work in messy countries affected by violence and 
conflict (Allouche & Lind, 2013, p. 18). In order to increase aid effectiveness, the 
New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States (henceforth called the New Deal) 
was developed in 2011. The New Deal acknowledges that aid in fragile states 
has been compromised by a lack of trust and leadership and that donors to a 
large extent have by-passed national interests and actors (Baranyi & Desrosiers, 
2012), with a focus on short-term results instead of medium- to long-term 
sustainable results that are brought about by building systems and national 
capacity (OECD, 2011, pp. 2–3). The New Deal builds upon established 
declarations on aid effectiveness, namely the Paris Declaration (2004) and 
subsequently the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Aid 
Effectiveness Declaration (2011), by highlighting the need for country ownership, 
aid coordination, predictable aid and the importance of transparency (OECD, 
2011, pp. 2–3). However, in addition to these "standard" aid effectiveness 
principles, such as supporting country-led transitions and use of country systems, 
the New Deal also takes into account the fragility of these countries by adding 
                                            
4 Acknowledging that donors are usually focusing their state-building efforts on building Weberian states, 
and thereby ignoring other type of state-building, including the necessity of working alongside informal 
power structures, as I will show in chapter 6 on ‘real governance’. 
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five Peace-building and State-building goals ranging from political settlements to 
service delivery as seen in the matrix below. It also emphasises country-led 
transitions out of fragility and the building of mutual trust and strong partnership. 
Table 1: The three pillars of the New Deal 
 
The Peace-building and 
State-building Goals 
 
                                              
FOCUS (on new ways of 
engaging, supporting 
inclusive, country-led 
transitions out of fragility) 
Building mutual TRUST and 
strong partnerships. 
 
                                              
Legitimate policies (Political 
settlements and conflict 
resolution)  
Fragility assessment of the 
causes and features of 
fragility 
Transparency in the use of 
domestic resources 
Security – establish and 
strengthen people’s security 
One vision and one plan 
(which is country-owned) 
Risk – that is jointly assessed 
& managed 
Justice – address injustices 
and increase access to 
justice 
Compact to implement the 
one vision and one plan 
Use of country systems 
Economic foundations 
(generate employment and 
livelihoods) 
Use the PSGs to monitor 
progress. 
Strengthening capacity of 
local institutions and actors to 
build peaceful states.   
Revenues and Services Support political dialogue and 
leadership 
Timely and predictable aid  
(From: www.newdeal4peace.org) 
 
The New Deal was a major breakthrough with 20 fragile states taking effective 
leadership of the process (IPI, 2012, p. 10), through the g7+ group 
(www.g7plus.org). Congo played an active role in the group through the Minister 
of Planning and was also one of eight countries that volunteered to pilot the 
implementation of the New Deal. Tellingly, it was indicative of the lack of trust 
between the donors and the Congolese government that none of the donors 
agreed to be co-implementer of the New Deal in Congo unlike in the other pilot 
countries, such as Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia.   
As highlighted by Carothers and De Gramont, the Paris Declaration and the New 
Deal assume that recipient governments are ‘well-intended’ and if donors give 
them the resources and flexibility to use aid, they will use it to develop their own 
countries (Carothers & De Gramont, 2013, p. 270). Thus, these international 
declarations have an idealized vision of the world in which vested interests and 
neo-patrimonial relationships do not exist. In addition, the Paris Declaration and 
the New Deal also assume that the interests of donors and recipients are always 
aligned, which in reality they rarely are (Zürcher, 2012, p. 468). Instead, as noted 
by Englebert and Tull ‘Many African Elites share neither the diagnosis of failure 
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nor the objectives set out by the foreign promoters of reconstruction policies’ 
(2008 pp. 110–111). A key issue, therefore, is how development projects and 
programmes are negotiated and implemented in countries such as Congo.  
State-building in fragile states is further complicated by the fact that many are 
what academics usually refer to as ‘hybrid’ or ‘negotiated’ states and some, like 
Congo, also fit into the description of ‘predatory’ states. I will here go through 
these concepts and how they affect state-building efforts, as well as what the 
implications might be on the aid relationship.  
State-building and ownership in hybrid and predatory states 
Widespread disillusionment with ‘failed state’ perspectives on African governance 
has drawn attention to new forms of order emerging on the ground in areas where 
the presence of the state is weak. The term ‘hybrid governance’ emerged in 
reference to these new organisational arrangements that incorporate local 
institutions and popular organisations which fill gaps in state capacity (Meagher, 
De Herdt, & Titeca, 2014, p. 1). The idea that there are forms of order beyond the 
state is nothing new. Hybrid arrangements incorporating non-state institutions 
into formal governance arrangements have been well documented in Africa since 
colonial experiences of indirect rule. What is new is the move from state-based 
ideals of post-colonial order to a more practical emphasis on local non-state 
arrangements already operating on the ground in fragile areas of Africa (Meagher 
et al., 2014, p. 1). This signals what has been called a paradigm shift from the 
‘good governance’ orthodoxy to a focus on ‘arrangements that work’ (Crook & 
Booth, 2011, p. 97). Instead of fixing failed states, one might ‘work with the grain’, 
that is work with the local institutions that are already operating on the ground 
(Crook & Booth, 2011; Kelsall, 2008, 2011).  
In addition to being classified as fragile Congo is also viewed by researchers as 
a hybrid state, in which the state shares its authority with a number of other non-
state actors such as community groups, militias, local 'big men' (they rarely tend 
to be women), and customary chiefs. These actors sometimes exercise more 
influence than state officials and are often seen by the population as being more 
legitimate than the state actors. The state often co-exists together with these non-
state structures in a complex system of negotiations with each other which is why 
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some academics, such as Titeca and de Herdt, chose to call them ‘negotiated’ 
states (2011). It can also be seen as a kind of co-production where a range of 
actors ‘co-produce’ services through institutional configuration (Olivier de Sardan, 
2011). While some authors accept such hybridity as a practical response to weak 
states and encourage donors to more actively engage with this reality on the 
ground (see for example, Boege et al, 2009 p. 16), others critique it for reasons 
related to legitimacy, transparency and accountability (see for example, Meagher 
2012 and Hilhorst et al. 2010). Whatever one’s position on hybrid states, they 
pose important normative and practical questions for donors as to what kind of 
state-building to support and who to negotiate with. Should one work with the 
hybridity or move towards more Weberian organisations? And who, given the 
strong presence of alternative forms of authority, should one engage with and 
whose ownership is one trying to cultivate? 
Despite the fact that researchers have shown that many of the fragile states in 
which donors are trying to build state capacity in, are indeed hybrid forms of state, 
we know relatively little about how donors are dealing with these hybrid forms of 
governance and how it may affect aid negotiations regarding state-building in 
fragile states. There is some research such as the work by De Herdt, Titeca and 
Wagermakers on the education sector in Congo and how the state has tried to 
reconfigurate itself to become more relevant by trying to impose itself on the faith-
based organisations (2010 & 2012).5 Another example is Denney (2013 & 2014),6 
who has explored DFID’s interaction with informal institutions in Sierra Leone. 
While these studies offer some insights, they also underscore the difficulties 
donors have grappling with issues of ‘real governance’7 on the ground, i.e. that 
services and governance of sectors are being co-produced by a large variety of 
actors.   
                                            
5 ‘Making investment in education part of the peace dividend in the DRC‘ and ‘Make Schools, Not War? Donors’ 
Rewriting of the Social Contract in the DRC’ (De Herdt, Titeca, & Wagemakers, 2010; De Herdt, Titeca, & Wagemakers, 
2012). 
6 ‘Liberal Chiefs of Illiberal Development: The Challenges of Engaging Chiefs in DFID’s Security Sector Reform 
Programme in Sierra Leone‘ and ‘Justice and Security Reform: Development Agencies and Informal Institutions in 
Sierra Leone’ (Denney, 2013, 2014). 
7 Real governance is a conceptual term used as a conceptual phrase used by Olivier de Sardan and other APPP 
researchers to encourage people to extend their research beyond formal state rules, particularly in contexts in which 
a variety of actors, contribute to governance and public services. De Sardan also used the term ‘real’ to contrast such 
an approach from normative approaches that analyse actual governance practices against a standard of ‘good 
governance’ characterising Western democracies. In the rest of the thesis I will use the term without inverted comas. 
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Predatory states 
The term fragile states groups together a wide variety of countries. Whereas 
some fragile states can be seen as developmental in which the elite use the 
resources of the state for the development of the country,8 others fit more into the 
category of predatory states, where the elite use the state for the sole purpose of 
enriching themselves. Evans defines the predatory state as one that ‘preys upon 
its citizens, terrorizing them, despoiling their common patrimony, and providing 
little in the way of services in return’ (Evans, 1995, p. 45).  
Some key features of predatory states include: i) a high degree of political power 
concentrated in personal rule; ii) the use of power to control economic resources; 
iii) failure to use such resources for any observable developmental purposes; and 
iv) the absence of any feasible vision or commitment to promoting long-term and 
sustainable growth (Bavister-Gould, 2011, pp. 1–2). Predatory rulers, as Reno 
shows, pursue policies that are antithetical to development as they ‘recognise 
that improving the welfare of citizens could bring a fundamental shift in political 
power that would threaten their survival’, (p. 730). Underlying conditions, usually 
consisting of valuable natural resources or other rent-seeking opportunities, 
make staying in power particularly rewarding and in order to stay in power 
predatory rulers perceive other elite members as a threat to their regime’s 
survival. Under these conditions, as Reno argues, bureaucratic efficiency, 
property rights and other elements of the rule of law9 that are usually associated 
with the provision of public goods to the population are considered as threats to 
the regime (ibid). As a consequence, predatory rule often leads to the systematic 
erosion of public institutions and the rule of law and thereby making the state 
fragile (ibid). 
In the worst forms, predation and corruption are the dominating characteristics in 
all spheres and levels, including the bureaucracy. Diamond uses the term 
‘predatory societies’ to describe a system where every transaction is 
                                            
8 For a discussion about development states, see for ex: ‘Developmental Regimes in Africa, initiating and sustaining 
developmental regimes in Africa’ (Overseas Development Institute, 2015). In brief the research finds that neo-
patrimonial states can indeed be developmental and hence that it is possible for external actors to work with the 
state and achieve outcomes that are good for the country at large.  
9 With rule of law I use the definition suggested by Crook et al. in that it refers to the provision of a justice system 
which sustains the security of all citizens against the exercise of arbitrary power by the state or the powerful, and 
provides for public regulation of civic disputes in ways which are trusted (Crook, Asante, & Brobbey, 2011) 
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‘manipulated towards someone’s immediate advantage’ (Diamond, 2008, p. 43-
44). I will argue that the Congo fits well with the description of a predatory state, 
as the regime uses the natural resources of the country for its own benefits, and 
the government has more or less abandoned social service provision. The regime 
has also, as I will demonstrate in chapter 3, left the bureaucracy to manage on 
its own almost totally deprived of resources. Civil servants are hence left to 
extract resources from the population. How the state and the civil service have 
transformed under this predatory rule has been well described by amongst others 
Trefon (Trefon & Smis, 2002; Trefon, 2009, 2011) and Englebert (2002).    
Not surprisingly, predatory regimes are a serious threat to state-building. They 
also pose major challenges for donors who have to choose between the following 
options: 
1) By-pass the state and work directly with international organisations and 
local civil society. This has often been the default choice for donors when 
they haven't trusted the recipient government. In the long-run, however, 
this is not a sustainable strategy and it might destroy and further weaken 
existing structures in the country. In addition, this mode of operation is not 
in line with international commitments on aid effectiveness and state-
building. 
2) Work with the government in order to build state-capacity. This 
approach risks legitimizing an illegitimate state, which does not have the 
support of its people, and donors become complicit in the mismanagement 
of the country.  
Previously donors have chosen to by-pass the state. Although they are still doing 
this to a certain extent the increased focus on state-building, and the new global 
norms on ownership in the aid effectiveness declarations, have made this option 
less feasible.  
1.3. Research aim, purpose and rationale  
This thesis aims to contribute to our understandings of how development 
assistance for state-building is negotiated in hybrid and predatory states through 
researching one such case: The Democratic Republic of Congo.  
11 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction the relationship between the donors and the 
government is rather hostile and the donors seem to lack control and power in 
the aid negotiations, but despite repeated reform failures and the government’s 
tough stance with the donors, Congo has managed to secure a constant flow of 
mainly unconditional aid. As noted earlier, there are some major contextual 
factors as to why Congo matters for Western donors and why they persist in 
providing development assistance to the country. Within this particular context I 
research how the donors try to secure as much as they can of their state-building 
agenda goals, focusing on negotiations in two different sectors, the health and 
the justice sectors, and how the government has reacted to it. 
I review the aid negotiations to investigate how donors and the government 
engaged with each other, and by unpacking their history of engagement – how 
they reacted and counteracted with each other iteratively over time. Aid 
negotiations is a highly relevant prism through which to analyse the relationship, 
as aid is the main channel through which the international community engages 
with Congo. Through an in-depth analysis of how the donors and the government 
engage with each other in aid negotiations, I address how the negotiations are 
being conducted in the two sectors, by looking at both structural factors 
influencing the negotiations and actual strategies employed by the different 
parties.  
Considering the frequency of aid negotiations, as Spector and Wagner have 
pointed out, there is a surprisingly limited body of literature that is specifically 
devoted to these kind of negotiations (Spector & Wagner, 2010, pp. 327 & 338).10 
The recent literature on aid negotiations that exists focuses mainly on how 
                                            
10 Within the literature on international relations there have been some important studies on North-South 
negotiations most notably by William Zartman (1987; 1985). However, these studies focus on multilateral 
negotiations, such as international trade negotiations and don’t investigate aid negotiations. Negotiations with only 
two parties differ considerable from multiparty conferences. Also, as I will highlight at p. 15 aid negotiations differs 
from other kind of asymmetric north – south negotiations, in that they are often informal without a clear beginning 
or end. They are often not a one-off event, but rather a form of on-going negotiations between the donors and the 
recipients over the implementation of aid (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009, Zurcher et al, 2013, Spector & Wagner, 2010). 
Other academics, such as Barry O’Neill (2018) has looked at international negotiations from a game theory 
perspective and rational choice models. Game-theory builds on the study of mathematical models of strategic 
interactions between rational decision-makers. It views the players as rational actors rather than as political agents 
that are partially constituted by ideas and memories of the community from which they emerge. Negotiations are, 
however, not just strategic games based on the choices of rational agents. The interests and preferences of the actors 
are instead shaped and influenced by the global economic, political and ideological contexts in which actors are 
situated and the negotiations themselves are embedded. As a consequence, I have chosen to not use 
game-theory as my conceptual approach to contemporary aid negotiations. 
12 
 
 
countries considered to be so-called ‘aid darlings’ have pro-actively used 
strategies to successfully create a bargaining space to elaborate their own 
policies. However, as De Haan and Warmerdam have pointed out much less 
research has been carried out on predatory states and in particular how donors 
have engaged with the government elite and how aid has been negotiated (De 
Haan & Warmerdam, 2012, p. 22). Scant attention has also been paid to how 
national actors experience and navigate the involvement from the international 
community (Baaz & Stern, 2013; Whitfield & Fraser, 2009a).  
Considering the focus on the New Deal, and the increased attention to fragile 
states it is timely to explore aid negotiations and engagement strategies in 
situations of hybridity and predation. International aid to fragile and conflict-
affected states has risen during the last decade (IPI, 2012, p. 1). The British 
government has, for example, declared in its 2015 aid strategy that 50% of its 
foreign development assistance would be targeted to fragile states and regions 
(DFID, 2015, p. 4).11 Multilateral organisations are also increasing their work in 
fragile states. For example, in the agreement for a capital increase for the World 
Bank in 2018, it was agreed to double financial support for countries facing 
current or rising risks of fragility (World Bank, 2017, p. 51). Congo is not the only 
country amongst them to display the characteristics of a predatory and hybrid 
state. 
This research is guided by one main question, and two sub-questions: 
What explains the strategies the Western donors use when engaging with the 
hybrid and predatory Congolese state to advance their state-building agenda and 
how does the Congolese government respond? 
a. What strategies are the donors using to create incentives amongst 
the ruling elite to implement their state-building policies and 
programmes in the health and justice sectors, and what strategies 
does the government use to secure their autonomy and to secure 
the influx of aid? 
                                            
11 DFID’s latest Aid Strategy: UK Aid - tackling global challenges in the national interest’ (2015). 
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b. What explains the different strategies that the Western donors are 
using in the two sectors and how the Congolese side has reacted 
to it? 
To answer these questions, I will explore how structural factors that surround the 
negotiations, such as political and economic factors and international norms, 
influence the negotiations and the strategies that the different parties can use to 
advance their agendas. I will review in-depth the negotiation strategies of both 
the donors and the Congolese government, and how the fact that Congo is a 
hybrid state affects the donors and the Congolese government. To what degree, 
for example, do the donors involve domestic non-state actors such as faith-based 
organisations, customary chiefs and community-based organisations in their 
negotiations? Considering that the Congolese government is perceived as 
predatory, one might expect that the donors are actively looking for other 
domestic actors that they could work with in their state-building efforts. One might 
also expect that the government, that has been forced to share its authority with 
a number of non-state actors, might be unwilling to involve them in the negotiation 
process, as they might be seen as competing foci of loyalty and political and 
economic organisations whose existence might be seen as a challenge to state 
control. I will explore if this was indeed the case and if there are any differences 
between the health and the justice sectors.   
Significance of the study 
Much of the newer literature on aid negotiations focuses on developmental states.   
Far less research has been carried out on aid negotiations in predatory and hybrid 
states like Congo. I will explore how, within the various structural factors that 
surround the negotiations, different actors have tried to influence these factors to 
their advantage, and what strategies the donors and the government have used 
to reach their objectives. I will assess whether this differs from aid negotiations in 
other type of countries explored in research by for example Whitfield and Fraser 
(2009), Fisher (2013, 2014, 2015), Elgström (1993) and Beswick (2007, 2013). 
Considering that increasing levels of aid are being provided to fragile states, it is 
timely to investigate the negotiations between the donors and the government in 
these kinds of contexts. 
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My research complements studies on the education sector (De Herdt, Titeca and 
Wagemakers 2012), administrative reforms (Moshonas, 2012) and Trefon’s book 
about aid inefficiency and state reforms in the DRC (2011).  It does this by taking 
a more in-depth look into how the actors have engaged and negotiated with each 
other and how the aid effectiveness agenda has influenced the negotiation 
process. By doing an in-depth review and grounded analysis of how negotiation 
strategies differ from one sector to another, this thesis will demonstrate how the 
negotiations and engagement strategies vary significantly between sectors – a 
distinction that is mainly lacking in other studies.  
Finally, this thesis also contributes to the literature on hybrid states. Although the 
literature on hybridity, especially in fragile states, has grown rather rapidly 
recently, we still know relatively little about how hybrid governance works in 
Congo. There is some literature on hybridity in Congo, for example, the 
aforementioned study of the education sector (see also De Herdt and Titeca 2011 
and 2016) and some studies on the customary justice system (see for example 
Shearon, 2017; Verweijen, 2016; Vlassenroot, 2012). We know less about real 
governance in the health sector and the linkages between the formal justice 
system and the customary system. In particular we know little about how the 
hybridity affects the negotiations on state-building between donors and the 
government, and whom they engage with in the aid negotiation process.  
1.4. Some considerations on terminology 
This thesis uses a number of terms that are potentially contentious. Below I 
explain the choices that I have made in this regard. 
The use of the term ‘the donors’ is, as Whitfield and Fraser (2009) remark, a 
convenient and almost unavoidable term for writing about donor – government 
relations at a general level, but it can arguably also be rather imprecise because 
it portrays donors as a homogeneous and unified group. While it is definitely true 
that donor motivations for giving development assistance vary, as noted by 
Lancaster (2007), they broadly follow the same policy guidelines issued by the 
OECD Development Assistant Committee (DAC). This plays an important role in 
homogenising donor discourse and actions (Lancaster, 2007; Whitfield & Fraser, 
2009a, p. 18). Besides the normative influence of the OECD-DAC, there are a 
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number of other factors that tends to contribute to a harmonized view amongst 
the donors. Autesserre (2014) argues that there are numerous formal and 
informal mechanisms that help spread and reinforce ways that donors interpret 
and act, for example, through the rotation of staff members between the different 
agencies and organisations and also through personal and professional 
gatherings of expatriates. These gatherings range from formalised settings such 
as various coordination groups to informal settings, such as after-work drinks with 
colleagues. Through these various interactions donors share information and 
narratives and it allows newcomers to learn from those that have been in the 
country for a longer time (Autesserre, 2014, pp. 34–39). 
Rather than ‘development partners’ or ‘partner countries’ which is the terminology 
promoted by the new aid architecture in an effort to give the impression that 
development is a partnership between two equal partners that are working 
towards a common goal, I use the terms ‘(aid) recipient’ and ‘donors’. I concur 
with Collins who remarks that these labels make more sense as they reflect ‘the 
real dichotomy despite the partnership rhetoric’ (Collins, 2011, p. 4). In the 
context of this research, they are also important to providing clarity in the 
argument.  
Finally, regarding the term ‘aid negotiations’, such discussions are, by their very 
nature, usually seen as asymmetrical with one party in need of the assistance 
and the other party having control over funds (Spector & Wagner, 2010, p. 327). 
Hence, it has often been taken for granted that developing countries can do 
nothing but comply with the demands made by the donors (ibid p. 327-328).  In 
this thesis, I will seek to demonstrate that this is not always the case. In contrast 
to many other types of negotiations, aid negotiations are usually quite informal: 
they are not a one-off event, but rather a form of on-going dialogue between the 
donors and the recipient over the implementation of aid (Whitfield, 2009, Spector 
& Wagner, 2010, Zürcher et al, 2013). The informal characteristic of aid 
negotiations makes them rather harder to trace with discussions between the 
parties not always documented, and therefore making interviews with key 
participants in the negotiation a necessary research tool.  
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1.5. Research design and methodology 
Research design 
The research methodology was designed to address limitations that were 
identified in previous literature on aid negotiations. Hence, taking Congo as my 
case study, I traced the negotiations between the donors and the government at 
three different levels: national, provincial and district in order to assess whether 
the power balance between the parties at an overall level was reproduced at the 
sector and local levels.  
In the first phase of my field research I analyzed the overall relationship between 
the donors and the government by interviewing donor representatives, 
government officials and other observers, such as academics, independent 
consultants and CSO representatives, taking account of the climate in which the 
negotiations were taking place.  
In the second phase, I tracked how these overall relations translated to the sector 
level by looking at two illustrative comparative case studies; namely the justice 
and health sectors. The health sector is, to a large extent, financed by the donors 
(an estimated 40% of the health costs are covered by the donors). The justice 
sector has been identified by a number of donors as key to promoting the rule of 
law, combating impunity, and promoting democracy and economic growth. Both 
sectors are identified as important for state-building in the Peace and Stability 
Goals of the New Deal, with one providing social services to the population and 
the other addressing injustices and increasing access to justice. To use the 
terminology of Fritz and Menocal, one (justice) is in the ‘constitutional domain’ of 
state-building that is concerned with security and rule of law and the other one 
(health) is a so-called non-constitutive domain in which we find social-service 
delivery (Fritz & Menocal, 2007, p. 26). I also selected these sectors in the 
expectation that they would likely differ in a number of aspects and thereby be 
more interesting to compare. The aspects that I looked at were:  
a) How sensitive the issue was likely to be for the government, with the 
expectation that justice reforms would be more sensitive for national 
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sovereignty which would likely lead to differences in engagement 
strategies;  
b) The way that the sectors reflected a hybrid nature in delivery of services 
to the population, with the health sector having more engagement from 
NGOs and faith-based organisations, whilst the justice sector is dominated 
by traditional authorities alongside state institutions. 
By choosing two sectors that were likely to differ in a number of aspects, I aimed 
to identify possible differences in aid negotiations.  
Finally, as a third phase, I chose one programme of particular importance in each 
of the sectors that I then analyzed down to the district level.  
In the health sector I analyzed DFID's and Sida's Access to Primary Health Care 
Programme (ASSP). The reason for choosing this programme was: i) with a 
budget of £572 million it is the largest bilaterally-funded health programme in the 
country; ii) it has two aims: (a) to improve access to health care and (b) to 
strengthen the national health system, hence it has a clear state-building 
objective; and iii) it has a clear focus on working with the faith-based 
organisations in addition to the state.  
In the justice sector, I reviewed two inter-related programmes. One of the 
Programmes was called PARJ (Programme d'Appui à la Reforme de la Justice) 
which aimed to address justice reforms at the central level. This programme was 
financed by the EU and Sweden. The other programme was called Uhaki Safi 
which aimed to address justice reforms in the Eastern Congo and was financed 
by the EU, Sweden and Belgium. These two programmes were the largest reform 
programmes in the sector and both had clear state-building objectives. However, 
both also intended to work with customary chiefs, and hence to some extent 
embraced the hybridity of the justice sector.  
Research methods 
I used qualitative methods of data collection, mainly in the form of semi-structured 
interviews in order to understand, explain and clarify different actors' views, 
attitudes and perceptions. Qualitative methods lend themselves to studies of 
attitudes and perceptions of actors in a way that quantitative methods are unable 
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to capture (Silverman, 1997, p. 12). The interviews were complemented by 
observations during ten months of fieldwork spread out over three years: 
November – December 2014, February – July 2015 and November – December 
2016. Interviews were used as a core source of information for two 
interconnected purposes: firstly, as a means to gather first-hand information on 
the wider environment of aid politics in Congo, and secondly, to shed light upon 
the process involved in the two focal sectors and programmes. To complement 
the interviews, I also drew from a number of secondary sources, such as policy 
papers, minutes from meetings, and programme documents from donors, CSOs 
and the Congolese government. I also followed analysis in national newspapers 
such as ‘Le Potentiel’. L’Avenir and ‘Phare’,12 and international newspapers and 
journals, such as the New York Times, Jeune Afrique and The Economist, to 
supplement my understanding of the donor – government relationship in the 
country.  
I used both sets of information to reconstitute the aid negotiation process at an 
overall level as well as the negotiation processes in the health and the justice 
sector. Each of these tools to collect information, and the way in which they were 
used, are discussed below.  
Interviewing 
Whilst in Congo I interviewed 117 people in total, 46 from the donor community 
(including national staff), 15 from CSOs, 18 from implementing agencies, 25 
Congolese Civil servants and 13 others, which includes people from Academia 
and independent consultants and experts. These categories are somewhat 
blurred as I found that, for example, some people that had previously been 
working with the government were now working for donor or implementing 
agencies. The interviews were on average 1.5 hours long and I met many of the 
interviewees on several occasions in order to build a rapport with them and to 
triangulate data from other interviewees. I spent most of my time in Kinshasa 
where the donors, ministries and many of the headquarters of CSOs are located. 
In addition, I also visited the province of Kasaï-Occidental for a week together 
                                            
12 Le Potentiel is owned by a Member of Parliament that belongs to President Kabila’s party, but it is generally seen 
as being rather critical towards the government. Phare is affiliated with UDPS and L’Avenir is pro-government. They 
all have very limited circulation, ranging between 2 500 – 3 000 copies per day (Rift Valley Institute, 2016, p. 85). 
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with IMA, the implementing agency of the ASSP programme, where I met with 
provincial and district level authorities in the health sector as well as with staff in 
health centers.13 I also spent ten days in Goma in North Kivu (eastern Congo) 
with the Uhaki Safi programme, where I met people working for the provincial 
justice administration, CSOs and the implementers of the programme.  
When I started my research, it was my intention to spend a substantial amount of 
my time at the provincial and district level to review how the relationship played 
out at these levels. However, considering that i) my main focus has been on the 
donors and their relationship with the Government and ii) that most of the donors 
do not have any presence at the provincial and district level, but instead are 
dealing with these levels through their aid contractors, I chose to spend most of 
my time in Kinshasa. To research the full extent of the relationship between the 
contractors and the local administration would require a thesis on its own. 
However, as explained above I did make shorter field-trips to interview people 
engaged in aid programmes at the provincial and district level, and I review the 
outcome of these meetings in chapter 5. 
I interviewed most of the people while on my own, but a research assistant, Mr. 
Delphin Mbaya, accompanied me on the field-visit to Kasaï-Occidentale and to a 
few interviews with government officials and faith-based organisations in 
Kinshasa. I knew Delphin Mbaya from previous encounters, having met him in 
his role as a translator for various embassies. His in-depth knowledge of 
Congolese politics made him a valuable discussion partner throughout my 
research. My interviews with Congolese respondents were carried out in French, 
whereas the interviews with the donors, INGOs and external experts, were 
carried out either in French or English depending on the language the interviewee 
felt most comfortable with. Some were carried out in Swedish, which is my native 
language. In a few cases the interviewee responded in one of the other Nordic 
languages. French is widely spoken in Congo, and considering that I was 
conducting interviews with the elites, I never had to use an interpreter. In a few 
cases, when I attended focus group discussions arranged by ASSP in former 
                                            
13 Meeting authorities and health staff together with the implementing agency might affect the responses. To 
counter-balance this I met with a number people alone afterwards to allow them to more freely express their views. 
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Kasaï-Occidentale, my research assistant, who is from that region and can speak 
the local language, Tshiluba, translated for me.  
The semi-structured interviews provided a useful data gathering method because 
of its flexibility, allowing me to ask planned questions whilst also elaborating the 
unexpected, interesting themes that arose during the discussions. It also made it 
possible to tailor the interviews to the role that the person played in the 
negotiations between the different actors. In many ways my research was 
following what Flick terms ‘the principle of case reconstruction’ (Flick, 2014, p. 
136) and was inspired by process tracing, a method which is suitable for where 
the researcher systematically seeks to ‘reconstruct an event or set of events’ 
(Tansey, 2007, p. 766).14  
Many of the interviews I conducted could be described as elite-interviews, in 
which the interviewee is considered as an expert in the area. It is commonly 
perceived that it is more difficult to gain access to the elite than it is to people who 
are regarded as being less powerful (Burnham, 2008, p. 208; Sabot, 1999, p. 
329). This is based on the assumption that powerful people will have limited time 
to take part in interviews and need to be given some very convincing motivation 
for seeing a researcher (Burnham, 2008, p. 208). It is also assumed that elites 
have more possibilities of actively preventing access by, for example, making use 
of gate-keepers such as guards and secretaries (Smith, 2006, p. 115). In contrast, 
I found getting in touch with the key respondents from the Congolese government 
departments, independent experts and Western donor organisations to be a fairly 
straightforward process. When I started my research I already knew some of the 
people I wanted to interview, which facilitated access. Using snow-balling, a 
method where the researcher continuously asks respondents to refer her or him 
to other suitable respondents, was also a useful sampling technique for gaining 
access to relevant people (Burnham et al, 2008 p. 208).  
One group that I, however, did not manage to get access to was politicians in the 
donor countries and Congolese politicians. While politicians in donor countries, 
such as the Minister of Development, set the broad guidelines for which countries 
will receive aid and whether budget support should be given etc., they are not 
                                            
14 Process tracing has also been defined differently, see for example: (Checkel, 2006) and (Collier, 2011). 
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involved in the negotiations of aid at the country level. Interviews with donor 
officials thus provided the ‘donor perspective’. Congolese politicians would have 
been interesting/more relevant to interview, as they are to some extent involved 
in the negotiations with the donors. I interviewed advisors to the Minister of Health 
and the Minister of Justice but did not managed to secure a one-to-one interview 
with the Ministers themselves, despite efforts to approach them through their 
advisers. I didn’t get a feeling that there was any hostility against meeting me as 
a researcher, but rather that they didn’t prioritized it. Interviews with their advisors 
and staff members thus provide the ‘government perspective’. 
Some researchers have highlighted that elite interviews can be flawed, and that 
although they are good in revealing attitudes and perceptions, there might be 
questions regarding their representativeness. People might want to be seen in a 
favourable light, and their memories might have faded. This is why triangulation 
of data is so important. I have weighted the information I have received from 
interviewees with the accounts of other people involved in the negotiations and, 
to the extent possible, information that was documented in minutes or other 
documentation of the negotiations such as mid-term reports and evaluations. The 
negotiations in my chosen sectors had been undertaken relatively recently before 
the start of my fieldwork, and some of the work was still on-going. Hence many 
of the people that had been involved in the negotiations were still in the same 
positions, and had recent memories of the engagement with each other. I also 
conducted a few interviews with people who had recently left their work in Congo 
in order to get a longer-term perspective on the engagement in a particular sector. 
In this thesis, I am frequently quoting what interviewees have told me. Some of 
these quotes are used to reinforce some of the general observations or give a 
flavour of how actors understood the situation, whereas others provide more key 
elements of empirical information on how the negotiations were conducted, and 
how the outcomes were perceived by the different actors.  
From the outset of the research, I decided not to record my interviews. This was 
part of an ambition to make the respondents feel at ease because the more formal 
the interview setting, the less likely the respondent is to feel comfortable enough 
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to discuss the issues at hand (Leech, 2002, p. 665). Instead, I recorded the 
interviews in extensive notes, together with my own thoughts about the interview. 
I also had a large number of informal conversations with relevant stakeholders 
such as independent experts with decades of experience of working in Congo, 
Congolese academics and donor representatives whom I often met in informal 
settings such as dinners and cultural events. These informal encounters provided 
useful background information and possibilities to get feedback on my preliminary 
findings.   
The research went through the Sussex University’s ethical approval process. I 
made informants aware of the purpose of the interviews and gained their verbal 
approval for using the information they provided to me. Confidentiality was 
guaranteed and, in writing this thesis, direct quotations have been anonymised 
through use of the descriptors such as ‘government representative’, ‘donor 
representative’ or ‘INGO/CSO representative’. Where relevant, I have included 
more information on respondents, for example, the ministry they were affiliated 
with or whether the donor representative was the head of an agency or a sector 
expert, but I have ensured that the number of interviewees fitting this category 
corresponded to more than one person in order to maintain anonymity. 
Observations 
In addition to the interviews, I also had the opportunity to participate in meetings 
between donors and government officials. For example, whilst visiting North Kivu, 
I attended a high-level programme review meeting between the Minister of 
Justice, key stakeholders in the province and the main donors to the Uhaki Safi 
programme. I also had the opportunity to attend the largest policy meeting of the 
justice sector in a decade (the so-called Etats-Généraux), which was led by the 
Ministry of Justice and opened by President Kabila. In the health sector, I 
attended two review meetings (one annual and one quarterly) of the ASSP 
programme in which the donors and the implementers met with government 
officials from the central, provincial and district levels to discuss achievements 
and challenges. During my visits in the provinces, I also had the opportunity to 
observe the interactions between the implementing agencies and their 
counterparts at the provincial and district level. In addition to providing much 
23 
 
 
useful background material to my research, the attendance at these meetings 
provided me with opportunities to informally discuss with participants and also to 
set up meetings for formal interviews. I am deliberately avoiding the term 
participatory observations as my role in these meetings was strictly as an 
observer. In the meetings I introduced myself as a PhD researcher.   
Secondary sources 
To supplement the interview data, and to help check its validity, I utilised a large 
amount of information from secondary sources. A lot of the material has been in 
the form of ‘grey literature’ in the sense that it is not publicly available. These 
materials include project documents, minutes, travel reports, evaluations and 
studies conducted by donors and INGOs.  All in all, I have reviewed over 100 
documents related to the sampled programmes which provide an invaluable 
source to triangulate information from interviews. Moreover, reading the 
documents also informed the questions I asked during the semi-structured 
interviews. I also benefited from access to publications by International NGOs, 
such as Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group and the 
Congolese Research Group based at New York University. They provide useful 
insights into the politics of Congo and the relationship between the government 
and the donors.   
Reflections on positionality and reflexivity 
During 2011-2013, I worked as the deputy head/lead analyst at the development 
section of the Swedish Embassy in Kinshasa and was also the acting head for 
nine months. I also worked there again for a brief period between July-October 
2016 as a temporary staff member, dealing with peace and security related 
issues.15  
Before going to the field, I had thought that my previous role might sometimes be 
an advantage, but in some situations it might also be a disadvantage. I was 
concerned that government officials and some CSO representatives might recall 
my previous role and as a consequence be more cautious about criticizing donors 
                                            
15 For discussions on the importance of positionality and reflexivity see for ex. Saukko and Etherington (Etherington, 
2004; Saukko, 2003). 
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in front of me. Hence, I intended to downplay my previous connection with the 
donor community as much as possible.16 In reality, I soon realised that my 
attempts were rather pointless as even though Congo is a large country, the 
donor community is relatively small, and donors are working with more or less the 
same people in the different ministries. So despite my efforts, many interviewees 
knew of my previous role. It is of course impossible to fully know to what extent it 
affected the respondents, but I was surprised by how outspoken civil servants 
and implementing partners were regarding the donor community. I got the 
impression they wanted to convey their reality to me and sometimes send a 
message back to the donor community. This is apparently not unusual. Rosalind 
Eyben, Emeritus Fellow at IDS, who has extensive experience of working in the 
donor community before entering academia, advised me of similar experience in 
conducting her research.  
Some of the people within the government were high-level civil servants whilst 
others were mid-level officials. This could possibly affect the power-balance, 
between me as a researcher and them as interviewees. However, I did not notice 
much difference in the reactions regardless of the individual’s seniority, other than 
some of the more high-level ones who were a bit more time-constrained.  
Amongst the donors, I was often seen as an insider, someone to whom they could 
talk to who would understand them. It is difficult to know what people would have 
said if I were not considered as an insider, but I expect that some would have 
been more cautious in their responses. My insider position and experience of 
having participated in the donor coordination group with some of them also gave 
me an access to Heads of Cooperation that I believe would have been difficult to 
access without my insider position.  
Working for donor agencies has given me an in-depth understanding of the 
international aid system and how it operates at the country level. I thus have an 
understanding of the system, I have seen its weaknesses from the inside and 
understand the constraints within which it operates. In order to ensure that I 
maintain a critical point of view, throughout the research I sought to challenge 
                                            
16 This by stressing that I have currently left the 'aid industry' and that my research was in no way sponsored, or would 
be used, by any donor.  
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any potential biases in my thinking by discussing the issue with my supervisors 
and fellow PhD researchers and have been conscious of how it might affect my 
interpretations and made adjustments accordingly.  
I have also been reflecting upon whether my views on the Congolese government 
may have affected my interviews. Although I am critical towards the government’s 
approach of not arranging elections and that they are not providing for their 
population, this critical viewpoint is directed more towards the highest levels of 
the government, such as the President and people within the military and not 
towards the civil servants who are, in most cases, just trying to do the best within 
a dire situation. I was very careful about avoiding negative comment about the 
government within the interviews, although some of the respondents did raise 
critical viewpoints both towards the donors and towards the government.   
Research setting 
Finally, a short note on conducting research in Congo. Although the conflict 
mainly affects the eastern part of Congo, it is not an easy country in which to 
conduct fieldwork. Corruption is rampant and people in authority frequently seek 
to extract financial resources, often in quite intimidating ways. Just to mention 
one example that happened to me the last weekend during my fieldwork: I was 
visiting a local market an hour outside central Kinshasa together with some 
Congolese friends. Foreigners are a rare sight at the market, and when we were 
about to leave we were surrounded by a group of people who claimed we had 
illegally taken photos at the market place. Until 2010 it was illegal to take photos 
in public spaces, and although it is now legal, people are still using the old law to 
extract money. My friends asked for IDs, as those who stopped us claimed to be 
from the police. However, only one of them could produce some sort of an ID. It 
was clear they wanted money. More and more people were coming and they 
were getting increasingly aggressive. We were moved to some plastic chairs 
outside a hut, where we were ‘detained’. It took my Congolese friends two hours, 
and a number of phone calls to various friends in Kinshasa, to get us ‘released’ 
without having to pay any money. These groups of people did not have an official 
position in the Congolese state system but took the chance to extract some 
money in a highly informal way. With the real police it would probably have proven 
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even more difficult to negotiate the way out despite the fact that we had done 
nothing wrong.  
Another challenge with doing research in Congo is the limited infrastructure, 
which makes it difficult to get around. Congo is four times bigger than France, but 
has fewer roads than Luxembourg. Air travel is to a large extent limited to UN 
flights, which are hard to get onto for people outside the ‘aid circle’. The 
immigration police, in addition to controlling movements in and out of Congo, are 
also closely following the domestic movements of foreigners and sometimes try 
to exact money from travelers. I was grateful to both Congolese and international 
staff members who helped me with arranging necessary travel documents and 
vouching for me while being interrogated about my whereabouts.   
Safety is an issue, although interestingly enough, it was in one sense easier to 
carry out research in Goma in the conflict-affected province of North Kivu than in 
Kananga, which at the time of my research was a quiet part in the centre of 
Congo. This was because the infrastructure in the form of taxis, hotels etc. are 
more easily available in the conflict affected provinces where there are a large 
number of international staff.17 However, security constraints make moving 
outside Goma, the provincial capital extremely difficult. Illustrative of the volatile 
situation in Congo, the Kasaï-Occidentale province became one of the major 
conflict zones in the country only a year after I had finalized my research in the 
province. The province was then a sleepy and almost forgotten part of Congo. 
However, militia attacks and army reprisals have subsequently uprooted more 
than 1.4 million people in this previously stable region and according to the 
Catholic Church over 3,000 people have been killed (Reuters, 20 June 2017). 
1.6. Caveat of the study 
A challenge has been that my research subject, the aid relationship, is a 
continuous and unfolding policy process. Since I completed my fieldwork in 
Congo in November 2016 the relationship between the donors and the 
government has partly changed. This is due to the fact that the presidential and 
                                            
17 Please note that I am here only referring to the situation in the provincial capitals: Goma and Kananga. Outside 
Goma the security situation is dire as is the quality of infrastructure.  
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Parliamentary elections were scheduled to be held in December 2016 had yet to 
take place at the time of this writing. The violence that the government has used 
against people demonstrating for democracy has made things more difficult. As 
a consequence, Belgium decided in the beginning of 2018 to redirect part of its 
aid from the Congolese government to INGOs. The Congolese government has 
retaliated by closing down the so-called ‘Maison Schengen’, the Belgium office 
for handling Visas, which they operated on behalf of the EU. Other donors have 
not so far followed Belgium’s actions, although both the EU and the USA have 
issued sanctions against individuals within the regime considered to be behind 
election-related violence and human rights abuses. My research covers mainly 
the period from the country’s first elections since independence in 2006 until the 
end of 2016, although I will make references to more recent events where 
relevant. I have added an epilogue in the end of the thesis to provide an account 
of the recent events in this turbulent aid relationship. The epilogue covers events 
until September 2018, with a footnote that contains a brief summary of key events 
until September 2019. 
1.7. Structure of the thesis 
The following provides a detailed outline of the conceptual and analytical 
frameworks used for the empirical analyses in the thesis. In chapter 2, I outline 
what earlier literature on aid negotiation said about the influence of structure 
versus agency on the aid negotiating process. I also review the structural factors 
and conditions that surround the negotiations and how they might influence 
outcomes. I identify the different strategies the donors and recipient governments 
use to control the outcome of the negotiations. Finally, I identify some gaps in the 
previous literature and suggest a conceptual framework for analysing aid 
negotiations.  
Chapter 3 provides a historical and contemporary overview of the state-building 
process and aid relationships in Congo. The historical context is important to 
situate and understand the constraints that shape the agency of Congolese 
actors in the contemporary period. Many of the constraints of the Congolese 
state, such as extroverted patterns of wealth accumulation, administrative 
malpractice and non-accountability of the government, go back to colonial times 
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and the 32-year rule of Mobutu. An historical approach is even more relevant 
considering the foreign influence in the country’s recent history, from its creation 
as a state under King Leopold of Belgium, to the decolonization crisis of the 1960s 
and up to the present. I also provide an overview of contemporary aid to Congo, 
with a particular focus on the health and the justice sector. 
In chapter 4, I provide a review of the overall contemporary aid relationship 
between the donors and the government, focusing on perceptions of self and the 
other and how this is affecting the relationship. I provide an account of the 
different strategies that the donors and the government have used in their 
engagement with each other.  
Having set the scene both contextually and historically, chapter 5 then provides 
case studies in the health and justice sectors. I examine how perceptions, 
organizational factors and norms have influenced the negotiations and what 
strategies the donors and the government use. I also review how the level of 
discussion (national, provincial or district) affects the negotiations. 
Chapter 6 provides a detailed account on hybridity and real governance in the 
health and justice sectors. A brief history of the development of hybridity in the 
two sectors is provided, including how the government and the donors are 
interacting with the non-state actors. I will also review why the donors find it 
difficult to engage with non-state actors. 
Chapter 7 provides findings and conclusions to the research questions outlined 
in this introduction. It also, highlights some future potential areas of research, and 
policy recommendations for the donors. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the conceptual framework that informs this thesis. It is 
focused on a set of debates that coalesce around the engagement between 
donors and aid recipient governments including how they engage with other 
actors involved in state-building efforts such as FBOs and customary chiefs that 
form part of the hybrid character of the Congolese state. It contributes to recent 
research that highlights that there is a need to rethink earlier assumptions about 
aid negotiations that have traditionally been cast in terms of donor power and 
African dependency, in which donors hold the ultimate power and the aid recipient 
government does not have the agency to say no or resist the donors.  
Unsurprisingly, research in recent years has shown that this is not always the 
case. The supposedly strong are not always strong, and the assumedly weak are 
not always weak. African states are not mere passive recipients of aid, but active 
agents in seeking to increase their influence over the outcomes in the 
negotiations. Whitfield and Fraser (2009), for example, in an extensive study on 
eight African states and aid negotiations, show that some African governments 
have managed to gain control over aid in their engagement with the donors, 
highlighting specifically Botswana, Ethiopia and Rwanda as cases in point. They 
argue that these countries have managed to effectively steer the situation to 
increase their control over the outcomes of aid negotiations. Building upon the 
work of Whitfield and Fraser, other researchers such as Fisher (2015, 2017) and 
Beswick (2007, 2013), have focused on aid negotiations in countries that have 
been described as ‘donor darlings’, like Rwanda and Uganda. They found that 
these countries, despite a strong dependency on aid, have successfully used 
strategies of ‘image management’ to carve out a substantial space for policy 
manoeuvre.  
Less research has been carried out on aid negotiations in fragile states, such as 
Congo that is regularly ranked amongst the world’s most fragile states. For 
example, on the Fund for Peace’s state fragility index for 2018, Congo is one of 
six countries that are placed in the very high alert category together with countries 
like Yemen, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. In comparison, 
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Rwanda is ranked no. 34 and Uganda no. 24 (www.fundforpeace/fsi/). As one 
might expect, fragile states have less capability to successfully manage and 
create positive images in the same way as the aforementioned countries have 
been able to do. In addition, the more fragile states usually don’t have strong 
macro-economic management, nor strong state institutions or comprehensive 
national development visions, which are all factors that Whitfield and Fraser 
identify as critical points for a recipient government to secure a favourable deal. 
On the other hand, and possibly somewhat counter-intuitively, a country’s fragility 
might also be something that a recipient country can try to capitalize on as an 
asset in its relationship with the donors (Fisher, 2014; Zürcher, 2012).  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 details what the existing 
aid negotiation literature has said about the structure and agency debate, 
followed by an account of structural conditions and factors and what influence 
they might have on aid negotiations. Section 2.3 describes the negotiation 
strategies that donors and recipient governments use to get what they want 
through their engagement with each other. Section 2.4 analyses how negotiations 
might differ depending on which sector and at which level the negotiations are 
taking place. Section 2.5 provides an account of real governance and hybridity 
and how this might affect negotiations over state-building. The chapter concludes 
with an account of the gaps in the literature, and the framework for analysing aid 
negotiations in fragile and hybrid states.  
2.2. The context of engagement and structural factors 
Structures versus agency 
In the social sciences there is a long-standing debate over the primacy 
of structure or agency in shaping human behavior.18 Within the broader literature 
on international relations there has been a tendency, as noted by Brown and 
Harman, to overemphasis structural causes over agency (Brown, 2012 p. 1890; 
see also Brown & Harman, 2013). In addition, due to the fact that many countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa were more or less financially dependent on external aid 
                                            
18 ‘Structure’ is the recurrent patterned arrangements which influence or limit the choices and opportunities 
available. ‘Agency’ is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. 
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after independence (Bayart, et al, 1999, p. 4), there has been a tendency in the 
aid literature to over-emphasise the dominance of international donors and to 
under-emphasise African agency and room to manoeuvre (Brown, 2012, pp. 
1896&1900; Whitfield, 2009;  Beswick, 2007, p. 17). 
Zartman has, for example, described north-south negotiations as ‘archetypical 
cases of power asymmetry’ (Zartman, 1985, p. 121). During the Cold War there 
was some recognition that African countries could have some leverage in the 
relationship, by either siding with the bloc of Soviet Union or the Western World, 
dominated by the United States. Clapham (1996), for example, whilst 
acknowledging this particular leverage, still argues that it was the superpowers 
of the Cold War that were the important side of the relationship, noting that ‘to 
claim that so large a dog as the United States or the Soviet Union could be 
wagged by so small a tail as their African ‘partners’ appeared to stretch plausibility  
beyond any acceptable limit’ (Clapham, 1996, p. 134). After the end of the Cold 
War there was a general assumption that African regimes lost the autonomy that 
they had in the bi-polar era (Fraser, 2009, pp. 64–65; Plank, 1993, p. 414). 
It is important to point out that these descriptions have been challenged, including 
most notably by Bayart in his work on: ‘The State in Africa: the Politics of the 
Belly’ (1993) and ‘Africa in the World, a History of Extraversion’ (2000). Bayart 
claims that despite the collapse of bi-polarity, African regimes have not been 
reduced to a purely submissive role in aid relationships. Instead he argues, they 
continue to seek to manipulate and manage relations with donors to their 
advantage (Bayart, 2000). I will return to Bayart’s arguments later in this chapter, 
in reviewing the negotiation strategies being used.  
Another author that challenged the view of African dependency is Chabal who 
argues that African regimes ‘though they could no longer use the Cold War rivalry 
to extract aid, they could make it clear that the growing poverty of their countries 
was perilous’ (Chabal, 2002, p. 458); thereby highlighting other sources of 
leverage available for recipient countries. Indeed, African governments continue 
to construct images of threats and dependency, and highlight the risk their 
instability poses to the outside world (Fisher, 2014; Zürcher, 2012). Dependency 
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and weakness is, however, not the only source of leverage available to recipient 
countries.  
What is important in this discussion on structural factors and agency is that alone 
neither is sufficient to analyse in order to understand international negotiations. 
As Wight accurately points out, we need to think of agency “as always structurally 
embedded yet distinct from those structures that enable and constrain” and that 
‘agents always bring their structures with them’ (Brown, 2012 p. 1895). Autessere 
(2014) uses a similar definition in her book ‘Peaceland – Conflict Resolution and 
Everyday Politics of International Interventions’ in which she stresses that ‘agents 
and structures are mutually constructive, in the sense that they shape each other’ 
(Autesserre, 2014, p. 40). The structures set certain limits, but through their 
practices, individuals are able to use their agency by creating, maintaining or 
even altering the dominant structures by using different strategies (ibid). Hence, 
in order to analyse the power between the parties we need, unsurprisingly, to 
analyse the interplay between structural factors as well as how donors and 
recipient governments use their agency to use or alter structures to their benefit.   
Whitfield and Fraser use the term ‘structural conditions’ to refer to the structural 
factors that surround the negotiations and which provide the economic, political 
and institutional context within which donor and recipient define their preferences 
and select their strategies (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009b, p. 39). Just as other authors 
have pointed out, they emphasise that these conditions do not automatically 
determine the outcome in negotiations, but rather ‘present the donors and 
recipients with constraints to consider in deciding what they think can be achieved 
through the negotiations’ (ibid). They then use the term ‘negotiating capital’ to 
refer to the leverage that a negotiator is able to derive from these structural 
conditions (ibid).  
To translate the structural conditions into real power and influence in a specific 
negotiation situation can be difficult and will partly depend on an actor’s capacity 
and motivation to do so. Whilst the structures are not set in stone, how fixed and 
deterministic they are varies – as does how easy it is for actors to change them.  
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Having established that both structure and agency are important to analyse in aid 
negotiations, I will now review which structural factors seem to have an influence 
in aid negotiations. 
Structural factors 
As highlighted by Whitfield and Fraser, the first step in analysing an aid 
negotiation is to develop a clear understanding of the structural factors within 
which actors define their preferences and select their strategies (Whitfield & 
Fraser, 2009b, p. 39).  
The key structural factors very much depend on the context and the substantive 
content of the negotiations. As Elgström points out, the military strength of two 
opponents might be a key aspect taken into account in some negotiations while 
in others, such as aid negotiations, the military capacity of the donors and the 
recipient may be of little relevance (Elgström, 1992 p. 22-23).19 For aid 
negotiations, following on from research by Elgström (1993) and Whitfield and 
Fraser (2009), it is more useful to look into the following four structural factors: 1) 
political and economic factors; 2) international norms and discourses related to 
aid; 3) organisational factors; and 4) perceptions of self and others. These factors 
are often more or less external to the negotiations themselves but still exert a 
strong influence on the negotiators’ goals and behaviour (Elgström, 1992, p. 19). 
The structural factors that surround the negotiations are, as we saw above, very 
different in how set they are and how easy it is for one or another of the partners 
to influence. Hence it might be useful to talk about ‘Macro-level’, ‘Meso-level’ and 
‘Micro-level’ structural factors. Macro-level factors include political and economic 
factors as well as international norms. These are factors that are very difficult for 
an individual actor to influence, at least in the short-run. Meso-level contextual 
factors include organizational factors and perceptions of Self and Others. These 
factors are much more in the hands of the different partners to shape and 
influence, although it may be difficult in the short-run to compensate for, for 
example, weaker capacity and expertise than the adversary. Likewise, we can 
see perceptions both as being a structural factor, as well as part of something 
                                            
19 Although military power can be used in trying to extract aid resources in return for demilitarization as, for 
example, in the case of North Korea. 
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that can change relatively quickly over time and is more in the control of the 
different partners to change. Micro-level factors are also about perceptions, but 
on a more individual level in the day-to-day interaction and the personal 
relationship that the actors engaged in a negotiation have with each other. 
Considering that aid negotiations are often characterised by what Whitfield and 
Fraser call ‘permanent negotiation’ due to the close engagement by the donors 
in the politics of the recipient country (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009a), these personal 
relationships are likely to be of more importance in aid negotiations than in other 
types of negotiations that might be of shorter term duration (Elgstöm, 1992 p. 
156). Elgström, for example, shows how the positive Swedish images of Tanzania 
were strengthened by strong personal ties, with key officials looking upon one 
another as friends (ibid, p. 105). Different incentives at the individual level might 
also influence the negotiations, such as a hesitation to ‘rock the boat’ by taking a 
tough stand against the host government (Brown, 2012, p. 525; Gibson, 2005, p. 
155). 
An overview of the different structural factors 
The following describes more in detail the different structural factors that may 
influence aid negotiations.  
Political and economic factors: A range of political and economic factors, both 
domestic and international, can affect the relationship between donors and the 
recipient government. For countries whose economy depends on the export of 
natural resources, international commodity prices are likely to affect the power 
relations between the partners, with the recipient government becoming more 
dependent on aid the lower the commodity price. Global events including 
international crises, such as the current situation in Syria and the subsequent 
migration flows, divert finite aid resources from one part of the world to another.20 
How aid dependent the recipient government is and whether it has other 
resources that it can access, such as an abundance of natural resources or 
resources from emerging powers such as China, may also affect the power 
balance. How important the country is for political or geo-strategic reasons will 
                                            
20 Syria, Yemen and Iraq receives a large part of the humanitarian funding, and the level of geographical concentration 
of humanitarian aid is much higher than five years ago (Development Initiative, 2017, p. chapter 4). 
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also likely have an influence, as the Cold War proved. Likewise, as Reno has 
shown, private capital flows from businesses can be a major source of income 
for weak but resource rich countries and thereby lessen their aid dependency 
(Reno, 1999, p. 7). As Lindsay and Fraser found, the political and economic 
situation in a specific country is also a decisive factor influencing donor behavior 
(Whitfield, 2009, p. Chapter 12). They identified that countries with a stable 
macro-economy and a government committed to improving governance were 
likely to have more influence in aid negotiations as donors had more trust in them 
(ibid).   
International norms and discourses: As both Zeitz and Elgström have 
convincingly argued, norms and discourses can profoundly affect negotiations by 
setting boundaries for what is seen as general standards of acceptable behavior 
(Elgström, 1992, p. 24; Zeitz, 2015, p. 7). Norms surrounding aid include the norm 
that rich states should give assistance to poor people (Jackson, 1987, p. 545)  
and the principle of state sovereignty (Elgström, 1992 p. 26; Zeitz, 2015 p. 7). In 
humanitarian aid there are strong norms based on the humanitarian imperative 
of saving lives which guide interventions. During the 1980s and the 1990s with 
its focus on structural adjustment, conditionality was often used to force 
developing countries to comply with the wish of the donors. Following agreement 
of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005), there has, however, 
been a much stronger focus on the norms of country ownership with the recipient 
countries in the driving seat. The Paris Declaration principles outline that donors 
should take a less active role, aligning their support to country-owned poverty 
reduction strategies and that donors should, in principle, refrain from putting 
pressure on recipient countries (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2011; Yanguas, 2018). 
The Paris Declaration and the subsequent declarations on aid effectiveness have 
been criticized for being hypocritical and it has been argued that donor 
involvement in recipient countries has actually increased with aid instruments, 
such as budget and sector support giving donors more insights into, and influence 
over, the recipient’s public financial management system (Cammack, 2004, pp. 
203–204; Sjöstedt, 2013). 
Organisational factors and coordination: According to this factor, negotiations 
between countries are best interpreted as bargaining between organisations. The 
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capacity, interests and culture of organisations hence set the framework for the 
engagement and become key variables in explaining bargaining behaviours and 
outcomes (Elgström, 1992, p. 27). An analysis of organisational aspects can 
indicate which actors are relevant to study and what the capacity of these actors 
are (ibid). This approach also highlights the fact that there is internal bargaining 
within each actor in the engagement (ibid). For example, on the donor side there 
might be divergent interests between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the aid 
agency and the military (Gibson et al, 2005). In looking at organisational aspects, 
I will mainly focus on assessing the coordination between donors to see whether 
they form a uniform negotiation partner to the recipient government, or whether 
there are divergent interests between them. I will also review how the dialogue 
between the government and the donors is arranged, whether there are 
dedicated coordination groups, and how they are functioning. In addition, I will 
explore whether actors other than the donors and the state get involved in these 
coordination mechanisms, and whether these alternative service providers affect 
the negotiations. 
Perceptions of Self and Others: This factor highlights actors’ images, beliefs and 
assumptions of themselves and each other as important explanatory factors for 
the negotiation outcome and the strategies used (Elgström, 1993 p. 33). It 
analyses how ‘foreign’ involvements are received, experienced, navigated and 
assessed from the perspective of both key external and national actors (Elgström, 
1992 p. 8). The influence of culture, framing and perceptions have been taken 
up, for example, by Autesserre in her influential work on peace-keeping missions 
(Autesserre, 2010, 2012), as well by Baaz and Stern in their work on Security 
Sector Reforms in Congo (Baaz & Stern, 2013). Perceptions are not bound by 
laws of natural science. Governments form and change their perceptions of other 
governments on the basis of various information flows, evaluations of events, and 
personal encounters in a highly informal and often arbitrary fashion (Fisher, 2015, 
p. 63). As Dunn (2003) notes in his research on the image of Congo among 
Western policy-makers in the 1960s to the 1990s, Western perceptions are based 
on ‘a gradual layering and connection of events and meanings’, stressing that 
there are few guarantees, however, as for ‘which events will be selected’ in this 
process (Dunn, 2003, pp. 124-125). 
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As Elgström rightly points out, national self-images also influence negotiation 
processes. The perception of a nation’s role in the world is culture-bound. The 
national culture may comprise images of the nation’s position in the international 
system and of the special qualities possessed by the state (Elgström, 1992 p. 
34). A donor country may, for example, view their country as having a special 
mission in the world, as being a leader or a mediator (ibid). Images of self and 
others are also related to the image held of the bargaining situation itself. If a 
country regards itself as powerful and strong and the opponent as weak, it may 
come to expect obedience and not a negotiation between equals. Likewise, a 
recipient country can have a highly-esteemed nationalistic pride, despite high 
levels of debt and a reliance on international aid. Cases that comes to mind are, 
for example, India, that in the 90s asked smaller bilateral aid agencies to leave, 
and Rwanda, where President Kagame often makes statements like ‘Africa 
doesn’t need baby-sitters’ (Jeune Afrique, 2018), referring to the fact that they 
might need aid now but they will soon overcome poverty and they know how to 
do this without unsolicited advice from the donors. 
Hence reviewing the perceptions that the donors and the recipient governments 
have regarding their own role and influence is an important ‘building block’ in 
understanding engagement strategies in aid negotiations. Contrary to what one 
might have expected, even in aid dependent countries, donors often perceive that 
their influence is rather weak. This is shown, for example, in Brown’s work on 
what he argues is donor officials’ apologies for non-democratic regimes in Africa 
(2011) and in Fisher’s investigation into why donors abandoned taking ‘a political’ 
approach in their election support in Uganda (Fisher, 2013b, p. 472). Building on 
the work of Fisher and Brown, these factors can be divided into ‘real’ and 
‘perceived’ factors that limit the donors influence. Among the ‘real’ ones we find 
the following: a) the relatively short time that donor officials spend in the country, 
which makes it difficult for them to fully understand the situation; b) career 
incentives that reward officials for building strong relationships with the 
governments in order to get access to information and a better opportunity to 
exert influence; c) pressure to spend aid allocations which is not facilitated by 
worsening relations with the host country; d) competing foreign policy priorities – 
efficient aid allocation might not be the most prioritized task; and e) internal 
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politics in the donor countries, such as competing priorities which might prevent 
a joint approach towards the host government (Brown, 2011, pp. 524-526; Fisher, 
2013b, pp. 482–485). Added to this is the perception that the donors have of their 
own influence which can become self-fulfilling. If you believe that nothing you will 
say or do will change a situation, you might refrain from making an effort in the 
first place (Fisher, 2013b).  
Another interesting point when it comes to perceptions is what Brown (2011) 
called the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’, or to use the anthropological term ‘the going 
native’ factor. This happens when donor officials over-identify with the host 
government to the point that they defend non-acceptable behavior in the name of 
a higher goal. This can go so far as to defend the host country’s interference in 
other countries  (Brown, 2011, p. 526).  For example, when the Rwandan-backed 
rebel group, the M-23, took over parts of eastern Congo I was based in Kinshasa 
and was astounded by the fierce denial by some donor officials in Kigali regarding 
Rwanda’s involvement, despite compelling evidence from several UN 
investigations.21 
Another aspect of perceptions that becomes relevant in countries characterized 
by hybridity is the extent to which donors perceive alternative service providers 
such as FBOs and customary chiefs as possible building blocks in their state-
building agenda and whether the government sees these actors as competitors 
or possible partners. 
In section 2.3 I will detail how some countries have managed to influence how 
they are seen by the international community by using various strategies of so-
called ‘image management’, investing time and effort in order to create and 
portray positive images of themselves to the donors.  
In summary, structural factors surround aid negotiations. It is important to stress 
that these factors are not in themselves determining the outcome in a negotiation, 
but they do have an influence on the negotiator’s behavior and positions. The 
factors outlined above merely provide the potential for influence; actors then 
respond to these conditions in their efforts to secure their desired negotiation 
                                            
21 See for example the letter dated 12 October 2012 and the letter dated 12 December 2013 from the UN Group of 
Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee (UN, 2012a, 2012b).  
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outcomes. In the next section, I will also look at the different strategies that donors 
and recipient governments are using and how they are employing these 
strategies to strengthen their negotiation capital.  
2.3. Negotiation strategies 
As shown in the introduction, donors and recipient governments have different 
objectives, motivations and interests that they pursue in aid negotiations. For the 
recipient government it might be driven by a genuine interest to get access to 
resources to develop their countries or it might be, to use the terminology of 
Bayart, to extract resources in order to secure the survival of the ruling regime. 
Equally for the donors, there might be more or less benign motivations, such as 
to be seen as a generous and humanitarian actor in the international sphere or 
to be driven by ‘real politics’, such as ensuring the willingness of the recipient 
country to host military bases or to secure the access to strategic natural 
resources, such as oil (Lancaster, 2007, chapter 2). Donors’ capacity to engage 
effectively is compounded by their difficulties of getting an in-depth understanding 
of the context and the incentives of their counterparts. These difficulties are linked 
to a) their own organizational structures, such as frequent rotation, and small 
number of staff members which means each staff member has to deal with a 
large number of diverse issues; b) the limited availability and up-take of political 
economy analysis of the country/sectors (Fisher, 2013b; Hughes & Hutchison, 
2012; Unsworth, 2009; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015); and c) limited access to conflict 
affected areas in fragile states (Fisher, 2013b). Consequently, the strategies that 
donors and recipients pursue will be influenced by the incentives, motivations, 
capacities and the structural factors outlined earlier. 
In their comparative analysis on aid negotiations, Fraser and Whitfield found that 
recipient governments made use of a number of different strategies to advance 
their objectives and to increase their leverage. These included: i) using strategies 
such as negotiating with donors separately to make it harder for them to ‘gang 
up’ towards oneself; ii) separating the policy discussions within the government 
from the discussions with donors; iii) centralizing the structures and processes 
through which aid is sought and received in order to maintain control;  iv) rejecting 
technical assistance aid, unless it meets the recipient governments’ needs; and 
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v) paying ‘lip service’ to the conditions put forward by the donors in the  hope that 
the donors won’t stop funding (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009, pp. 369–370). What 
these strategies have in common are attempts to ensure that the recipient country 
is in the driving seat, by limiting the influence that the donors might have on policy 
processes and issues. They found that the strategy of paying lip service to 
reforms was particularly popular amongst the weaker states (ibid p. 21). This 
strategy goes back to Bayart’s concept of extraversion in which he referred to the 
process of attracting international resources through the professed commitment 
to donor agendas, and subsequent use of these resources to reinforce the 
position of the ruling regime (Bayart, 1993, p. 20). 
As we saw in the introduction chapter, the concept of extraversion has been 
further developed by Fisher and Beswick who have looked at African agency in 
two aid recipient countries - Uganda and Rwanda - and their relationship with the 
donor community. They show how some regimes have managed, despite a 
strong dependency on aid, to carve out a substantial space for policy manoeuver. 
They have achieved this through successfully developing strategies to ‘manage’ 
the donors by creating an image of themselves as important to the international 
community by, for example, being seen as allies in the fight against terrorism or 
as successful cases of reducing poverty. As a consequence, these countries 
have managed to secure aid flows and room for policy manoeuver despite their 
aid dependency and their less than impressive records concerning human rights 
and democracy, that donors usually push for (Beswick, 2007 & 2013; Fisher, 
2013a & 2015). In fairness, as also highlighted by Fisher (2015), these policies 
are not always adopted or ‘manoeuvered’ just to please the donors. The country 
might very well have a sincere wish to pursue policies favoured by the donors, 
such as to reduce poverty, fight terror groups etc. The difference lies instead in 
how these countries, regardless of the motivation, manage to ‘sell themselves’ to 
the donors. Fisher identified in the case of Rwanda and Uganda that they actively 
used the following strategies: 1) a personalisation of diplomacy, such as providing 
access to donors to sustain close relationships; 2) use of public relations firms; 
and 3) engagement with non-governmental actors such as the media and 
business communities. Both Museveni and Kagame have, for example, been 
keen to speak at think tanks, academic institutions and business associates in 
41 
 
 
the UK and the USA, as well as generously giving interviews to major 
international news outlets, such as the BBC, CNN and the Economist (Fisher, 
2015 pp. 71-76). This has given them opportunities to frame the image of 
themselves.  
Not all countries have the capability to successfully manage donors in the same 
ways. However, as I have shown in the introduction to this chapter, a country’s 
vulnerable situation can also be used as a means to extract aid or to prevent the 
donors from attaching conditionality to their support. In his paper on aid 
effectiveness in Afghanistan, Zürcher (2012) shows how conditions of fragility 
might actually increase the bargaining position of domestic elites. He argues that 
donors might be reluctant to put too much pressure on elites, especially if they 
are seen as the only safeguard for security and stability (Zürcher, 2012, p. 468). 
He claims that, as a result, elites in fragile states tend to be tougher in 
negotiations, whereas donors tend to be more lenient (ibid). The question is 
whether Afghanistan is exceptional due to the heavy security-investments by the 
international community in the country or if the same strategy can be used by 
other fragile countries. In addition, as highlighted by Beswick, a country’s 
instability and the threat it may pose to the international community and/or to its 
neighbours can be a ‘bargaining chip’ to be used in the negotiations by the 
perceived weaker party (Beswick, 2013, p. 162).  
Strategies favoured by donors 
Donors often use political dialogue and conditionality in order to seek to influence 
the behaviour of the recipient government. Conditionality has been usefully 
described by Frerks as 'the promise of increased aid in the case of compliance 
by a recipient with conditions set by a donor, or its withdrawal or reduction in the 
case of non-compliance' (Frerks, 2006, p. 15). This definition is useful as it 
includes both positive and negative conditionality - the carrot and the stick, 
whereas some authors have mainly focused on the negative aspect of 
conditionality, e.g. the threat of withdrawing assistance (Borchgrevink, 2008, p. 
196). It is important to note this definition does not cover all uses of aid as 
incentives or disincentives in order to achieve specific objectives but only those 
where the aid is linked to the promise, threat or use of ‘a demonstrable reciprocal 
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follow-up action by the donor in the case of compliance or non-compliance with 
conditions set’ (ibid.). 
Conditionality has become deeply politically charged and the literature is fairly 
unanimous in assessing the effectiveness of conditionality: in general it is 
considered to not work very well (Fisher, 2013b, p. 475; Killick, 1997; Rodrik, 
1990). Killick has, for example, argued that donors applying conditionality are 
often unable to put in place a system of rewards or punishment sufficient to 
overcome the perceived conflicts of interest between themselves and the 
recipient country (Killick, 1997, p. 483). This does not mean that conditionality 
has no impact at all, and the literature shows that there is variation in outcomes 
(Borchgrevink, 2008, p. 198). Under certain circumstances the chances of 
conditionality achieving its objectives are greater. Two factors that, according to 
the literature, may increase the efficacy of conditionality are a) the degree of aid 
dependency of the recipient country and, b) the extent to which there is broad 
coordination on conditionality amongst donors (Borchgrevink, 2008, p. 199; 
Frerks, 2006 pp. 29 & 33). In addition, the existence of an influential domestic 
constituency for change, which the donors can strengthen by imposing 
conditionality, may improve the chances of success (Borchgrevink, 2008, p. 199).  
Donors, however, rarely resort to cutting funding. There are several reasons for 
this. First of all, the donors might be keen to keep a good relationship with the 
recipient government, or they may have reason to believe, rightfully or not, that 
the population rather than the government would suffer the consequences of the 
withdrawal of aid. Also, as highlighted by Yanguas in his article on aid strategies 
and donor politics in institutional assistance (2014), conditionality is not a costless 
strategy. Enforcement requires the monitoring of compliance through, for 
example, reliable indicators of progress, as well as credible commitment to 
sanctioning the recipient in case it doesn’t comply (Yanguas, 2014, p. 304). But 
how to differentiate between the lack of political will to undertake the reforms (that 
might warrant sanction) and a lack of capacity to reach the objectives in which 
case more, rather than less, donor support might be called for to overcome the 
difficulties of implementation? These kinds of considerations take considerable 
time, insights and efforts (ibid), and donors might not have the necessary staff 
capacity and capability to properly judge and monitor compliance. In addition, as 
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noted by several authors, donor representatives in the field are often under 
pressure from headquarters to spend the aid budget in order to avoid seeing the 
budget cut the subsequent year (Yanguas, 2014 p. 305; Brown, 2013 p. 525; 
Gibson, 2005 p. 155). Hence, there might be several reasons for a donor’s lack 
of commitment to follow-through on imposed conditions. 
Uvin, when researching donor behaviour before the genocide in Rwanda, makes 
the interesting point that although conditionality might not convince a government 
to adopt policies it doesn’t want, there might be another, more indirect and long-
term, reason for using it (Uvin, 1998, p. 236). He argues that, in aid dependent 
countries, people carefully monitor the discourses and actions and inactions of 
donors. This is not only the case of people in the government and in the 
opposition but also people in general. Hence, whatever action donors take will 
send messages and constitute political acts that will have some impact on local 
political and social processes (ibid). This includes cases where the donors are 
taking no action at all, such as not reacting in situations of increased human rights 
abuses or the prosecution of political opponents by the recipient government. In 
situations like this, the population might see the donors as complicit with an 
illegitimate government. This argument is closely related to the accurate point 
made by Yanguas that ‘by virtue of their very presence in a country, donors can 
sometime become sources of legitimation in the eyes of local actors, whether 
they want that responsibility or not’ (Yanguas, 2018, p. 127). 
Harrison argues, in his book on the relationship between the World Bank and a 
number of indebted African countries, that the ‘period during which donors 
constantly policed reform through the threat of a freezing or withdrawal has 
passed’ (Harrison, 2004, p. 71). Instead he shows how donors are increasingly 
using softer and more indirect approaches to wield influence over the recipients, 
for example, by a closer engagement with key state institutions like the Ministry 
of Finance and through intimate involvement in administrative reforms and 
capacity building programmes. This at times involves the embeddedness of 
donor financed staff in recipients’ ministries and agencies. Harrison argues that 
this constitutes a less visible but also perhaps more powerful role for donors who 
thus may get to influence the recipient’s poverty reduction strategies and other 
core policy documents (Harrison, 2004 p. 77). This form of involvement, he 
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argues, blurs the external and internal interest and makes the donor - state 
relationship too interrelated to be understood as a dichotomy (Harrison, 2004 p. 
90). A similar point has been argued by, amongst others, Cammack (2004) in his 
paper on the World Bank and poverty reduction strategies. Another, and rather 
interesting, form of how this indirect influence works is to look at the number of 
high level politicians in African states, most notably Ministers of Finance, which 
have previously worked for the World Bank and/or IMF. This is one avenue 
through which the thinking of these institutions is promoted inside the recipient 
governments. A case in point is, for example, President Ouattara in the Ivory 
Coast who previously held senior positions at the IMF.  
When Harrison wrote his book in 2004, he focused on a number of African 
countries that he referred to as ‘governance states’. These were countries where 
the elite had embraced the good governance model promoted by donors and 
where donors had started to elaborate with aid modalities, such as general 
budget and sector budget support. As Lancaster has shown, donors in the early 
2000s used a policy of ‘selectivity’ in which they chose to invest more heavily in 
countries based on not only the macro-economic policies the recipient 
governments pursued, but also on their perceived quality of governance 
(Lancaster, 2007, pp. 52-53). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 
gave further promotion to concepts such as country ownership and aid modalities 
such as budget support. This considerably broadened the number of countries in 
which the donors tried to use the post-conditionality form of aid. It was no longer 
to be applied only in countries that were judged to have ‘good governance’. The 
Paris Declaration and subsequent aid effectiveness declarations (Accra Agenda 
for Action in 2008, and the Busan Aid Effectiveness Declaration in 2011) does 
not totally rule out the use of conditionality but the word nonetheless became 
unfashionable (Yanguas, 2012). Donors, such as DFID, declared that it was 
abandoning conditionality in favour of dialogue and partnerships based on 
national ownership, shared commitments and mutual agreements, stating that 
‘we will not make our aid conditional on specific policy decisions by partner 
government or attempt to impose policy choices on them’ (DFID, FCO, & HMT, 
2005, pp. 2–6). Although, the principles of the Paris Declaration and the 
subsequent New Deal in many ways are theoretically sound, the problem starts 
45 
 
 
when the principles hit reality. What do you do if the regime in the recipient 
country is unwilling to develop the country? How then do you build state-capacity? 
Neither the Paris Declaration nor the New Deal have any answers to this 
dilemma. An independent review of the New Deal highlights that although it has 
had a significant impact on global norms and policies, implementation has been 
more complex. It also notes that significant additional resources have not been 
directed to the State and Peacebuilding goals (Hearn, 2016, pp. 11–12). In 
addition, despite the rhetoric on increased ownership and need to use country 
systems, several bilateral donors are no longer using budget support as widely 
as they used to. For example, in 2016 Sida did not make any payments in the 
form of budget support22 and DFID, who used to be one of the champions for 
budget support, has currently a leadership that is hesitant towards it.23 The work 
on implementing the New Deal is, however, still on-going and in the Stockholm 
Declaration from 2016, the signatories recommitted to the principles. The need 
to increase funding and to link the work to the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and in particular the goal 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions 
were also emphasised (International Dialogue, 2016). 
One result of the focus on aid effectiveness and budget support, that is worth 
mentioning here, was that some donors, notably DFID and the World Bank, 
started to undertake detailed political economy analyses in order to identify the 
bottlenecks to reform. The idea was to identify so-called ‘drivers of change’, 
including institutions and people within the administration that the donors could 
work with. This type of analysis is still being undertaken although several 
shortcomings, such as difficulties in translating findings from the reports into 
practice, have been noted (Hughes & Hutchison, 2012; Unsworth, 2009; Yanguas 
& Hulme, 2015, pp. 209–210).    
In order to analyse and understand engagement processes, it is not enough to 
only look at the aggregate picture. Rather it is important to understand and take 
into account that processes might look very different depending on the topics 
                                            
22 https://www.sida.se/Svenska/sa-arbetar-vi/Detta-ar-svenskt-bistand/Budgetstod/. 
23 https://www.devex.com/news/dfid-turns-20-the-7-politicians-who-shaped-uk-aid-90995. 
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being negotiated and the level at which the negotiations are taking place - 
whether at the central level, provincial level or the district level.  
2.4. Negotiations within different sectors and different levels of 
engagement 
While going through the literature on aid negotiation I found that much of the 
literature is: a) aggregated in the sense that it focuses on aid negotiations at the 
central level, and doesn’t follow through on how the negotiations look at the 
provincial and district levels; and b) even though some of the literature reviews 
aid negotiations in different sectors few makes comparisons between negotiation 
strategies pursued in one sector compared to another. For example, Whitfield’s 
book on ‘The Politics of Aid’ builds on eight case studies from Africa. While some 
contributors to Whitfield’s book draw on examples from different sectors to 
illustrate the negotiation process, e.g. Bergamashi (2009) in her study on patterns 
and limits of donor-driven ownership in Mali, and Hayman on her study on 
creating policy space in spite of aid dependency in Rwanda (2009), most of them 
don’t draw any comparisons between the sectors.24 Neither does Whitfield in her 
conclusions of the case studies. Likewise, Trefon (2011), who in his book 
provides valuable insights into aid inefficiency and reform failure in Congo, 
doesn’t provide an in-depth analysis of variances in different sectors. By 
aggregating the data related to, for example, how country x and the donors 
negotiate, the literature ignores that actors, considerations and strategies used 
at national, provincial and district level might differ. In addition, by aggregating 
the findings, the analyses omit that the negotiation processes might look very 
different depending on the nature of the topic being reviewed. 
Negotiations within different sectors 
There are reasons to believe that aid negotiations will differ depending on the 
subject area being discussed. For example, negotiations on justice or security 
sector reforms are likely to be quite different from negotiations over health or 
education support. The former is more political and hence is more likely to be 
                                            
24 One exception is de Renzio and Hanlon’s chapter on Mozambique that identifies that the Mozambique government 
was subservient on trade liberalisation for cashew nuts but refused to compromise on land reforms and corruption 
where the leadership had personal interests at stake (de Renzio & Hanlon, 2009). 
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sensitive to the recipient government and for national sovereignty, which is likely 
to affect their motivation and their negotiation strategies. For example, in their 
review of security sector reforms Baaz and Stern highlight that it is difficult for a 
country to openly share information about such sensitive topics as military 
reforms, which might lead to less open and trustful negotiations (Baaz & Stern, 
2013, p. 207). In addition, the interests and motivation from external actors are 
also likely to be different, sometimes involving a different set of actors. Whereas 
the social sectors are usually in the domain of traditional development actors, 
politically more sensitive areas, such as security sector reforms, are likely to 
involve not only aid workers, but diplomats and the military as well (Lancaster, 
2007, p. Chapter 1).  
Depending on the sector being analysed, the nature of hybridity in the sector will 
also vary. The service sectors generally have more engagement from religious 
institutions and NGOs (local as well as international ones), while more politically 
sensitive domains will be more dominated by traditional authorities and militias 
alongside state institutions. The way donors react to the hybridity of the sector is 
also likely to differ as they are probably more familiar and comfortable with 
working with service delivery FBOs and CSOs that are seen to complement state 
institutions rather than challenge them. To actively work with and negotiate with 
actors such as militias is more openly challenging to the authority of the state.  
That negotiation strategies might differ between sectors also goes back to what 
Habeeb describes as ‘aggregated structural power’ and ‘issue-specific structural 
power’ (Habeeb, 1988). He uses the terms to explain why in negotiations between 
weak states and more powerful states on politically sensitive matters (focusing 
on Western countries) the apparently weaker state can achieve outcomes at the 
expense of the stronger. He looked at, among others, how Iceland could extract 
major concessions from the UK in the Anglo-Icelandic ‘cod wars’ in the 1970s.  
His term ‘aggregated structural power’ equals the structural conditions and 
factors discussed in the section above, whereas the issue-specific structural 
power relates to the topic being discussed. He convincingly argues that the 
balance of issue-specific power is determined by three interrelated variables of: 
i) alternatives; ii) commitment; and iii) control. The availability of alternatives may 
increase an actor’s issue power by decreasing its dependence on the other actor. 
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However, lack of alternatives might also increase an actor’s commitment to reach 
an agreement and hence make them invest more time and resources to get their 
preferred outcome. ‘Control’ refers to the amount of control a partner has over 
the thing that the other party wants. Depending on the issue-specific power, a 
situation that, on the surface, looks detrimental to a party from an aggregated 
structural power point of view may actually turn out to favour the more dedicated 
actor (Elgström,1992, p. 23; Habeeb, 1988, p. 22). As Whitfield and Fraser, 
Habeeb also points out that although aggregate power only changes slowly over 
time, the elements of issue-specific power can change rather quickly in the short 
term if the actors apply appropriate tactics (Habeeb, 1988). 
Hence, as we have seen before, the aggregated structural factors might point in 
one direction but when analysed sector by sector, the structural factors that 
matter might be different. For example, in sectors where vital national interests 
are at play the government’s intensity of commitment is likely to increase and 
hence the opportunity for an apparent weaker government to achieve a 
favourable outcome at the expense of the strong is likely to increase.   
Different levels of engagement 
In a similar vein, depending whether the engagement is at the national, provincial 
or district level, the actors, their incentives and motivations as well as their 
negotiation strategies, will differ. Donors rarely have permanent presence outside 
the capital and usually negotiate their programmes with the line ministries at 
central level. They tend to confine their interactions with provincial and district 
level authorities to adhoc meetings, often in connection with the establishment or 
monitoring of programmes. As a consequence, programmes are often decided 
upon at the national level with only limited input from government officials at the 
provincial or district level. 
The regular interaction with lower level authorities is instead often left to the 
contracted implementers, which tend to be either consultancy firms of 
international or local CS0s. This changes the dynamics. For example, the main 
interest of the implementer is to achieve the results that the donors have 
contracted them to achieve and the possibility to adapt the framework once 
approved is usually limited. This makes the contracting partners less flexible to 
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adjusting their work to local realities and to the wishes of the authorities (Gibson, 
2005, pp. 166–170). In addition, contractors usually have limited interest in aid 
coordination, which is often seen as taking time and resources from the 
implementation of the result frameworks. The power of provincial and district level 
actors also tends to be weaker as resources are usually scarcer at lower levels 
and hence the dependency on aid higher. The fact that donors are not very active 
at the local level might also prevent them from fully recognising that from a 
bottom-up perspective there are other actors than the state that are providing 
services to the population and that form the real governance on the ground.  
2.5. Real governance, predation and state building  
The widespread disillusionment with the ‘failed state’ discourse on African 
governance, as well as the fact that most of the states haven’t turned into 
complete anarchy, has renewed attention to the different forms of governance 
arrangements that exist (Meagher et al., 2014, p. 1), and how local forms of order 
and authority have held societies together (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010 p. 541; 
Meagher, 2012, p. 1075). As a consequence, the first decade of this millennium 
saw emerging theoretical perspectives revolve around notions of governance 
without government, negotiated or mediated states and hybrid political orders 
(see for example Boege et al., 2009; Raeymaekers et al., 2008; Hagmann and 
Péclard, 2010, Menkhaus, 2008). 
By focusing on so-called ‘governance without government’ and looking at service 
provision from a bottom-up perspective, academic research has shown that, even 
in states that are generally considered as failed, public service provision often 
continues through what Olivier de Sardan calls real governance (Olivier de 
Sardan, 2008, p. 1). This means that in order to understand statehood, we need 
to pay attention not only to state institutions but to the whole spectrum of formal 
and informal actors in the field of power around state institutions (Titeca & Herdt, 
2011; Olivier de Sardan, 2008). By focusing on function of governance rather 
than form, it becomes easier to recognize that there are both formal and informal 
institutions that are undertaking core governance functions, such as offering 
protection from external threats, resolution of conflicts and providing and 
facilitating the provision of a range of collective goods and services (IDS, 2010). 
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It should be noted that the term hybridity is being defined and used differently 
depending on whether researchers focus on fragile states or more stable 
countries. The African Power and Politics Programme (APPP),25 that has focused 
on African forms of governance and how some neo-patrimonial states have 
indeed been developmental despite not following the Western model of good 
governance is using the term practical hybrids for systems that are ‘combining 
the authoritative coordination which can come from a developmental neo-
patrimonial state with an enabling environment for local problem-solving and a 
constructive use of culturally legitimate ways of working’ (Booth and Crook, 2011 
p. 101). The research programme has been reviewing how elements of the 
modern state adapt to local preferences and accepted ways of doing things. 
Hence, the emphasis is on how so-called modern institutions functions and their 
blending with local culture and beliefs. They convincingly argue that the ’grain’ of 
popular demand in contemporary Africa is not a desire for ‘traditional’ institutions, 
but rather for modern state structures that have been adapted to, or infused with, 
contemporary local values (ibid).  
Within the fragility state literature researchers have used a bottom-up approach 
to see what institutions that already exist on the ground in countries with limited 
statehood. Within this research, the state is only one of many actors that are 
providing governance and various actors with their own form of authority and 
legitimacy exist alongside each other in the same socio-political space, and in 
which (especially at a local level) a variety of relationships exist between divers 
actors (De Herdt & Titeca, 2019, p. 6).26 It is important to emphasise that within 
the fragility research the customary chiefs, spiritual and religious leaders, militas, 
community groups etc. are not seen as mere non-state actors but are recognised 
as part of the real governance. It is not seen as an ambition or goal to be reached, 
but rather a description of the situation in many fragile states (Moe, 2014, p. 38; 
Boege et al 2009b). To put it simply, this approach analyses which actors are 
providing services and governance on the ground to the population and how 
                                            
25 The main research question for APPP was: ‘What kinds of institutions and ways of exercising power 
work for development in Africa’ (African Power and Politics Programme – a joint statement from five-
research programmes, April 2012, p. 7). 
26 Luckham and Kirk define hybrid political orders as ‘characterized by complex interactions among a 
variety of actors following different animating logics and drawing on varying sources of authority within 
fragile and conflict-affected spaces'  (Luckham & Kirk, 2012, p. 12). 
51 
 
 
these are interacting and co-existing with the state, whereas in practical hybridity 
as defined by APPP it is more the blending of the modern state and local culture 
that is the focus of research. Hence, the practical hybridity as defined by APPP 
goes one step further in the analysis of hybridity as it looks at the blending of 
modern institutions with traditional norms, whereas in fragile context this blending 
is not yet apparent as modern state institutions are absent to a large extent or 
extremely weak. 
In this thesis, I am using the term hybridity in the same sense as it has been used 
in the fragile state research, namely to see which actors are actually providing 
services to the population and how they interact with the state. I will analyse how 
the hybridity or real governance in the health and justice sectors function and how 
this might affect the negotiations between the donors and the government.  
So what does this real governance mean for the practical functioning of state 
institutions, and for the governance process at stake? First regulatory processes 
are profoundly affected. The powers to sanction are not centralized in one 
institution, and are neither part of a hierarchical relation nor institutionalized in a 
systematic relationship between various institutions. There is no monopoly on 
regulation; neither the state or any other institution has a privileged position or a 
unique legitimacy to enforce its regulatory monopoly (Bierschenk & Olivier de 
Sardan, 2003). In other words, local regulatory power is fragmented. Regulation 
is therefore prone to continued change, in which neither the state nor non-state 
actors (customary chiefs, FBOs, community groups etc.) have a monopoly of 
regulation. All of this give shape to what De Herdt and Titeca (2019, p. 19) call 
the ‘weblike society of Congo’. This demonstrate the problem with analyses that 
build on a dichotomy between state and society (ibid p. 13).  
As a result of the hybridity, local level political arenas are highly fragmented, and 
extremely complex to understand, especially for donor officials that are only in a 
country for a few years, and who most often are based in the capital, where this 
hybridity tend to be less noticeable. Despite these challenges for donors, 
engaging with the real governance is necessary if there is genuine concern about 
the impact of one’s interventions in weblike societies. It also allows the donors to 
build on structures that already exist on the ground rather than to build up 
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completely new ones. An important factor to analyse is whether to build on real 
governance or not is the question of the various actors’ legitimacy and who 
defines the legitimacy of hybrid governance arrangements: academics, donors, 
states or the population. It is important to understand the extent to which hybrid 
arrangements are normalized, institutionalized and seen as socially legitimate 
(Meagher et al., 2014 pp. 2&5) 
One reason why donors have often failed to consider informal service providers 
as potential partners in post-conflict reconstruction and state-building is due to a 
perceived contrast between state-building and service-provision through non-
state actors (Allouche, 2013). Donors have feared that by building up informal 
institutions they would undermine state authority and that the failure to support 
direct state delivery of essential services would negatively affect the legitimacy of 
the state (Mcloughlin, 2015; OECD, 2010, p. 118). However, as research has 
pointed out, there are multiple pathways to post-conflict state-building. While 
policy makers and donors may see state-building as institution building of formal 
state actors, it might be more helpful to think of state-building initiatives in a multi-
institutional, or hybrid, context (Allouche, 2013).  
While there is a growing realisation within the donor community of the need to 
rethink state-building and to consider different governance systems, there are few 
concrete guidelines on how to do so. As pointed out in the introduction, much of 
what has been written, for example, by the OECD still misses some of the main 
points such as there not always being a clear-cut separation between none-state 
and state-actors in fragile states. The New Deal while recognizing that state-
building is not only about the state fails to recognize the complexity of the 
relationships between state actors and non-state actors, and how those 
relationships can be built upon.  
Despite the rather rich academic literature on real governance and hybridity in 
fragile states we know relatively little about how donors and governments are 
interacting with the breadth of actors while negotiating aid. Do they involve these 
other actors in their discussions and negotiations on issues related to state-
building? If not, how does this affect the complex relationship and linkages that 
often exist between the non-state actors and the state? These are important 
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factors to consider and have so far been more or less neglected in the academic 
literature on aid negotiations.  
It is no surprise that predatory states have been seen as archetypes for hybrid 
states. As Reno points out, predatory state regimes often purposefully undermine 
institutions and economic transformation (Reno, 2015, p. 731), which then open 
up space for other actors. Instead, wider political authority is exercised through 
extensive networks of personal patronage that include inefficient bureaucracies 
staffed with officials selected for their political loyalties rather than for their 
technical skills (ibid). This intentional weakening of bureaucracies creates 
obstacles to economic growth, leading to declining economic growth and 
diminished social welfare measures (ibid). Although these states are often 
labeled as failed or fragile due to their divergence from conventional expectations 
about how states should perform (see e.g. Ghani & Lockhart, 2008), as Reno 
highlights, predatory governments can be successful in staying in power and can 
remain stable for long periods of time as the case of both Mobutu and Kabila 
shows (Reno, 2015 p. 731). In addition, as he also points out: ‘Predatory states 
demonstrate surprising capabilities to manipulate otherwise much stronger 
partners’ (ibid, p. 742). This certainly holds true for Mobutu, who managed to co-
opt the donors, though Kabila has been less skilled in this game.  
2.6. Towards a conceptual framework 
The review of existing literature on aid negotiations from the previous section 
suggests that there are some limitations in how negotiations have been viewed 
in previous literature, for which a new conceptual framework would be useful. I 
identified three such gaps, which can be summarized as follows: First, there has 
been too much focus on structures over agency; and particularly recipient 
government’s agency has been neglected. While structural factors are important 
they largely provide the constraints within which actors operate. Actors respond 
to these conditions in their efforts to alter the power balance to secure their 
desired outcome, and insights into what shapes their efforts seem important to 
advance our understandings of negotiations.  Second, the current literature has 
largely not been sector and scale-specific. Much of the analysis of aid 
negotiations has been aggregated in the sense that it doesn’t take into account 
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the separate national, provincial and district levels involved in aid processes, and 
thereby ignores that the actors involved and the strategies they use might differ 
at different levels of negotiation. In addition, by aggregating the findings, the 
analyses usually haven’t taken into account that the negotiation processes might 
look very different depending on the nature of the issue being discussed and its 
importance to either party. Third, we saw how little or no account has been taken 
into the hybrid nature of the recipient states and how this may or may not 
influence the negotiations. This is a serious oversight considering that many 
fragile states are indeed hybrid, in the sense that the state usually has to share 
its authority with a number of non-state actors. Although all countries have some 
dimensions of alternative sources having some authority, what is different in very 
fragile states is that these non-state actors are a) more powerful in some sense, 
and b) take over state-like functions. In an attempt to address these gaps, I have 
developed a conceptual framework that will structure my research. The 
framework builds on previous research by, amongst others Elgström (1993) and 
Whitfield (2009). 
Figure 1: Conceptual model for aid negotiations 
 
On the left-hand side of the figure 1 have listed structural and agency factors that 
surround the negotiations. I have divided them into macro, meso, and micro level 
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depending on how easy it is for an individual to change them. For example, the 
economic power or international norms on aid might be difficult for an individual 
actor to change, whereas organizational factors as well as perceptions are easier 
to influence. Hence there is a constant interaction between structure and agency, 
and this will be taken into account when I look at how donors and the government 
have engaged with each other, and what strategies they are using to achieve a 
favourable outcome in the negotiations. I will explore this issue both in chapter 4 
on the overall negotiations between the donors and the government and in 
chapter 5 on the health and justice sectors.   
In the middle of the figure 1 have identified the different levels and the different 
sectors and how they influence the negotiations. First there is the country level, 
meaning the overall negotiations between the government and the donors. Under 
this overall level there is the sector level in which I suggest that different sectors 
should be analysed in order to draw out comparisons between the sectors and 
how this affects the negotiations. To really understand negotiations in-depth I also 
suggest that one needs to follow individual programmes from the central level 
where aid is being negotiated between the donors and the sector ministries, down 
to the provincial and district level, where programme implementers have the main 
interaction with local government officials.   
Within these circles there is also the question of hybridity and how the sectors in 
which the negotiations are taking place are hybrid and how this may or may not 
affect the negotiations. I will review this in chapter 6. The reasons that previous 
aid negotiation literature hasn’t dealt with the hybrid nature, I would argue, are 
related to the aforementioned fact that the researchers have been focused at an 
aggregated level and not on the sector or local level – where the hybridity of a 
country becomes more visible. Another possible explanation for this omission is 
that much of the literature has focused on more stable and stronger states where 
the governments have not, to the same extent, been forced to share authority 
with other actors as many conflict and post-conflict countries with weaker 
governments have been forced to do. 
Finally, to the far right there are the processes surrounding the negotiations 
themselves, that are affected by all of the above-mentioned factors.  
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While this framework could no doubt be improved upon, it is a useful scaffolding 
upon which to organize my research and highlight some of the findings that help 
address the gaps related to agency, sectors and hybridity that I outlined earlier.  
2.7. Conclusion  
Despite an increasing amount of literature on aid negotiations, there is currently 
not much empirical knowledge on how donors and governments have tried to 
negotiate their way in a predatory state like Congo, and how the donors have 
engaged with the elite in order to build ownership and state-capacity. Based on 
gaps identified in existing aid negotiation literature I have developed the 
conceptual framework (figure 1 above) to guide my research and through which 
I will analyse the structural factors that surrounds the negotiations and how 
different actors have used their agency to influence them to their advantage 
through the use of different strategies, whether this is through extracting 
resources in a rather passive way by simply paying lip-service to reforms as 
identified by Bayart (1993, 2000), or more proactively using ‘image management’ 
strategies. The framework will also be used to assess different negotiation 
strategies between different sectors and between central and local negotiations 
as well examine to what extent hybridity might influence the negotiation process.  
It is important to underline that it is not a static framework and that the outcome 
of negotiations will of course depend on how the structural factors look in different 
contexts and how skillful the different actors are in using them to their advantage. 
The conceptual framework has been built to analyze aid negotiations in Congo, 
however, I believe it will be a useful model for exploring aid negotiations in other 
countries as well.  
Although Congo is different to many other aid receiving countries mainly due to 
its strategic importance for the donors, there are indeed other countries that are 
of equally strategical importance for the donors and that can use this position as 
a bargaining chip. For example, the Sahel countries, Somalia and Afghanistan 
could all use the potential threat of terrorism to secure more favourable aid 
conditions. Hence, it would be interesting to apply this framework in these 
contexts as well, to see what influence this have had on the donors’ and the 
governments’ aid negotiation strategies.  
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Chapter 3: State Failure and Aid in Congo 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents an historical overview of the Congolese state. To 
understand present aid relationships in Congo requires looking back into history 
as current configurations have their roots in Belgian colonialism. It is important to 
retrace the political and administrative trajectory of the country, from its origins 
during Belgian colonisation through independence, to the long rule of Mobutu 
Sese Seko27 (1965-1997) and through to the present day. This allows for a 
contextualisation of the failures of state-building by looking at the roots of state 
weakness and the role foreign interventions and development aid have played in 
the shaping of the Congolese state.  
The history of Congo has been marred by successive conflicts, economic 
mismanagement, widespread corruption and severe poverty, and this has 
shaped Congo’s present and its political culture. I explain how the current 
Congolese government functions, detailing its dependence on patrimonial 
networks and weak state institutions that are not set up to provide a check on its 
power, but rather to prey on the population, and how this situation has existed 
since the country’s independence from Belgium.  
To put the aid negotiations into context I will review what development assistance 
to Congo looks like today and what, if any, significant changes have taken place 
since the first democratic elections after independence were held in 2006. I will 
also look at how the number of donors has diversified from the Mobutu era, when 
it was mainly Belgium, France, the USA and multilateral development banks that 
operated in the country.  
I also provide an overview of aid in the two sectors that I focus on in this thesis, 
the health and justice sectors, along with information about the donor 
programmes that I followed in those sectors.  
 
                                            
27 His Christian name was Joseph-Desiré Mobutu. 
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3.2. The turbulent history of Congo 
Colonial period (1886-1960) 
In the mid-1800s, when the European powers effectively divided up the African 
continent, the Congo was granted by other western states to King Leopold II as 
a ‘personal concession’ ironically named the Congo Free State. The King had 
from his youth longed for a colony that would enhance the importance of Belgium 
and manipulated European leaders to grant him the right to the Congolese 
territory (Ewans, 2003, p. 167).28 The Congo Free State was administered as the 
private property of the King and, aside from the King himself, there was no 
connection to the Belgium state (ibid p. 168). King Leopold camouflaged his 
intention by promising to establish free trade and anti-slavery in the territory 
(Reybrouck, 2012, p. 84). Despite the rhetoric, King Leopold ruled the colony 
(which he never visited) with particularly brutal force, using its rubber plantations 
to amass great personal wealth (Weiss & Carayannis, 2004 p. 116; Hochschild, 
2006). External pressure and protest over widespread human rights violations 
eventually forced the reluctant Belgian government to take over the 
administration. In 1908, Congo became a Belgian colony (Weiss & Carayannis, 
2004 p. 117; Ewans, 2003 p. 170). Although the Belgians established a much 
more elaborate administration with extensive primary education, mainly provided 
by the churches, they still focused on extracting resources and did little to 
encourage Congolese development (Stearns, 2011, p. 7). On the contrary, the 
Belgians acted according to the principle of ‘pas d’élites, pas d’ennemis’; the 
colonial theory that an educated African class would create nothing but trouble 
for the colonial ‘masters’ (Wrong, 2001, p. 52). All important positions in the 
administration and the military were held by foreigners and the Belgians didn’t 
prepare the country to administer itself (Stearns, 2011 p. 330). Indeed, the 
Belgians had expected as late as 1955 that independence would be decades 
away (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 81). Hence, they were totally unprepared by 
the Congolese intelligentsia’s demand for the immediate freedom for their country 
                                            
28 He did so by, in great secrecy, sending the explorer Henry Morton Stanley, up the Congo to establish a presence on 
the ground and sign up local chiefs (Ewans, 2003 p. 168). 
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and the riots for independence that ravaged the county in 1959 (Reybrouck, 2012, 
Chapter 6).  
As a consequence, when Belgium reluctantly turned the country over to the 
Congolese in June 1960, the country had only 16 university graduates and was 
ill-prepared for governing (Reybrouck, 2012, p. 257).29 The withdrawal was one 
of the most abrupt in African history (Wrong, 2001, p. 53) and the negotiations 
that preceded independence were concluded in less than seven months 
(Reybrouck, 2012, Chapter 6). By leaving the country so unprepared, the 
Belgians hoped to still rule the country informally (Ewans, 2003 p. 173). The 
Belgians retained control over much of the economy (Moshonas, 2012, p. 108) 
with large interests in the mining industry (Turner, 2013; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, 
chapter 2). Hence, the conditions for the newly dependent state were not 
favourable, and this was to have important consequences in the years that 
followed.  
Independence, Civil War and Military Coup (1960-1965) 
Everything that possibly could go wrong at independence did. The country 
immediately fell into chaos, and the years that followed were marked by ethnic 
rivalries, army mutinies, and power struggles. The violence led most Belgians 
and other foreigners to leave the country, seeing an outflow of teachers, doctors 
and the upper levels of the military (Reybrouck, 2012, pp. 280–281). The mineral 
rich province of Katanga declared independence, supported by Belgium who was 
keen to keep it within its sphere of influence. The UN eventually sent a peace-
keeping force to the country to try to resolve matters. This put the UN at odds 
with Belgium and the U.K, and at times also with the USA. The country’s first 
elected Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, was forced out of office in 1960 only 
ten weeks after taking office in September 1960. Joseph Desiré Mobutu, who had 
been representing Lumumba during the independence negotiations (until 
Lumumba was released from prison) and who had been appointed as the head 
of the Congolese army, had a big role in the ousting of Lumumba and in the 
establishment of a more western-friendly government (Devlin, 2008 p. 258; 
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Turner, 2013 p. 37). A few months after having been ousted and imprisoned, 
Lumumba was sent by Mobutu to Katanga where he was executed by Katangan 
secessionists (Turner, 2013 p. 37). Mobutu was allegedly supported in this by the 
USA and Belgium.30 In 1990 Belgium later accepted moral responsibility for 
Lumumba’s death (Turner, 2013 p. 28).  
From the time Congo was declared independent in 1960, the control and 
governance of the country became intertwined with the Cold War struggle 
between the USA and the Soviet Union. Until the late 1950s, the United States 
had generally avoided political involvement in Africa and had been dealing with 
the continent though the European colonial powers that effectively blocked Soviet 
influence in the continent. However, decolonialization in the 1950s and 1960s 
changed this (Devlin, 2008 p. 259). The Americans were convinced that the 
Soviets would try to turn Congo into a power base in Africa, to be used as its 
stepping stone to power and influence on the continent. Lumumba, who was a 
nationalist and Pan-Africanist, was not considered to be a communist. However, 
when he didn’t receive the support he wanted from the UN Security Council to 
remove Belgian mercenaries from Katanga, he threatened to turn to the Soviet 
Union for support.31 This greatly worried the USA who started to plot against 
Lumumba, supporting the so-called Binza group32 who were led by, among others 
Mobutu. In 1964 Moïse Tshombe, the leader of Katanga, gave up the claims for 
independence and instead accepted the post as Prime Minister for Congo  
(Englebert, 2003, p. 17; Turner, 2013 p. 28). From September 1960 to 1965 
Mobutu remained chief of the army, whilst the country was run by the President 
Joseph Kasa-Vubu. In 1965, however, Mobutu staged a coup d’état, which paved 
the way for his 32-year authoritarian regime (Devlin, 2008, pp. 259–260).33 
On a social level the tumultuous years after independence took a social toll. 
Services deteriorated, employment plummeted, living conditions worsened and 
the use of extortion by the administration and army spread, leading to wide-
                                            
30 See for example Ludo de Witte’s book ‘The Assassination of Lumumba’ (De Witte, 2002). 
31 The request for help to crush the rebellion, supported by the Belgians, was blocked by the Security Council 
(Reybrouck, 2012, p. 288). 
32 The group got its name after the part of Kinshasa (called Leopold ville during the colonial time) where most of the 
members lived. 
33 Larry Devlin, a former CIA officer provides an interesting account of the US involvement in Congolese politics in the 
early days of Congolese independence in his book ‘Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone (2007). 
Including a detailed account over the US support to Mobutu. 
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ranging discontent with the central and provincial governments (Nzongola-Ntalja 
2002 p. 126). Due to the chaotic situation, which Young has described as a 
veritable Hobbesian state,34 no one really protested when Mobutu staged his 
military coup and eventually managed to pacify the entire country (Young, 1978 
p. 170-171; Scharzberg, 1988; Englebert, 2006, pp. 57–58; Nzongola-Ntalja 2002 
p. 145). 
A brief period of state-building (1965-1974) 
Once firmly in control over the country, Mobutu started to consolidate his power. 
Commonly portrayed as one of the most corrupt and kleptocratic dictators in 
Africa's history (Wrong, 2001 p. 11; Putzel et al., 2008 p. iii), it is easy to forget 
that during Mobutu’s first decade in power the country saw the only relatively 
stable phase of state-building in the history of independent Congo (Young & 
Turner, 1985, pp. 396-397). He centralized the state and took a number of 
measures to reinforce it. He reduced the number of provinces from 21 to 9 and 
suppressed their autonomy, thereby significantly reducing the power of local 
networks (Putzel, et al., 2008, p. v). Mobutu also set out to build a modern public 
administration that depended on the centre, ensuring that officials did not serve 
in their own territories of origin. While there was some effort to maintain ethnic 
balance in appointments, those who held office served as officials of the Congo 
and not of their locality (Putzel et al. 2008 p. v). This was intended to reduce 
patrimonialism (at least the one that was outside Mobutu’s control) and tribalism 
and to create a strong sense of national unity. During these early years of 
Mobutu’s rule, social services to the population expanded and the country 
reached a 95 % rate of vaccination against childhood diseases (Putzel et al, 2008 
pp. v-vi). Inflation was halted and real wages went up (Young, 1978, p. 170). 
During this period the administration also underwent a massive expansion 
(Hesselbein, 2007 p. 30). 
It would be a mistake though to believe that Mobuto did this for the sole benefit 
of the country. From a political economy perspective, Mobutu was in the process 
of constructing a centralized system of patronage, which would allow the state to 
                                            
34 For the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, the state of nature is characterized by the “war of every man against every 
man,” a constant and violent condition of competition in which each individual has a natural right to everything, 
regardless of the interests of others. 
62 
 
 
capture rents.35 As the head of state, he was the one profiting from the system 
he set up. The rents captured by the state were controlled by Mobutu himself, 
who used them to strengthen his grip on power. He nationalised the former 
Belgian Union Minière (the country’s largest Mining company) in 1967 and 
created Gecamines which controlled the most important export earners, cobalt 
and copper (Putzel et al., 2008 p. v; Englebert, 2006 p. 58). Private avenues for 
wealth accumulation were progressively restricted as control of the economy by 
the state increased. As a result, all wealth soon became dependent on access to 
the state which further increased Mobutu’s power (Englebert, 2006, p. 58). 
In the early 1970s Mobutu started the so-called ‘authenticité’ process, which was 
an attempt to recover a sense of African identity and pride crushed by the colonial 
experience (Wrong, 2001 p. 94). As part of this process, Congo was renamed 
Zaïre, and Christian names were banned and replaced by African names and 
even Christmas was abandoned (Callaghy, 1984, pp. 304–305). Symbols of the 
state, such as the flag and the national anthem were changed and roads and 
squares named after Belgians were renamed. Titles such as Madame and 
Monsieur were replaced by Citoyen and Citoyenne and western suits were 
forbidden and replaced by a high-collared jacket called abacost that Mobutu 
found inspiration for during his trip to China in 1973 (Braeckman, 1992, p. 172; 
Wrong, 2001, p. 95). As Wrong notes, at least part of the process of ‘authenticité’ 
worked and it left Congolese with a sense of uniqueness and a feeling that they 
were citizens of one vast central African nation with its own, very distinct identity 
(Wrong, 2001 p. 95). It also gave them a certain pride in being Congolese which 
is still notable today. 
The stability, however, came with a high price. In essence, Mobutu pacified 
Congo at the cost of its very plural nature. He banned all political parties except 
his own, the ‘Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution’ (MPR); political opponents 
were executed, repressed or co-opted; and trade unions and student groups were 
incorporated into the MPR (Englebert, 2006, p. 58; Callaghy, 1984, p. 282).  
 
                                            
35 State capture occurs when the ruling elite and/or powerful businessmen manipulate policy formation and influence 
the emerging rules of the game (including laws and economic regulations) to their own advantage. 
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Zaïrisation and the decline of the state (1973-1990) 
From the mid-1970s, Mobuto progressively transformed the country into an 
absolute monarchy (Braeckman, 1992, pp. 137–138). In 1973 he began the so-
called 'Zaïrianisation' of the economy, under which Mobutu nationalised nearly all 
foreign-owned businesses and plantations and handed them over to friends and 
family members (Englebert, 2006 p. 55; Devlin, 2008 p. 264-265). The 
‘Zaïrianisation’ was catastrophic for the economy. Many of the new owners were 
neither interested nor qualified to operate them, and in 1975 and 1976 GDP 
declined by 5% each year (Young, 1978 p. 172-176; Englebert, 2006 p. 55). The 
economic down-turn was also compounded by the dramatic fall of copper prices 
in 1974 (Young, 1978 p. 171). In the 1980s, the mobilization and redistribution 
capacity of the Zairian state apparatus was further reduced due to the enduring 
economic crisis, hyperinflation and economic mismanagement (Putzel et al., 
2008). Despite this, Mobutu managed to maintain control over the country, in part, 
by reaffirming his status as uncontested negotiating partner of the Western world. 
During the Cold War era aid was distributed according to allegiance and Mobutu's 
anti-Soviet stance provided him with massive support from mainly the United 
States, Belgium and France. These countries also used their influence in the 
World Bank and the IMF to ensure that these institutions were providing loans to 
the country (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 218; Wrong, 2001, pp. 203–205). Between 
the start of the economic crisis and Mobutu’s departure in 1997 the country 
received a total of 9.3 billion USD in foreign aid (Wrong, 2001 p. 196) and 
accumulated foreign debt of around 14 billion USD (Ndikumana & Boyce, 1998, 
p. 195). At the same time, most Congolese saw their living standards decline: the 
UN estimates that by the 1980s 70% of the population lived in absolute poverty 
(Ndikumana & Boyce, 1998, p. 195). 
Mobutu’s three main backers had other motives too. The USA, for example, 
needed Zaïre’s bases to support the US-backed rebels in Angola with weapons 
(Wrong, 2001, p. 202). The French were keen to keep an influence in Africa, and 
Congo, as the second largest francophone country after France, was considered 
to be of key importance (Ndikumana & Boyce, 1998 p. 210; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 
2002 p. 162). French foreign policy in Africa was guided by the so-called ‘Chasse 
gardée’ policy, which meant that countries in Africa could rely on the protection 
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of France as long as they kept friendly relations with the country. This policy 
allowed France to punch above its weight in the international arena (Young, 1978 
p. 181; Wrong, 2001 p. 202, Turner, 2013 p. 31). Belgium was keen to keep its 
foot in its former colony and to protect its investments (Wrong, 2001 p. 203; 
Turner, 2013, chapter 1).  
It would, be a mistake though to believe that Mobutu was just a puppet of the 
West. On the contrary, Mobutu exercised considerable agency in his relationship 
with foreign donors, and he excelled in the game of playing the donors. As one 
American diplomat recalled “he played us, and his environment, like a 
Stradivarius” (Wrong, 2001 p. 204). His independence vis-à-vis the donors can 
be noted, for example, in his admiration for China and his rejection of Israel in the 
security council, both of which can’t have pleased the USA (Young, 1978, pp. 171 
& 184; Young & Turner, 1985, pp. 372–373). He was also skilled in exploiting  the 
divisions of his external supporters such as France versus Belgium and Belgium 
versus USA (Young, 1978 p. 177; Gibbs, 1991, p. 161). Knowing that his regime 
depended on external resources, Mobutu spent significant sums on press 
relations, funding well-placed political ‘friends’ and lobbyists in the key Western 
capitals to ensure continued support (Wrong, 2001 p. 199). The former French 
president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was one beneficiary of Mobutu’s generosity; 
d’Estaing’s son and other relatives had several business interests in the country 
(Young & Turner, 1985, pp. 374–375; Wrong, 2001 p. 199). Construction projects 
involving businesses controlled by relatives of d’Estaing accounted for nearly 
one-third of Zaire's foreign debt in the early 1980s (Ndikumana & Boyce, 1998 p. 
212). Mobutu also had close ties with the Belgian executive director to the World 
Bank and IMF, Mr. Jacques de Groote, who allegedly leaked classified 
documents to Mobutu and put pressure on senior officials in the financial 
institutions to guarantee loans to the Congolese state (Ndikumana & Boyce, 1998 
p. 212).    
Mobutu managed to transform the very weakness of Congo into an asset for the 
survival of his regime by playing on the West’s fear of what would happen if he 
was no longer in power; telling them ‘après moi le déluge’ (after me there will be 
chaos). With the memories of the chaotic years after independence still fresh, 
donors worried what would happen to the country after Mobutu. This worry was 
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compounded by Mobutu’s suppression of the opposition, which effectively 
hindered its emergence, which led donors to question whether there was anyone 
that could actually take over the leadership should Mobutu fall (Young and 
Turner, 1985 p. 395; Wrong, 2001 p. 203).36 Hence, the donors always came to 
his rescue, whether in the form of military support to squeeze rebel groups or 
ensuring the re-scheduling of loans by the multilateral institutions (Young and 
Turner, 1985 p. 395) despite the fact that it was no secret that funding never 
benefitted the population. A German banker, Mr. Erwin Blumenthal, sent by IMF 
to work as an adviser at the Congolese Central Bank in Kinshasa, reported back 
in frustration that there was no possibility that the numerous creditors would 
recover their funds and that the root cause which destroyed all possibilities of the 
recovery was “the corruption of the ruling group” (Young & Turner, 1985, p. 385). 
Diplomats also reported chilling meetings where Mobutu more or less covertly 
threatened them, causing some former American diplomats reportedly to say “we 
know he is evil, but who else is there?” (Wrong, 2001 p. 203). Thus, Mobutu 
effectively inserted fears amongst his backers, thereby enabling him to continue 
to extract resources despite growing discontent.   
While external sources were key for Mobutu’s rule, he also emptied the state’s 
resources. In most patrimonial systems the boundary between the treasury and 
the President’s accounts tends to be blurred. However, in Congo the treasury’s 
main function was to fill the President’s coffers (Trefon & Smis, 2002, p. 380). 
Mobutu used state-owned enterprises such as Gécamines and the Central Bank 
as his private properties, which further undermined the Congolese economy. Part 
of the money was used for paying for his extravagant life-style for which he 
became infamous (Young and Turner, 1985 p. 400). He built a copy of Versailles 
in his native village in the middle of the jungle in Equateur, and his family went on 
shopping trips to Paris with suitcases filled with dollars (Wrong, 2001, chapter 
10). However, his predatory behaviour was not simply for personal self-
enrichment but was also for the buying of national and international sources of 
support that kept him in power (Wrong, 2001; Ndikumana & Boyce, 1998 p. 215). 
                                            
36 The co-option of the opposition and the use of violence to suppress opponents is part of the political culture in 
Congo. 
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The table below details the degree to which government expenditures became 
privatized during Mobutu’s regime. In the early 1970s a fair amount of funding 
went to social services, whereas in 1990 its share of the national budget was 
down to 2%. Investments in agriculture declined, which led to a situation where 
the country, which used to be an exporter of agricultural products, now doesn’t 
grow enough to meet the basic needs of its population (Trefon, 2016, p. 42).37  
Table 2: Privatization of Government Expenditures (Reno, 1997, p. 43) 
 President Social Services  Agriculture 
1972 28% 17.5% 29.3% 
1980 33% 11% 42% 
1990 80% 2% 11% 
 
In this process of decline, state agencies become involuted mechanisms, mainly 
preoccupied with their own reproduction. In order to survive civil servants, 
including the police, health workers and other government officials, preyed on the 
population. A bribe accompanied almost every interaction with the state, whether 
when enrolling a child in school, passing a police roadblock or visiting a public 
clinic (Young and Turner, 1985 pp. 399-400). Corruption became during this 
period deeply engrained in the political culture of the country. The whole state 
apparatus started to disintegrate in the 1980s when it became almost totally 
deprived of funding due to the economic crisis in the country. A 'debrouillez-vous' 
mentality started to govern relationships between the state and the people. The 
expression, which means 'fend for yourself', was something that Mobutu used in 
a speech to the military when the soldiers had started to complain about not 
getting paid. He asked them what their problem was, saying ‘you have guns, you 
don’t need a salary’ so they should be able to 'manage on their own’ (Stearns, 
2010 p. 116). They inferred this gave them official authorisation to steal a little bit 
from the people. Congolese often refer to ‘Article 15’ in the constitution, a fictitious 
clause in a non-existent constitution that calls for the population to do anything 
                                            
37 In the end of 1950 export of agricultural products amounted to 39% of total exports. Today it represents almost 
zero (Trefon, 2016, p. 42). 
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they need to survive and which became the modus operandi for every Congolese 
(ibid).  
Domestically, Mobutu continued to artfully exploit division in the opposition, co-
opting dissidents by, for example, offering them lucrative posts within the 
government and, when nothing else helped, occasionally unleashing the army 
(Young, 1978 p. 177; Dunn 2003 pp. 139-140). He also used his secret police to 
arrest dissidents (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 156). 
With the end of the Cold War Mobutu became less relevant for his foreign 
backers, who pushed Mobuto to move towards democracy. Feeling the pressure, 
in 1990 Mobutu convened a National Conference on democracy that involved the 
Catholic Church and opposition members. He promised elections, multi-partyism 
and revision of the constitution, but in the end delivered very little (Braeckman, 
1992 p. 13; Dunn, 2003 pp. 139-140), again proving himself to be a master of co-
opting opponents to his rule. 
Further erosion of the state, the fall of Mobutu and two wars (1990-2002) 
The 1990s was a period of unravelling and the eventual collapse of the 
Congolese state. With the end of the Cold War, maintaining African clients 
became less necessary for the West. Hence, when Mobutu brutally killed pro-
democracy students in Lubumbashi, Mobutu’s former backers, the USA, Belgium, 
France and the Multilateral Banks, withdrew support to the regime (Braeckman, 
1992 pp. 13-27). Foreign aid to Congo fell by 41% between 1989 and 1990 
(Marriage, 2010, p. 358). This made it almost impossible for Mobutu to sustain 
the networks that had helped to keep him in power. The economy was in free fall, 
and soldiers that had gone without pay started violent riots in various cities in 
1991 and yet again in 1993 (de Villers & Omasombo Tshonda, 2004, pp. 142–
147). The riots destroyed much of what had been left of formal industries and 
business enterprises in the country (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 151). To stay in 
power Mobutu started to play off different ethnic groups against each other which 
had disastrous consequences, especially in the eastern parts of the country (ibid 
p. 172). Inciting ethnic violence is, according to Reno, a typical strategy by 
predatory states in response to threats (Reno, 2015, p. 739). 
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Another factor contributing to the fall of Mobutu was that he had become an 
enemy to many of Congo’s nine neighbours by providing a free haven to various 
foreign rebel groups, such as the Hutu militias known as Interahamwe, who were 
behind the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The Interahamwe were hiding among 
the refugees in the camps that were set up by the international community at the 
Congolese side of the border with Rwanda to deal with the refugee crisis after 
the genocide. From the camps the Interahamwe launched attacks against the 
new Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda (Weiss and Tatiyana, 2004 p. 122).  
President Kagame of Rwanda repeatedly asked the international community to 
disarm the Hutu in the refugee camps but nothing concrete was done (ibid). 
Kagame lost patience and in October 1996 Rwanda attacked the camps. 
Rwanda, together with Uganda, also decided to get rid of Mobutu for good, 
thereby starting the first war in Congo (1996-1997). To avoid being seen as 
aggressors, the Rwandans and the Ugandans sponsored the creation of an 
alliance of small and obscure exiled anti-Mobutu Congolese revolutionary groups 
(Weiss and Tatiyana, 2004 p. 23). Laurent Kabila, a rebel leader from Katanga, 
was chosen as the group’s leader.38 The Congolese army was so weak that it 
hardly put up any resistance. As a consequence, it took the rebel group only six 
months to walk between the eastern parts of Congo to Kinshasa in the Western 
part of the country (3,551 km in a country with hardly any roads). In May 1997, 
Mobutu fled the country, and Laurent Kabila became the President of Congo. 
Hence, in an ironic twist, a person that many Congolese still see as a real patriot 
was actually put in place by its much smaller neighbour, Rwanda. 
Laurent Kabila was initially seen as a puppet of foreign interests. He had not been 
in Kinshasa for decades and had no experience of governing. He was surrounded 
by advisors from Rwanda and he felt alienated in the capital (Stearns, 2010 pp. 
163-166 & 173). Almost immediately upon taking office, he managed to upset the 
international community, not only by his refusal to allow an international 
investigation of the alleged massacres of the Rwandan-backed rebellion on 
Congolese soil but also by his anti-West rhetoric and left-leaning ideology 
(Prunier, 2010, pp. 159–160; Reyntjens, 2010, p. 165; Weiss & Carayannis, 2004, 
                                            
38 For more information regarding how Laurent Kabila was chosen by the Rwandans to be the official leader of the 
rebellion, see Stearns account in his book ‘Dancing in the glory of the Monster’ (2010). 
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p. 124). Consequently, when the World Bank convened a donors' meeting in 
Brussels in December 1997, Kabila asked for 575 million USD for help to rebuild 
the country but received a mere 32 million USD (Stearns, 2010 p. 174). To add 
insult, the World Bank also informed the new government that they owed 14 
billion USD in debts that Mobutu had accumulated over the years (Stearns, 2010 
pp. 174-175).  
The second Congo war (1998-2002) started less than a year after Laurent Kabila 
had been put in power and was essentially a continuation of the first one. The 
contributing factor was that Laurent Kabila decided to turn his back on his foreign 
backers and asked them to leave. This was a fatal, but almost inevitable, move. 
The Congolese were tired of the condescending and harsh behaviour of the 
Rwandan soldiers, and Laurent Kabila’s legitimacy was severely undermined 
(Reyntjens, 2010, pp. 166–169, Stearns, 2011 pp. 193-194). The request, 
however, unsurprisingly infuriated Rwanda and Uganda who decided to 
overthrow Laurent Kabila. They almost succeeded. It was only at the last 
moment, when the Rwandans were just outside Kinshasa, that Angola and 
Zimbabwe came to Laurent Kabila’s rescue (Reyntjens, 2010, pp. 196-198). The 
situation led to what is usually described as Africa's first World War. No less than 
nine different countries were fighting on Congolese soil during 1998 - 2002, some 
on the side of Kabila and some against him. While the first Congolese war that 
had removed Mobutu was a war of grievance by neighbouring countries who 
wanted to stop Mobutu’s interference in their countries, this war was largely about 
greed and access to resources (Lemarchand, 2009, pp. 254–255; Stearns, 2011, 
p. 297). The consequences for the population were immense; around 5 million 
people are estimated to have died as a result of the war.39 A large part of the 
country came under the influence of Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebel 
movements. A number of peace initiatives were launched but none succeeded. 
The stalemate was suddenly broken in 2001 when Laurent Kabila was killed by 
his bodyguard; one of the child soldiers that had marched together with Kabila 
from eastern Congo to Kinshasa in 1997 (Turner, 2013 p. 58). The child soldier 
was immediately killed, and the motive behind the murder is yet to be established. 
                                            
39 An estimated 5.4 million died because of the conflict between 1998-2007 (IRC, 2007, p. 16). This data has been 
disputed by the Human Security Project which estimates the figure to be 1/3 of the IRC estimates (World Bank, 2013, 
p. 22). 
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Some, like the French political scientists Gérard Prunier and René Lemarchand, 
suspect that Angola was behind it, while others believe it was Rwanda. Many also 
suspect that the USA was involved in one way or another, at least by not objecting 
to the assassination. 
Transition and the rise of Joseph Kabila (2002-2006) 
A small circle around Laurent Kabila decided that his son, Joseph Kabila, would 
take over from his father. Joseph 
was quite different from his father. 
While his father had been 
authoritarian and confrontational, 
Joseph was shy and reclusive, 
rarely giving speeches, and he  
struggled to be accepted by the 
population (Stearns, 2011). 
The small group of people that had 
decided to select Joseph Kabila as 
his father’s replacement probably 
calculated that he would be easily 
manipulated by them. However, 
the weak and introverted son 
turned out to be much smarter and 
more independent than anybody 
had suspected. Joseph Kabila 
also revised many of his father’s 
decisions (Stearns, 2011 pp. 308-
309). Within a year of his nomination he had gotten rid of almost everybody who 
had put him in power (ibid, p. 314). In his first address to the nation, just days 
after he had laid his father to rest, he announced a sea change in foreign policy. 
Bush had just been elected in the United States and Kabila's message was 
directed at him: ‘Without beating around the bush, I recognize there has been 
mutual misunderstanding with the former [US] administration. The DRC intends 
to normalise bilateral relations with the new administration’ (Stearns 2001 p. 312).  
Textbox 1: Kabila the choice of the West? 
Kabila is commonly assumed to have been the 
West’s candidate in both the 2006 and the 2011 
elections. These suspicions are not unfounded. In 
2006 Kabila was popular amongst Western 
governments due to his willingness to embrace 
liberal change and to improve the country’s 
relationship with the West. Kabila received strong 
support from CIAT which gave him the reputation 
of being ‘the candidate of the White man’ 
(Reyntjens, 2009, p. 272). By 2011 Kabila had to 
a certain degree fallen into disgrace, but he was 
by some of the main donors still seen as a safer 
and more stable option than any of the opposition 
leaders. Belgium, US and to a certain extent 
France, put a great emphasis on timely, stable 
and sufficiently credible elections at the cost of a 
legitimate process. Monusco, headed by an 
American diplomat, Roger Meece, took a passive 
stance and sided with the government on the need 
to arrange the elections on time. This despite the 
many question marks that existed on for example 
the voter registration process. Few embassies 
spoke up against threats against activists and 
journalists. The Western embassies also failed to 
understand Tshisekedi, the leader of UDPS, who 
was seen as stubborn and obstructive. Hence, 
Congo’s foreign partners are seen to have heavily 
invested in legitimizing Joseph Kabila, without 
fully taking the longer-term implications into 
account (Trefon, 2011, p. 24). 
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He also declared himself ‘firmly resolved to improve cooperation with our main 
partners of the European Union, especially France, and Belgium with which we 
share historical ties’ (Prunier, 2010, p. 258). At the same time, he promised to 
liberalize the economy, and - most importantly - immediately commit to 
resuscitating the peace process. Several months later he allowed political parties 
to operate again.  
Where his father had governed by left-leaning ideology, Joseph was in the 
beginning a pragmatist (Stearns, 2011 p. 312). It is easy to understand why the 
international community initially warmed to him. One might ask what Kabila had 
to gain from allying himself with the western donors but considering that the 
country was broke and having no real powerbase on his own, his best option was 
to become friendly with the West (Stearns, 2011 p. 313). Joseph Kabila moved 
rapidly ahead with peace talks, which had been stalled by his father 
(Lemarchand, 2009, p. 246). In 2002 a peace-agreement was signed in Sun City, 
South Africa. This initiated the transition period that led-up to the election of a 
democratic government in 2006. The transitional government was led by Joseph 
Kabila, together with four vice-presidents, two from the main rebel groups, one 
from Kabila’s entourage and one from the unarmed opposition (Reybrouck, 2012 
p. 449). International development assistance to the country increased 
substantially after the peace agreement.  
The peace agreement also established the so-called CIAT (Comité International 
d’Accompagnement à la Transition), which was made up of members from the 
international community,40 and they were, to a large extent, managing the country 
during the transition period. What made the arrangement with CIAT special is that 
it wasn’t an external advisory board, but a formal institution during the transition 
(Reybrouck, 2012 pp. 449-450). It was like a version of controlled sovereignty, 
which at points led to deep tensions between the CIAT and the 1+4 government 
(ibid, p. 450). It was, to a large extent, CIAT and UN Peacekeeping Mission 
(Monuc)41 that kept the transition process afloat through the application of 
pressure, and that assisted the government to arrange the first democratic 
                                            
40 The CIAT consisted of the Ambassadors for the five permanent members in the UN Security Council together with 
the Ambassadors from Belgium, Canada, Angola, Gabon, Zambia and South Africa as well as representatives from the 
African Union, EU and Monuc (Reybrouck, 2012 p. 450). 
41 Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo. 
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election since 1960. The elections, held in 2006, were by and large seen as a 
major success for Congo and for the international community. Kabila won the 
runoff with 58% compared to Jean-Paul Bemba’s 42% (one of the vice-Presidents 
who represented the rebel groups). The votes were regionally divided with Kabila 
winning in the East and his native Katanga province, whereas he lost in Kinshasa 
where many voters saw Kabila as the candidate of the international community 
(Reybrouck, 2012 pp. 481-482). 
There was a certain kind of optimism after the election had been held, and aid 
continued to flow into the country. Numerous reform projects were launched in 
areas such as Public Financial Management, Security Sector Reforms and 
Justice Reforms. Monuc, which in 2010 changed name to Monusco,42 continued 
its work in the East. From a diplomatic point of view, however, Congo became 
less of a priority once the elections in 2006 were held, and President Kabila 
reduced contact with the international community (Davis, 2009, p. 28).  
Congo under Kabila – from hope to disappointment (2006-2016) 
It didn’t take long before Kabila lost his allure as being part of a ‘new type’ of 
African leader. Reforms stalled, he failed to diversify the economy and, most 
importantly, he didn’t succeed in securing the situation in the East where he failed 
to consolidate his power (Stearns et al., 2013, p. 31). Instead the situation can 
best be described as what Berwouit has termed ‘Congo’s violent Peace’ 
(Berwouit, 2017). 
In 2011, the country’s held its second democratic elections. In contrast to 2006, 
Congo managed the arrangements, although with support from Monusco and 
financing from the international community. Mr. Bemba, Kabila’s main rival in the 
2006 elections, was detained at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The 
Hague during the 2011 polls, on trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed by his troops in the Central African Republic (CAR). President Kabila’s 
main electoral threat came from Etienne Tshisekedi of the Union Pour la 
Democratie et le Progres Social (UDPS). Tshisekedi was a major threat to Kabila, 
considering that many Congolese saw him as the only one that had stood up 
                                            
42 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
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against Mobutu.43 Kabila was, however, greatly aided by an earlier change in the 
constitution reducing the elections from two rounds to one. For the divided 
opposition this was a major set-back as they were not able to unite behind one 
candidate. Kabila had allegedly bribed the whole Parliament to get the change 
through and the international community had, according to one western diplomat, 
been conspicuously silent about the changes. Hence, despite being increasingly 
unpopular, Kabila and his party managed to win the elections. The elections were, 
however, in general not considered to be free and fair. The powerful Catholic 
Church, which had deployed thousands of electoral observers in the country, 
declared that the elections ‘do not conform either to truth or to justice’ and the 
Carter Center did the same (Carter Center, 2011). The USA labelled the elections 
as ‘seriously flawed’, adding however that it was unclear whether the irregularities 
had been enough to change the outcome (Turner, 2013 p. 20). Kabila was sworn 
in as President, but the legitimacy of his regime was severely tarnished. Of the 
neighbouring states, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe was the only leader to attend 
the inauguration ceremony. 
Foreign interference in the East continued and there was a proliferation of armed 
groups. It is estimated that in North Kivu alone there are currently over 70 rebel 
groups (Vogel & Musamba, 2016, p. 1).44 In 2012 the Rwandan and Ugandan 
backed rebel group M-23 took over part of eastern Congo, including Goma, the 
provincial capital of North Kivu. A peace agreement was signed in Addis Ababa 
on 24 February 2013. Other groups are still active, such as the Ugandan ADF 
(probably in close collaboration with part of the Congolese army) which is causing 
mayhem in the Beni area. The former intrahambwe in FDLR are still active, 
though weakened due to a split in the group. Conflicts have also spread to other 
parts of the country, such as Kasaïs which previously have been considered 
rather stable.  
Although there were some improvements, Congo under Kabila’s leadership 
continued to perform weakly. The Congolese economy continues to be highly 
dependent on the mining industry, and 95% of Congo’s export earnings come 
from oil and minerals, the vast majority from two main commodities, copper and 
                                            
43 Tshisekedi had been the Prime Minister for a short time after the national dialogue in 1990. 
44 Since the time of this writing the number has continued to increase. 
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cobalt (Global Witness, 2017, p. 7), which makes the country vulnerable to price 
fluctuations. In 2015 the copper price on global markets fell dramatically, forcing 
the government to cut the national budget by 22% (ibid, p. 32). By May 2017 the 
Congolese franc had lost half of its value compared to the year before and 
inflation leapt to over 25 percent in 2016, with severe consequences for the 
population which saw prices on food rise considerably (ibid).  
Further, the country has often ranked among the lowest in UNDP’s Human 
Development Index: in 2017 it was ranked 176 out of 188 countries45 (UNDP, 
2016, pp. 224–225). Between 2010 and 2015 the economy grew rapidly under 
Matata Ponyo, who was the Minister of Finance between 2010 and 2012, before 
he became Prime Minister in April 2012 (with continued responsibilities for the 
Finance Minister post). He managed to stabilise inflation, which had been 
rampant during earlier years. Thanks to this he was popular amongst donors. He 
was, however, forced to resign in 2016 as part of an African Union backed 
national dialogue framework agreement which specified that an opposition leader 
take the position of Prime Minister. The growth, however, has only led to very 
modest reduction in poverty rates. The latest available figures from the World 
Bank estimates that 77% of the population lives under the poverty line of 1.90 
USD per day (wdi.wordbank.org).  
3.3. Political culture, power and the functioning of the state 
administration 
It is worth commenting on Congolese political culture, and how political power 
and the state administration operate in Congo. Many states in Africa are so-called 
neo-patrimonial states, where the governments use state resources to secure the 
loyalty of clients in the general population. It has generally been believed that 
neo-patrimonialism is contradictory to development. However, more recent 
research shows that neo-patrimonial states can indeed be developmental and 
that it is possible for external actors to work with the state and achieve outcomes 
that are good for the country at large. The best examples of these so-called 
developmental states are Rwanda and Ethiopia where the political elite have 
                                            
45 Compiled on the basis of estimates from 2016. 
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centralized rent-seeking and used it to invest in services for the population 
(Booth, Kelsall, 2013). Not all neo-patrimonial states are developmental though, 
and Congo belongs to the category of neo-patrimonial states that are predatory, 
and non-conducive to development.  
As noted by Reno, predatory states usually are managed in a highly personal and 
informal way (Reno, 2015, pp. 730–731). This has several benefits for the ruler 
himself and might be vital for his survival, but it is not conducive to development. 
Joseph Kabila prefers informal networks and parallel command systems, as it 
gives him ‘greater leeway to rule’ (Stearns, 2010 pp. 321-322). For example, 
instead of passing through his Minister of Interior, Kabila will call governors or 
military commanders directly. Instead of authorizing increases to official salaries 
for civil servants: ’he allows many to scrape by on salaries of less than 100 USD 
a month, only to send them envelopes of several thousand dollars at his 
discretion to keep them happy’ (Stearns, 2010 pp. 321-322). This parallel 
management weakens institutions and makes officials directly dependent on the 
presidency. The inner circle of Kabila consists of some of his ministers and 
military leaders, but to know who is among the most powerful is almost impossible 
for outside observers. Kabila is secretive, gives few speeches and prefers to stay 
at his farm outside Kinshasa. He allegedly assigns issue-based responsibilities 
to those close to him and deals with them bilaterally. No one apart from President 
Kabila is said to have an overall overview of presidential affairs and all major 
decisions goes through the President. This secrecy is a powerful cultural reality 
and political strategy in Congo, and there is a belief that really effective power is 
exercised in secret (Trefon, 2011 p. 113).46 This secrecy and figuring out who 
knows what is a crucial element in Congolese politics (ibid). It also keeps the 
international community occupied, with the diplomats constantly trying to figure 
out who is in control of decision-making as formal power does not always equal 
real power. This makes it difficult for the donors to know whom to engage with as 
the ministers that they would normally deal with might not be the real decision-
makers.  
                                            
46 It is said that many politicians belong to secret societies.  
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This secrecy also leads to insecurity, not only for the population, but also for the 
elite itself, who never fully knows who is in and who is out, and how long they will 
hold on to power. This fuels corruption as ‘people in power seek to accumulate 
resources as rapidly as possible from those who occupy contextually inferior 
positions in the social hierarchy’ (Schatzberg, 1988, p. 3). Hence, whilst able, 
they extract whatever they can because they know a fall from grace might be 
imminent (ibid). 
The political culture of secrecy is also noted in how information is being used. 
Congolese society and politics are always full of rumours, some more fanciful 
than others, and the distinction between what is true from what is not true is not 
always made (Friedman, 1994, p. 101; Trefon, 2011, Chapter 6). Disinformation 
and manipulation are often used as a political strategy, and it is sometimes used 
to discredit the donors, such as rumours about aid workers spreading Ebola in 
North Kivu (The Economist, 2019, pp. 42–43; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2019, p. 15). 
As under Mobutu, the central and local administrations are weak and 
dysfunctional. However, it would be a mistake to assume that it they are non-
existent. As work by amongst others Trefon and Englebert shows, the Congolese 
state and its institutions do indeed exist, although they keep operating according 
to their own logic (Englebert, 2003; Trefon, 2009). The presence of the state is 
most evidently manifest in cities and towns, but it also reaches the rural areas 
(Trefon, 2009 p. 10). Civil servants are basically left to fend for themselves as 
their salaries are either low or non-existent, and as we saw earlier in this chapter 
a ‘debrouillez-vous’ mentality (i.e. manage on your own) has become engrained 
in the culture.47 Many resort to preying on the population in order to make a living. 
Policemen talk about “taking on an angry face” when they go to work in order to 
extract as much money as they possible can (interview, Congolese professor in 
Kinshasa, 2016-11-26). An unpublished study by Titeca and Sanchez de la Sierra 
shows that the police make 80% of their income from extortion (The Economist, 
2018d). A large part of it needs to be circulated upwards to their bosses. If they 
don’t deliver the weekly envelope with money they can be sure to be moved to 
                                            
47 See for example, Stearns 2011, for how the ‘debrouillez-vous’ mentality has affected the mentality of 
civil servants in Congo. 
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less profitable corners of the town (Baaz & Olsson, 2011). Health workers steal 
medicines that they then sell at private clinics and teachers turn children away 
from school if their parents fail to pay the school-fees, despite the constitution 
clearly stating that education should be provided free of charge. Hence, predation 
and corruption have become dominant characteristics in Congolese political 
culture leading to what Diamond (see chapter 1) referred to as a predatory society 
where every transaction is used to someone’s immediate advantage. To change 
a system that is so stuck against collective action both within the elite, but also 
within the administration will take time and a lot of efforts. 
In these and many other aspects the Congo hasn’t changed much since the 
Mobutu era. Formal jobs and business continue to be rare and employs less than 
10% of the population according to World Bank data from 2016 
(wdi.worldbank.org). Consequently, it is a commonly held view among the 
population that the only avenue to power and wealth is the state (Trefon, 2011, 
chapter 6). 
In a system that has become so ingrained in a predatory form of patrimonialism 
it is hard for both the political elite and the population at large to find forms of 
collective action. A trait in Congolese politics from Mobutu to Kabila is the relative 
easiness with which the ruling party has managed to co-opt the opposition, 
sometime by fear, but often with the promise of lucrative posts within the 
government. This co-opting is facilitated by the fact that opposition political parties 
for the most part, are dominated by individual politicians without a clear, and 
ideologically driven, political agenda (Kelsall, 2016, pp. 7–8). 
The government budget is very small. In 2015 the state's income was 5.8 billion 
USD but the actual budget execution was only 58.3% (Ministry of Budget). This 
low execution rate is in the same range every year and betrays both significant 
leakages on the revenue side and misallocation on the expenditure side. But not 
all budget posts are cut equally. The President's office and the Prime Minister 
usually spend more than 200% of their allocation, while sectors such as health 
and justice are routinely cut with around 50-70% (Ministry of Budget). This says 
a lot about the government’s priorities. The budget situation for provincial and 
local levels of the administration is dire, and they receive almost nothing from the 
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central government, despite the fact that the provinces should receive 40% of the 
revenues they are generating for the state according to the constitution 
(Englebert, 2012, p. 43; Englebert & Mungongo, 2016, p. 8). This often deliberate 
miscalculation on the expenditure side is common in systems based on patron-
client relationships, where the elite needs to get access to ‘rents’ in the economy 
to cement its internal relationships and buy the support of key constituencies 
(African Power and Politics Programme, 2012, p. 10). Consequently, ruling elites 
often resort to various kinds of off-budget transfers and informal sharing of rents 
(ibid).  
Finally, I would like to raise that cultural factors have both direct and indirect 
impacts on how political systems evolve, and that technocratic top-down 
initiatives can’t be viable without paying some attention to political culture, and 
how history and tradition are elements of the cultural reality that influence 
contemporary politics (Trefon, 2011, chapter 6). Knowledge about how political 
structures, power relations and historic legacies shape the motivations of different 
stakeholders and the behaviours within systems is important for donors to 
understand in order to facilitate reform processes (ibid). International experts, 
however well-intending, tend to neglect how culture can facilitate or hinder reform 
processes. There is often a lack of understanding that Congolese political actors 
sometimes operate ‘in a world with a substantially different understanding of 
causality and causal forces than most Western social and political scientists 
possess’ (Schatzberg, 1988). Obviously, in a place like Congo, and many other 
parts of Central Africa, where popular culture of witchcraft is pervasive it naturally 
also affects the political culture.48 People are, for example, often accused of using 
witchcraft and fetishes for personal, political and financial gains and for protection 
against potential rivals. Witchcraft was, for example, an important part of the 
mystique surrounding the Mobutu regime. Hence, to explore the influence of 
                                            
48 The belief in magic has a strong influence on people’s lives and it influences politics as well. It can, for 
example, lead to people being afraid of investing in businesses as it might create jealousy and accusations 
of witchcraft. The large number of street children in Kinshasa is to a large extent related to witchcraft. 
Many of the children have been accused of witchcraft and have been thrown out of their homes or left 
voluntarily to avoid being subjected to exorcism. Hence, perceptions of witchcraft have a real impact on 
people’s lives. 
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witchcraft is of relevance for the understanding of Congolese political culture. 
However, due to time constraints it is beyond the scope of this research.  
To conclude, reforming the state from this starting point will not be easy. In the 
words of Stearns “it will require tackling entrenched interests and mafia-like 
networks that operate the administration” (Stearns 2010 p. 324). In doing so 
Kabila would risk offending powerful people, who could then try to challenge him 
(ibid). Hence, it is therefore perhaps not surprising that Kabila has chosen not to 
push for neutral, efficient state institutions, but rather to strengthen his own 
personal security and business networks (ibid). Thereby sustaining a predatory 
rule that is not conducive to development. For the donors the political culture of 
neo-patrimonialism, predation, secrecy and disinformation creates considerable 
obstacles also for the donors’ state-building agenda. A first step in this process 
is to get an in-depth understanding of Congolese politics and what reforms are 
feasible to achieve.  
3.4. The current state of Congo – Heading towards a collapse?   
Congo is in the midst of a severe political crisis.49 President Kabila was obliged 
by the constitution to step down at the end of 2016. However, he has remained 
in power despite the protests of political opponents and mass demonstrations 
that have faced deadly suppression by Kabila’s forces (ICG, 2016; Human Rights 
Watch, 2017). On New Year’s eve 2016, a power-sharing agreement with the 
opposition was reached under the leadership of the Catholic Church (ICG, 2017, 
p. 1). The opposition faced a major disruption when Etienne Tshisekedi passed 
away in February 2017, and the fragile political truce fell apart in April 2017 when 
Kabila unilaterally appointed a Prime Minister (Mr. Bruno Tshibala, a dissident 
UDPS opposition leader) in an attempt to split and co-opt the opposition. During 
a visit to Kinshasa in October 2017 by the US Ambassador to the UN, Mrs. Nikki 
Haley, President Kabila promised that elections would be held by 23 December 
2018. At the time of writing (September 2018) it remains unclear whether 
elections will be held or not. Kabila has in the past few years shown that he is 
willing to go to great lengths to remain in power. He has tried to change the 
                                            
49 Since the time of this writing, elections have been taken place and Kabila is no longer the president. 
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electoral law in his favour, clamped down on peaceful protests, prosecuted 
political opponents and even decentralised the country in order to undermine the 
political power base of the former governor of Katanga, Mr. Moïse Katumbi 
(Berwouts, 2017a, pp. 154–156). There has been much speculation that he would 
appoint a so-called ‘Dauphin’, someone that would run for him (see for example 
Jeune Afrique, 2018a). There has also been speculation that Kabila would bend 
the rules, by having the Constitutional Court make a ruling that, due to the change 
to the constitution in 2011, the two-term period of the Presidency should be 
calculated from this election, and not from the 2006 elections. This interpretation 
would allow Kabila to stay another term in power. T-shirts with Mr. Kabila for 
President started to appear in Kinshasa in the summer of 2018, increasing the 
speculation that Kabila planned to run himself (The Economist, 2018a). On 
August 8th, Kabila finally announced that he would not stand in the election, and 
that the party’s candidate would be Mr. Shadary, the former Minister of Interior 
and currently the Secretariat of MPPR (The Economist, 2018b). He is seen as a 
loyalist to Kabila. President Kabila needs someone that he can trust as he is 
allegedly afraid of ending up in the ICC (Reid, 2018, p. 103). He has also invested 
a large amount of assets that he can’t take with him should he go into exile. 
Leaving the Presidency would put these investments in jeopardy and make 
himself and the close circle around him vulnerable to prosecution. Hence, the 
stakes are high. 
President Kabila’s efforts to cling to power have further distanced him from the 
international community. The EU and USA have issued sanctions against 
members linked to the regime and the electoral violence (Council of the EU, 2016, 
2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017, p. 8). Their bank accounts have been 
confiscated and they are no longer allowed to travel to the USA and Europe 
(Council of the EU, 2016, 2017). Belgium has also decided to redirect part of its 
aid from Congolese institutions to humanitarian aid. The African Union and 
neighbouring countries have so far, albeit not openly, put significant pressure on 
President Kabila, but once he is no longer perceived as the one that can bring at 
least a certain degree of stability in the region they are likely to abandon him.  
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3.5.  Contemporary development assistance to Congo 
In the previous section I have shown how development aid was used to support 
Mobutu’s 32-year rule and how instrumental it was for him to stay in power. But 
how important is aid today? And who are the donors?   
In 2016, the Congo received nearly 2,1 Billion USD (OECD Statistics) in aid.50 
Due to the prolonged crisis in the east, Congo is one of the world’s biggest 
recipients of humanitarian assistance and the UN has one of its biggest peace-
keeping operations in the country, with around 18,000 uniformed staff members 
(UN Security Council, 2018, p. 10). As can be seen from the graph below, levels 
of aid to Congo were broadly constant from 1970 to early 1990 when the donors 
turned off the taps. Aid then increased significantly in the period from 2002 up to 
the elections in 2006. Immediately thereafter it fell before increasing again so that 
in 2010 it was at the level provided before 2006. Since then aid has remained 
more or less at the same level. The rise in 2012 is due to a significant amount of 
debt relief agreed upon that year. Given the widespread rhetoric of ‘reform failure’ 
and ‘lack of political will’, as well as the difficulty of the aid environment, one might 
assume that development aid will begin to go down. However, despite some 
minor decreases during the last few years, there are so far few indicators of 
drastic cuts in aid.  
Figure 2: Trends in aid to Congo, USD Billion, 2015 prices and exchange rates, 
3-year average net ODA receipts.  
 
                                            
50 The figure refers to official development flows 2015, OECD Development Statistic System accessed 2018-07-01. 
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To get a sense of the importance of aid, the amount of aid needs to be put in 
relation to the government’s budget for 2016 which was 4 530 million USD 
(Ministry of Budget).51 As highlighted by De Herdt & Poncelet (2011), the flows of 
aid, despite being rather low in per capita terms, are of such magnitude that the 
political economy is profoundly affected, creating important stakes around its 
usage, with potential implications for power relations between domestic and 
international actors (De Herdt & Poncelet, 2011 p. 13). How important aid is 
depends on the sector and at which level. Some, like the Ministry of Mining, have 
access to other resources whereas, for example, the Ministry of Planning and the 
Ministry of Gender have less access to lucrative deals and are hence more 
dependent on development aid (interview Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa, 2014-
11-21).  
How much is this compared to other African states? In the following two graphs 
we can see that on average 2014-2016 Congo was the sixth largest recipient on 
the continent.  
Table 3: Top ten ODA recipients in Africa.52 
 
If we look at aid per capita we find that Congo received 27 USD per capita in 2016 
whereas its small neighbouring countries of Rwanda received 96 USD per capita 
                                            
51 This was the part of the budget that got executed. The initial budget was higher. 
52 Source: OECD data 2018. 
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the same year and Uganda received 42 USD per capita (World Bank data 
base).53  
Despite receiving substantial donor funding, Congo is far from being a ‘donor 
darling’. The level of trust between donors and the government is low and, as a 
consequence, the country doesn't receive general or sector budget support. 
Donors generally implement their programmes through mechanisms outside of 
the government’s systems although some, such as the World Bank, have 
advisors and project implementation units embedded within ministries. The lack 
of trust also manifests itself in the implementation of the New Deal as we saw in 
chapter 1, where none of the donors stepped up to take the co-lead role together 
with the government to support its implementation. 
The international reporting from Congo has, to a large extent, focused on the 
conflicts in the eastern Congo, and so has the development assistance. As a 
consequence, the eastern parts of the country receive the bulk of aid, whereas 
other parts receive considerably less despite often being poorer and having 
worse human development indicators.  
3.5.1 Congo’s natural resources make the elite less dependent on western aid 
Congo’s natural resources, and especially the mining industry enable the elite to 
stay in power and contribute to making the political elite independent of the 
donors. Hence, it is worth mentioning some recent developments in the sector. 
As we saw in the previous section, the mining industry was important for Mobutu’s 
ability to stay in power and it continues to be of monumental importance for 
Congo’s economy as well as for President Kabila himself. Kabila and his family 
are deeply involved in business operations in the country; from shady deals in 
the mining sector, to the telephone company industries, banking and land 
ownership (Congo Research Group, 2017). 
Corruption in the mining sector is rampant and, just like under Mobutu, a large 
part of the revenue never makes it into the state budget. Gécamines, the state-
owned company, continues to be the main culprit in the diversion of Congo’s 
mineral revenues from the budget by selling concessions and mining licences 
                                            
53 See: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS?locations=CD. 
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(Global Witness, 2017, p. 6). According to Global Witness’s investigation of five 
secretive mining deals, around 1.3 billion USD was lost to corruption between 
2010 - 2012. These secretive deals were struck with offshore companies which 
managed to get hold of mining licences at knockdown prices. Later it was 
revealed that these companies belonged, or were linked, to Dan Gertler, a 
billionaire Israel businessman who is friend of President Joseph Kabila (Global 
Witness, 2017, p. 10). The companies in the five offshore deals paid state bodies 
275.5 million USD for control of the mining assets, although they were worth at 
least 1.63 billion USD (ibid). 
These secret deals are not the only way that money disappears in the mining 
industry. Every year private international mining companies in Congo pay over a 
billion dollars a year in taxes, royalties and other charges to tax agencies and to 
Gécamines. Data analysed by Global Witness and Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) shows that 30-40% of the payments fail to reach 
the national treasury. It is estimated that between 2013 - 2015 more than 750 
million USD disappeared. At least some of the funds were allegedly distributed 
among corrupt networks linked to President Kabila’s regime (Global Witness, 
2017 p. 6). These resources are important for President Kabila, as it gives him 
funding to sustain patrimonial networks and buy support. Funding from the mining 
industry has, for example, been instrumental in financing President Kabila’s 
election campaigns (Kavanagh, 2016).  
In addition to mining, President Kabila and his family are also involved in a 
number of other businesses and own a lot of land in the country (Congo Research 
Group, 2017). The income from the mining industry and the other businesses 
makes President Kabila and the circle around him less dependent on aid. It also 
makes it more attractive to stay in power and it is a widely held belief that one of 
the reasons why Kabila is stubbornly insistent to hold on to power is because of 
his investments in the country. This is in line with Reno’s finding that predatory 
states are usually countries where it is particularly rewarding to hold on to power 
(Reno, 2015, p. 730). 
The entrance of China in Africa makes it even less necessary for the regime to 
listen to the Western donors. China has become an important player in Africa’s 
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economic activities since the turn of the century and the DRC with its natural 
resources is high on China’s list of African strategic partners. China has a policy 
of non-interference in Africa (Kragelund, 2010), which makes it even more 
attractive for the political elite. The unconditional support for Kabila’s regime has, 
however, on occasions created tensions in the form of targeted and destroyed 
Chinese businesses in connection with political riots (Kabemba, 2016; News 24, 
2015-01-25). 
 
In 2007 Congo and China signed the Sicomines agreement, which is commonly 
referred to as the deal of the century as it was the largest Chinese investment 
programme in Africa to date. In concluding the agreement, the Congolese 
government sought to finance a set of infrastructure projects which were badly 
needed, whereas on the Chinese side the main purpose was to gain access to 
key natural resources (Maiza-Larrarte & Claudio-Quiroga, 2019, p. 423).54 The 
Sicomine deal has stimulated the entry of additional Chinese investors into the 
Congolese mining sector, and China is now the dominant investor in the mining 
industry in Congo (Global Witness, 2017). Apart from minerals, China is also 
importing a large amount of timber from Congo (Kabemba, 2016 p. 76). China is 
DRC’s principal trading partner,55 and it is also the primary source of Congo’s 
foreign direct investments, followed by France and the USA (Renwick, Gu, & 
Hong, 2018, p. 6).  
 
The abundance of natural resources, and the interest of both Western and 
Chinese companies to make deals with Congo sharply contributes to making the 
elite less dependent on Western aid. It also, and more seriously, make the elite 
independent from its own population. Through the control of lucrative mining 
deals, the control of natural resources and corruption the elite has managed to 
distance itself from the population. It doesn’t even need to exploit them, as they 
have tapped in to more lucrative channels within the world economic system.  
                                            
54 The deal provides for the Chinese consortium to loan up to 3 billion USD to a joint-venture company in order to 
build infrastructure projects (Global Witness, 2017). The loans are to be repaid through the mining profits made by 
Sicomines (ibid). The deal has been critiqued for being biased towards China, and for having been negotiated behind 
closed doors with minimal transparency. In addition, the costs and allocation of infrastructure deals are unclear and 
many of them have been delayed and been much more expensive than planned (Global Witness, 2011).  
55 China accounted for 46% of Congo’s exports and 25% of its imports (Renwick, Gu and Hong 2019 p. 6). 
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Heterogenous donors and their divergent motives 
The donor community in Congo is a rather heterogeneous group, as we can see 
in graph 3, with a mix of large UN agencies, multilateral development banks, and 
the European Union (EU), as well as a number of bilateral donors and 
international NGOs. This contrasts with the Cold War era, where the donor scene 
was totally dominated by Belgium, France and the USA. The biggest bilateral 
donor to the country is the USA, followed by the UK, Belgium, Germany, Sweden 
and Japan56 (OECD/DAC, 2018). Although the Chinese government is investing 
heavily in Congo, it is not a traditional donor. The Chinese financing is mainly in 
the form of loans in exchange for natural resources. Hence, its contribution is not 
reflected in aid contributions reported by the OECD/DAC. Neither is China 
participating in the various aid coordination groups that have been established by 
the Western donors. 
 
Figure 3: Top ten donors to Congo, 2015-2016 in USD million.57  
 
 
As elsewhere, the motivation for a donor to support a country depends on a mix 
of factors and these might vary over time and for individual donors. Sometimes 
aid is driven by altruism, but usually it is also motivated by factors such as 
                                            
56 Based on gross disbursement data. 
57 OECD data 2018. 
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commercial or diplomatic interests, geo-strategic considerations or an interest in 
keeping and promoting one's influence (politically and/or culturally). As we saw 
earlier in this chapter, aid to Congo during the Cold War was largely motivated 
by political considerations, i.e. stopping the spread of communism in Africa. 
Today, humanitarian considerations and a wish to stabilize the region in order to 
avoid another costly African 'World War' appear to be the main considerations, 
although economic considerations, are also present. USAID’s development 
cooperation strategy for the DRC 2014-2019, for example, notes that: 
“The DRC is too large, has too much economic potential, and is too 
centrally located in Africa to let it fall back into the open, widespread 
conflict that characterized the late-1990s/early 2000s. Its strategic mineral 
resources, along with oil, timber and hydroelectric potential have all been 
recognized as critically important to U.S security. Instability in the DRC 
also affects all nine of its neighbors, as its large swaths of ungoverned 
spaces have proven to be good hiding places and training sites for foreign-
armed groups… All of these considerations, in addition to the human toll 
and the great cost of the continuing humanitarian response to the needs 
of conflict-affected populations ensure that DRC will remain a priority 
country” (USAID, 2014a, p. 10). 
The fact that Congo is also one of the poorest countries in the world and is far 
from reaching any of the MDGs has also motivated some donors, such as the 
U.K, to increase its aid budget for the country (DFID, 2011a, pp. 1–3). Belgium, 
being one of the largest donors to the country, is eager to keep its ties with its 
former colony. As one of my interviewees said: “Congo is the one country where 
Belgium can feel like a big power” (interview donor official, Kinshasa, 2014-12-
05) The Belgians have a large presence in Congo with staff levels that makes 
other embassies jealous. To be posted to Congo is also seen to be a strategic 
career move for Belgian diplomats, and the Ambassador is usually a senior 
official. This is in contrast to some other countries, like the U.K. and Sweden, that 
often send more junior political officers and first-time Ambassadors to the country. 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, Belgium was initially a reluctant colonizer and 
even today support for continued involvement of Belgium in Congo is divided 
along language divides. The French speaking Catholics are keener on a 
continued relationship with Congo than the Flemish section of the population. It 
is commonly said in Congo that they have more problems with the Flemish 
speaking ministers. France continues to be keen in supporting the French 
influence in Africa. In general, the USA and Belgium usually take a tougher stand 
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against the regime than France. France was, for example, more reluctant to 
abandon Mobutu, and many Congolese believe that France under Macron is 
more hesitant to take actions against Kabila than the USA and Belgium. 
Critics of aid often assume that aid is provided to Congo in order to control its 
vast natural resources (see for example Marriage, 2010). This is also a popular 
discourse in Congo and amongst some non-Congolese activists (Autesserre, 
2010, pp. 17–18). Although some companies and countries do profit from the 
chaos, I would argue that many of the aid donors and their enterprises would 
benefit from a more stable situation in Congo. The volatile situation in the Congo, 
has postponed major investment projects and stopped major companies with a 
reputation to risk from investing in Congo (Stearns, 2010 p. 333). This can be 
seen for example in the mining industry where industrial scale mining is rare with 
most of it being done through artisanal mining. Even in 1984, Callaghy noted that 
the Congolese state lacked the political and procedural predictability that is 
necessary for a healthy business climate (Callaghy, 1984, p. 204), and it hasn’t 
improved much since then. What donor countries probably are guilty of, however, 
as Stearns points out, are regulatory failures in the way that ‘mining cowboys’ 
have been allowed to get away with massive frauds, hiding behind shell 
companies registered in tax havens. In other words, western governments have 
not cared enough about the behaviour of their own companies (Stearns, 2010 p. 
333). This might be slowly changing, as the inclusion of Dan Gertler, Kabila’s grey 
eminence, on the USA sanction list seems to indicate (Bloomberg, 2017). 
3.6. The functioning of the health and justice sectors 
Having gone through the overall importance of the role of aid, I will here review 
aid in the two particular sectors that I have chosen to focus on, the health and the 
justice sectors. I will briefly describe the history of the two sectors, and how they 
have developed over time. I will give an overview of the structure and the 
organisation of the sectors, including the key challenges that they are facing. 
Then I will move on to look at the donors, which ones are involved and how much 
aid is given. Finally, I will look into the specific programme(s) in each sector that 
I have been reviewing in-depth throughout my research. 
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3.6.1. The health sector 
In the 1970s the community care system that the Congolese system is built upon 
was, for a brief period of time, seen as a model for the rest of Africa. Today, an 
estimated 70% of Congolese have little or no access to health care (USAID, 
2014a), the life expectancy rate at birth is 60 years (World Bank country profile, 
2016)58 and the country has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the 
world.59 
However, there are some rays of hope. As Pearson, in a case study on service 
delivery in Congo in 2011 pointed out, health is one of the stronger of Congo’s 
very weak social sectors (Pearson, 2011, p. 13). Compared to some other 
sectors, there is a national health structure in place that donors and the 
government can build upon in order to strengthen health service delivery in the 
country. The government has developed a national development plan that is 
praised by observers and is generally seen as being one of the best in the region. 
The government has also developed a so-called basic minimum service health 
package that all health centres should follow. There is a complementary health 
packages scheme for hospitals. These measures have helped to provide a 
degree of policy coherence and uniformity in service delivery in an otherwise 
uncoordinated system. It appears that there is some political will at the Ministry 
of Health, although patchy, to improve the situation and the country has been 
making progress in reducing child mortality. Between 2000 and 2015, the infant 
mortality rate decreased from 107.4 in 2000 to 74.5 deaths per 1,000 live births 
in 2015 (DFID, 2018, p. 6) .  
The health system is managed like a pyramid with the Ministry of Health at the 
top, followed by 26 provincial ministries of health, and with 515 health zone levels 
that form the operational base of the system (Waldman, 2006 p. 6). The health 
system is highly centralised, at least on paper, and the Ministry is responsible for 
making policies and for overseeing the health system (Integrity, 2014, p. 15). At 
the provincial level there is the provincial Minister of Health, appointed by the 
governor, and the ‘Departement de Santé’ (DPS). The health zones are directed 
                                            
58 https://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-dem-rep. 
59 The rate is 693 per 100 000 live births (http://www.who.int/gho/maternal_health/countries/cod.pdf). 
90 
 
 
by a Head Medical Chief (Médecin Chef de Zone) who is supported by an 
administrative health zone team (Équipe Cadre du Bureau Central de Zone 
(ECBZ) (Integrity, 2014 p. 9). The Health Zone is sub-divided into a variable 
number of 'Aires de santé’ that consist of several health centres and even more 
peripheral health posts. In addition, each health zone has a general reference 
hospital which is responsible for the most serious cases in the zone (Integrity, 
2014, p. 10).  
A large number of the health centers are run by faith-based networks and almost 
half of the health zones are co-managed by the FBOs (Waldman, 2006 p. 6). 
They exist in symbiosis with the government, and there are complex management 
systems between them, 
which I will go through 
in more detail in chapter 
6, where I will analyse 
the hybridity of the 
sector. The population 
is formally involved in 
the management of the 
health system through 
the system of so-called 
CODESAs.60  
Key challenges facing the health sector 
The sheer size of the country, the recurrent conflicts and lack of staff and health 
centres in rural areas are just some of the difficult challenges the health sector is 
facing. The Ministry of Health is quite open about the problems they are facing 
and the health policy stresses that part of the problem with poor health coverage 
is related to ineffective leadership at the Ministry of Health (SNSS, 2009 and 
2016). The MoH has, as a result of poor governance, chronic staffing problems 
and under-financing, lost the power to make independent decisions. It has 
difficulties in coordinating the activities of donors and is unable to control the 
financing of the health sector or the planning framework of health zones in the 
                                            
60 Comités de développement Sanitaire (ASSP gov. p. 1). 
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face of external initiatives, in part because as we will see later, donors are often 
by-passing the government. 
National budget: Government spending on health remains extremely low. The 
national budget that goes to the health sector is low, with 4.9% of 2016’s annual 
budget allocated to health (Ministry of Budget). Current health expenditure per 
capita was 34 USD which could be compared with Rwanda and Uganda where 
expenditures are 143 USD and 139 USD per capita respectively (USAID website, 
figures are from 2015).61 Most of the budget remains at the central level, which 
leaves the provincial and zone levels, where responsibility for service delivery 
resides, with very few resources (DFID, 2018, p. 6) 
To make things worse, there is also a very low understanding of the budget 
process and budgeting at the Ministry of Health. Funding mysteriously disappears 
on the way from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Health. As one former 
Director at the MoH put it: 'Budget lines exist for health and the money leaves the 
Ministry of Finance, but then nobody knows where it goes' (indicated in a 
confidential report). The confusion over budget lines and where they end up is a 
common problem in Congolese ministries and does not only relate to the MoH. 
One specific problem with the health budget is that a very large part of the budget 
allocation goes to the National Programme for Blood Transfusion. In 2016 and in 
the first half of 2017, the blood transfusion programme has used up much of the 
health budget (respectively 27% and 43% of all spending after remunerations) 
despite not officially having an allocated budget (DFID, 2018, p. 12). The most 
likely reason is that money is siphoned off from the blood bank into somebody’s 
account. In its request to the Ministry of Budget for 2018, the Health Ministry has 
strongly advocated for a specific and realistic allocation to the blood programme 
(ibid). 
Human resources: A closely related problem is weaknesses in Human Resource 
management. The majority of health staff members are not paid at all. It is difficult 
to get exact figures on who is paid and who is not, and it varies between the 26 
provinces. In a study undertaking in Kasaï, DFID found that out of 4 773 health 
workers identified, only 10% received a salary, whereas 24% received a salary 
                                            
61 https://idea.usaid.gov/cd/congo-kinshasa/health. 
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supplement (DFID, 2018, p. 23). As a consequence, health workers are heavily 
dependent on the so-called user-fees, which are out of pocket payments by 
patients. The user-fees not only provides salary to the staff at the health center 
but also finances administrative staff at various levels who do not have direct 
access to payments and therefore have limited possibilities of making money. 
This is what the Congolese refer to as the 'ventilation system', which can be 
described as a form of alternative taxation. The exact figures that flow through 
the system from the bottom all the way up to the Ministry are hard to get but 
studies have shown that 5 - 10 % of the health centres’ revenues from the patients 
move up the ladder to finance staff at the health zone, provincial and central 
levels (SRSS, 2009; Weijs et al. 2012 p. 30). The high poverty rates combined 
with high user-fees have left the population to a large extent without any 
affordable quality care, forcing people to rely instead on self-medication, 
traditional healers or simply doing nothing about sicknesses and diseases.  
Donor proliferation in the health sector 
There are more than a dozen bilateral and multilateral donors and hundreds of 
INGOs and NGOs involved in the health sector in Congo. Most are focusing their 
attention on the eastern, conflict-ridden part of the country. USAID is the largest 
bilateral donor, followed by DFID. Among the multilateral organisations, the World 
Bank, the EU, UNFPA and UNICEF are major actors. Global funds, such as GAVI 
and the Global Fund, are major players supporting vertical programmes and 
providing free medicines and bed nets.  
Due to concerns about capacity limitations and the possibility of corruption most 
international assistance is implemented through dedicated governmental 
implementation units and non-governmental contractors, often INGOs. This adds 
to the complexity and fragmentation of the sector. It is only lately that donors have 
started to take issues regarding sustainability and state-building more seriously 
and started to collaborate more closely with the Ministry of Health and the 
structures at the provincial and local level.  
The donors are funding around 40% of the health sector, making it the second 
largest sector for donors in the country (OECD data, 2015).  Donors' are funding 
around 20% of the recurrent costs of the health sector per year and around 80% 
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of the total investments such as the building and rehabilitation of health centres 
and hospitals. 
Having gone through the donor involvement in the health sector, I will now 
describe in some detail the DFID programme in health. As explained in the 
conceptual framework this is the largest bilateral health programme, and the one 
that I decided to review in-depth. 
DFID’s Access to primary health care programme 
DFID has been engaged in the health sector in Congo since 1997. The support 
was initially mainly focused on humanitarian assistance through UN agencies and 
INGOs. However, it has now evolved into longer term development projects 
aiming to improve both access to, and quality of, healthcare provision (DFID, 
2011b, p. 1). 
In the spring of 2012 DFID started its flagship programme in health, the 'Access 
to Primary Health Care' (ASSP). This built upon a former programme 'Access to 
Health Care' that was implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), 
which had a more humanitarian approach and didn’t focus on strengthening the 
health system itself. 
The ASSP programme is the biggest programme financed by DFID. It involves 
£188.3 million over a five-year period (2012-2016). The programme was later 
extended to continue until 2019 (DFID, 2018). During the first two years of the 
programme, Swedish Sida made a smaller contribution (4 million USD) to the 
programme in the form of a 'silent partnership', which meant that DFID alone was 
managing the programme (Sida, 2013a).  
The overall programme aims to strengthen the government’s health system by 
providing comprehensive support to 56 health-zones in four provinces. The 
programme has two components: 
1) The ASSP service delivery programme. This component has a strong 
emphasis on ensuring that reproductive, maternal, neonatal and child 
health improves in the supported health zones. It provides health systems 
strengthening and ‘Appui Global’, i.e. comprehensive support to the health 
zones in line with the Ministry of Health’s minimum package of activities 
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for primary health care (Sida assessment, 2013 p.1-2). The aim of the 
programme is to reduce mortality among children under five by 50% in 
target areas; to improve reproductive and maternal health: and to provide 
600,000 people with access to clean water and sanitation. 
2) Reinforcement of Institutional Capacity (Renforcement des Capacités 
Institutionnelles, RCI). The RCI component aims to support the MoH at 
central level through improving core functions such as stewardship, 
facilitating an enabling environment for service delivery, policy setting, 
implementation/quality control and information management (DFID, 
2012c).  
The programme is being implemented by a consortium of international and local 
organisations. The consortium lead is IMA World Health, an American faith-based 
organisation that has been working in Congo since 2000 and which has been 
working in close collaboration with SANRU, a local CSO that used to be part of 
the Protestant Church of Congo but is now an independent organisation. IMA’s 
four partners are each responsible for implementing the programme in a specific 
province. 
 Sanru is covering the province of former Kasaï-Occidental. 
 IRC covered the health zones in South Kivu, which were phased out during 
the first years of the programme. 
 World Vision is responsible for the health zones in the former province of 
Equateur. 
 Caritas (linked to the Catholic Church) works in former Province Orientale. 
In addition, there are four technical partners, each one responsible for a sub 
project: 
1) Family Planning and reproductive health (Path Finder)  
2) Operational Research (Tulane School of Public Health)  
3) Empowerment and Accountability (IMA) 
4) Development of a health database and registration of health workers 
(Intra-health) 
The programme has a strong community development component in order to 
involve the local community more actively in the co-management of the health 
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care centres, just as they were in the 1970s and 1980s. This is part of DFID's 
agenda of increasing accountability and good governance in the sector (DFID, 
2012a; Sida, 2013a). 
The programme has been reviewed by UK Parliament’s International 
Development Select Committee, and received overwhelming praise for its 
localised approach and the results the programme has achieved, such as 
utilisation rates having risen to 52% in the focus areas (U.K House of Commons, 
2017, pp. 27–28). During the first three years, the annual programme 
performance score was an A which means that the outputs met expectations. In 
2015/16 and 2016/2017, it received a B meaning that the outputs moderately did 
not meet expectations, and the risk rating has gone from Medium to Major. Part 
of this is related to the security challenges in the Kasaïs and part of it to some 
‘significant programme issues’, which seems to relate to mismanagement of 
funds in two of the four provinces in which the programme is active. DFID has 
subsequently strengthened the verification of medicines distributed and 
introduced more thorough checks on the status of equipment being distributed. 
Progress includes increased annual health service utilisation in the four 
provinces, increased use of health management information systems to support 
decision-making, a decrease in the number of ‘ghost workers’ in two pilot 
provinces and increased levels of vaccination (DFID, 2018, pp. 13, 22).   
3.6.2. The Justice Sector 
The justice sector in Congo is a dual system with two different legal systems. 
There is the traditional system, unwritten, which is also referred to as the local or 
traditional system of justice; and the formal, written one that is based on civil law. 
The formal system was introduced by the Belgians, and many of the laws are still 
the same as those inherited from the colonial system (Tekilazaya, et al., 2013b, 
p. 20). The traditional system is based on a system where the customary chief is 
the judge and where a settlement is negotiated with the goal of restoring social 
cohesion in the community. People are sometimes also resorting to other informal 
mechanisms, such as mediation by churches. In addition, some international 
organisations have set up structures for justice resolution in different parts of 
eastern Congo (see for ex. Jacobs & Kyamusugulwa, 2018; Jacobs et al., 2017). 
96 
 
 
The police are also mediating a number of cases and thereby solving conflicts 
before they are taken to the court. It is estimated that the non-state system is 
handling around 75 percent of the conflicts (Sida, 2011). 
There are many different reasons for the persistence of the dual system, which I 
will explore in more detail in chapter 6. The formal system has an incomplete 
physical infrastructure, i.e. out of 180 courts foreseen only about 50 have so far 
been constructed (Tekilazaya, et al., 2013a, p. 23). Customary Courts, on the 
other hand, have a presence from the village level up to royal courts of chiefdoms 
(Verweijen, 2016, p. 3). Apart from being far away and often seen as too 
expensive, the formal system is not well understood by the population (EU, 2013; 
Tekilazaya et al., 2013a, pp. 26–27).  
Unlike in the health sector, the government has not developed a comprehensive 
national justice policy and strategy, although the Ministry of Justice developed an 
action plan for justice sector reforms in 2007. This plan had, however, according 
to both interviewees from donors and the government not been used as a guiding 
instrument as I will show in chapter 5. 
Challenges in the justice system 
In this section I will deal with the challenges encountered in the formal system, 
which is the one that the donors are trying to reform. In chapter 6 on real 
governance, I will review some of the challenges with the customary system.  
There are a number of weaknesses with the formal justice sector that need to be 
addressed in order for it to function independently; and for people to gain trust in 
the system. The root problems are the lack of independence, shortage of funding 
and insufficient human resources.  
Interference by the executive branch is common and has a long history in Congo. 
This is one of the main reasons why the population has no confidence in the 
formal system, and it effectively hinders a credible system to deliver the rule of 
law from developing. During Mobutu’s rule, he was the head of the justice system 
and there was no independence of the judiciary. When the constitution was 
developed in 2006 it was agreed that the civilian court system should be 
reformed. A Constitutional Court was going to be established, but it was not until 
97 
 
 
2015 that the court was inaugurated, and there are doubts regarding its 
independence after some controversial verdicts by the court in favour of President 
Kabila.  
The new Constitution also stated that a judicial service council (Conseil Supérieur 
de la Magistrature - CSM) that would function as an oversight and monitoring 
body for judges and prosecutors should be established. Although it is now up and 
running, it is not perceived as being an independent body, and there is still an 
urgent need to eliminate corruption and impunity within the judicial profession 
(USAID, 2014b, p. 1). 
The independence of the justice system is also impaired by insufficient funding, 
which puts into question the government’s seriousness about creating an 
effectively functioning justice sector. Most of the budget goes to salaries for 
judges and other court employees. The judges are in general receiving their 
salaries, whereas only around 20% of the clerks do (interview implementer, 
Kinshasa, 2015-06-01). The government spends almost nothing on infrastructure 
and rehabilitation. In 2015 the percentage of the justice budget going to 
infrastructure was 3.8% (Ministry of Budget) leaving the donors to finance most 
of the cost for rehabilitation and infrastructure. The low level of budget set aside 
for infrastructure puts into question the feasibility of the government’s plan to build 
courthouses in every territory. 
Despite some recent recruitment, there are insufficient judges in the country and 
their number is not even enough for the existing number of courts in the country 
(Ilac, 2009, p. 20). In addition to the lack of staff, there is also the question of the 
quality of staff and their knowledge of laws and regulations. For example, there 
is no regular dissemination of new laws or regulations and the capacity within the 
Ministry of Justice to lead reforms is weak, especially as most of them do not 
have any judicial background (Sida, 2011, p. 5). 
The donor community in the justice sector 
The justice sector involves fewer donors than the health sector. The main actors 
have been the European Union, UNDP, and the USA, followed by Canada, 
Sweden and Belgium. There are also several International NGOs active in the 
sector, such as the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), RCN 
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Democracy and Justice, ‘Avocats sans Frontières’ (ASF) and the American Bar 
Association (ABA). The International NGOs are both implementing their own 
programmes as well as acting as programme implementers for the bilateral or 
multilateral donors. The UN peace-keeping operation mission, Monusco, has also 
been active in the area. 
There have been few major ideological differences between the donors, and they 
have approximately the same vision for justice reforms. Most of them are involved 
in rather similar programmes, focusing on justice reforms and training of 
personnel. Some of them are also engaged in building courts and prisons, and 
many of them are involved in promoting mobile courts which are seen as a way 
to bring the formal justice system closer to the population. The results of these 
courts have been mixed and their sustainability has been questioned since they 
are totally dependent on aid funding. There is a concentration of activities in the 
eastern part of the country but the EU, UNDP and USAID (sometimes co-financed 
by bilateral donors such as Canada, Sweden and Belgium) are also trying to 
address challenges at the central level, working with the Ministry of Justice and 
the CSM. As in the health sector, there is a donor-government coordination 
group. It has, however, for reasons that I will explore in chapter 5 been less 
functional than the one in health.  
Few donors, except from the Belgian organisation RCN, have been directly 
involved or working with the traditional system, except when it comes to land 
disputes, where the traditional chiefs still play a major role.  
The PARJ and Uhaki Safi programme 
The two programmes I reviewed were the 'Programme d'Appui à la Réforme de 
la Justice’ (PARJ) and 'Uhaki Safi', which means fair justice in Swahili.62 Both 
programmes were financed by the European Union, in close cooperation with 
Sida, and in the case of Uhaki Safi also with the support of Belgium (EU PARJ, 
2009; EU Uhaki Safi, 2010).63 The programmes were promoted by the EU as 
complementary, working in synergy with each other, although they had been 
                                            
62 The programme is by the EU also referred to as PARJ-E, where the E stands for East, as in the eastern part of Congo. 
63 PARJ, which had a total budget of 29 MEUR was being co-financed by Sweden, who contributed with 8 MEUR (Sida, 
2009). Uhaki Safi, with a total budget of 18 MEUR, was co-financed by Sweden (6 MEUR) and Belgium (2 MEUR) (EU 
PARJ, 2009). 
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developed separately. The PARJ programme focused on reforms at the national 
level as well as supporting reforms in two pilot provinces (former Kasaï-
Occidental and Bas-Congo). Uhaki Safi was focused on eastern Congo (north 
and south Kivu and Ituri). In addition to general justice reforms, Uhaki Safi also 
included a specific component focusing on sexual violence and another on land-
reforms (EU, Uhaki Safi, 2010). The two programmes were also funding the 
building and reconstruction of courts, justice-buildings and prisons. The PARJ 
programme covered the period 2009-2014. Due to delays in setting up the 
programme its implementation only commenced in 2011 and was closed down in 
2016, although some of the construction work is still ongoing in 2018. The Uhaki 
Safi programme ran from 2012-2016 but was later prolonged to 2017.  
Both of the programmes built upon previous programmes supported by the EU. 
The Uhaki Safi programme was a follow-up to a programme called REJUSCO 
that had been operating in eastern Congo since 2007 (EU Uhaki Safi, 2010). That 
programme closed down after charges of corruption were levied against the 
implementer, and there was a gap before the Uhaki Safi programme started in 
2012. The rather abrupt way that the programme was closed upset the Ministry 
of Justice at both the central level and the district level (interview consultant, 
Kinshasa 2015-06-09; government official, Goma, 2015-04-14). The PARJ 
programme built upon a governance programme called PAG64 that included 
justice reform components (EU PARJ, 2009, p. 2). 
The programmes had rather complex implementation structures that contributed 
to delays. A German Consultant firm, Gopa, was chosen as the programme 
implementer for PARJ and later also for Uhaki Safi. In the case of Uhaki Safi two 
international organisations, ASF and RCN, were also selected to implement parts 
of the programme in close collaboration with GOPA. This arrangement proved 
problematic as the roles between them were not always clear and on numerous 
occasions they found it difficult to work with each other (implementer, Kinshasa 
2015-03-02). Sweden and Belgium, who contributed with financing to the EU, did 
so through a process where the overall responsibility of the programme was left 
to the EU. They, however, participated in dialogues and in follow-up meetings.   
                                            
64 Programme d’appui à la gouvernance. 
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3.7. Conclusion  
The historical legacy of Congo weighs heavily on the present. The Belgians 
hastily left a country in the hands of an elite that hadn’t been prepared to rule the 
country.   
As pointed out by Callaghy and by Stearns amongst others, since independence 
the story of the shift of power from Mobutu to Joseph Kabila has been about 
staying in power, not about creating a strong, accountable state (Callaghy, 1984, 
p. 202; Stearns, 2010). In a system where the discretion of the ruler, fiscal 
resources (mainly in the forms of minerals) and corruption are the glue that holds 
the system together, externally driven reforms often become a direct threat to the 
patrimonial system. In the words of Callaghy: ‘When the bureaucratic clashes 
with the patrimonial, the latter will most likely win out’ (Callaghy, 1984, p. 202). 
This has led to a system that privileges loyalty over competence and wealth and 
power over moral character (Stearns, 2010 p. 331). In the Congo, everything 
flows from political office, including access to the best business deals, influence 
and status. For those without power there are few opportunities to prosper. This 
explains why it has been easy for Mobutu and Joseph Kabila to pay-off and co-
opt the opposition. The ruling elite has not needed to rely upon either its 
population or a functional bureaucracy. The misuse of resources from Congo’s 
mineral wealth and aid funds has helped to facilitate this situation. A heavy 
responsibility falls on those who looked the other way as state institutions eroded 
and political life was controlled by Mobutu. When the Cold War finished and aid 
was significantly reduced, it led to a further erosion of the Congolese state and 
the eventual overthrown of Mobutu. However, despite the departure of Mobutu 
and the increase of aid, the underlying structures haven’t changed, and hence 
the corruption and mismanagement have continued. 
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Chapter 4. The Contemporary Engagement Between 
Donors and the Government – a Complicated 
Relationship 
4.1. Introduction 
As explained in chapter 1, the relationship between the donors and the 
government has often been hostile. As I will show, the donors see themselves as 
the ‘good ones’ trying to develop the country despite what they perceive as the 
Congolese elite’s lack of political will to initiate reforms and stabilise the country. 
On the Congolese side there is a perception that the donors are there to profit 
from Congo’s large and rich resources.  
The donors have been rather unsuccessful in engaging in meaningful policy 
dialogue with the Congolese government, and they have, in general, been 
reluctant to use conditionality. The government for its part seems to keep the 
donors at a distance and has done little in the way of ‘image management’ yet 
has still managed to carve out a substantial amount of policy space and secured 
a continuous flow of aid. Part of the explanation is without doubt related to the 
geo-strategic importance of Congo, situated in the heart of central Africa and 
bordering nine other countries, and the abundance of natural resources, all of 
which makes it hard to for the donors to ignore the country. However, Congo has 
also been rather skilful in playing the donors by having an aggressive discourse 
and in avoiding having high-level discussions by, among other strategies: 1) 
referring to the country’s history of colonialization; 2) playing the sovereignty card 
when it fits their purpose; and 3) using the international discourse of the Paris 
Declaration and country ownership in the negotiations. 
4.2. Perceptions of self and others 
As explained in the conceptual chapter, it is important to understand the images 
partners have of each other in order to understand how they engage with one 
another. For example, the more positive view the donors have of the government, 
the more likely they are to try to find a win-win and mutually beneficial solution; 
and vice-versa.  
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The ‘good guys’ and the ‘bad guys’ 
One doesn’t have to spend much time in Kinshasa to realise that there is a 
considerable amount of tension between the donors and the government. The 
cautious optimism that surrounded the transition period in the early 2000s and 
following the 2006 elections has faded, because of what donors see as reform 
failures, the continued insecurity, the ongoing political situation, dominated by 
increased human rights abuses and uncertainty regarding the holding of 
presidential elections.  
During my interviews with Heads of Cooperation and high-level diplomats I was 
presented with a rather grim picture of the willingness of the government to 
improve the situation in the country. For example, one Head of Cooperation told 
me: 
“The DRC is a predatory state, the donors might not want to accept it, but 
let’s face it that this is the reality” (Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa, 2015-
03-20) 
Some donors I interviewed not only referred to the state as being predatory but 
went one step further and claimed that the government was cunningly 
manipulating the situation in the country to its own advantage. As the following 
Head of Cooperation said: 
“The fragility of this country is manipulated and fabricated. It is a useful 
governance structure for the elite. If there is no accountability they can do 
as they want. They don’t want the country to be stable as the current 
situation is in their interest” (Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2014-11-21).  
During my last fieldtrip in late 2016, there was also suspicion in the donor 
community that Kabila was inciting violence in the east and in the central Kasaï 
region as a pretext for not holding elections. Although it is certainly true that the 
regime is profiting economically from the lack of rule of law and accountability, it 
is doubtful whether Kabila has the strength and capacity to orchestrate the chaos. 
It is more likely, as others such as the Congo expert Kris Berwouts argues, that 
the regime is not controlling the situation but they are seeking to profit from 
situations when they arise (Berwouts, 2017b). 
The donors are not the only ones with a bleak outlook on the government. Several 
reports produced by international organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, 
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the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Global Witness, also cast the regime in 
a negative light. The Enough project, an American organisation that monitors the 
mining sector, labelled the Congolese state as criminal in its report on the 
situation in the country in 2016 (Lezhnev, 2016).  
Do all the donors hold equally negative perceptions? There were some interesting 
exceptions. Generally, the Heads of Cooperation and other people working 
directly on aid tended to be a bit more negative than some of the high-level 
diplomats from multilateral organisations. For example, the UN Secretary 
General’s Special Representative (SGSR) at the time of my first two field visits, 
Martin Koebler, was, according to some other diplomats and UN staff members, 
overly optimistic about Congo.65 The EU Ambassador, a French diplomat, was 
also perceived by his staff and some other diplomats to be overly cautious in 
criticising the government (interview diplomat, Kinshasa 2016-11-17). In my 
experience, multilateral organisations tend to be more hesitant to criticize the host 
government and more often see their role as being a partner to the government, 
than the bilateral donors. In the case of the SGSRs, they are in a particularly 
delicate situation considering that the government has on several occasions 
asked Monusco to leave.66 Hence the SGSR needs to find a way forward so that 
the government allows the peacekeepers to stay, which without doubt makes 
taking a critical approach more difficult. 
We are here to help - the donors’ views of themselves 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the donors portrayed themselves as the ‘good ones’ in 
my interviews. For example, one Ambassador I interviewed said the following: 
“It is us [the international community] who are the ones that are making 
demands in this country. The people don't do it themselves because they 
expect a Hobbesian state.67 They have no expectations of the 
government, and the government simply don't care about them. So we are 
the ones that are making the demands. It is sad but that is the way it is´' 
(interview Ambassador, Kinshasa 2015-06-10). 
                                            
65 Interview with diplomat, Kinshasa 2015-06-29; Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015-02-24; UN official, Kinshasa 
2014-11-20. 
66 President Kabila has regularly asked for an exit strategy from Monusco, he did so for example before the elections 
in 2011 and again before the supposed elections in 2016 (ICG, 2018, p. 8). 
67 Referring to the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, and his idea about how life would have been before societies came 
into existence, stating that life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty and brutish’. 
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I heard similar comments from several other diplomats and donors throughout 
my field research. One of them expressed himself a bit more dramatically:  
“The donors care much more about the population than the government. 
Donors know that if you withdraw, people will die. So what level do you set 
- what kind of levels of death are you ready to accept?” (interview Head of 
Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015-06-18).  
The above quotes highlight three key elements in how the donors perceive 
themselves: i) they are in Congo to do good things and are on side of the 
population, trying to defend it against the state; ii) the government is callous, not 
caring about its population; and iii) the population has no power and will not be 
able to stand up against the government in order to claim their rights. Hence the 
donors are needed in order to protect the population and to help it claim their 
rights. 
It would be easy to dismiss accounts like these as naïve or even neo-colonial. 
However, in fairness, statements like the above should be seen in the context of 
the current situation in Congo with a government hanging on to power and 
violently clamping down on peaceful demonstrations. The government also has 
little popular support, with a poll from 2016 finding that only 13.4% of the 
population thought that the government was looking after their interests (Berci & 
Congo Research Group, 2016, p. 31). 
Background to the negative perceptions 
So where did these negative views come from? This might seem like a 
superfluous question to ask considering the precarious situation in the country. 
However, as I will demonstrate, there are other, deeper reasons behind the 
donors’ negative perceptions of the country.  
Firstly, as Dunn shows in his influential book ‘Imagining the Congo’ (2003), the 
country has consistently been framed as a country with violent people in need of 
civilizing influences (Dunn, 2003 p. 4). By examining the discourse about Congo 
during pre-colonial times through to the first Congo War in 1996/1997, Dunn 
develops a long view of trends and themes that emerge and recur throughout the 
history of the country (ibid p. 6). One key theme he finds is that “external actors 
have frequently attempted to characterize the country as divided, chaotic, and 
lacking the ability of self-articulation” which allows the external actors to then 
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speak on behalf of the Congo (ibid p. 9). That the situation is dire in Congo is, I 
would argue, an undeniable truth. The problem, however, with discourses like this 
is that by portraying Congo as a chaotic and backward country, external actors 
de-legitimize the country as a counterpart. As Stearns (2010) points out, these 
prior perceptions may lead to a lack of understanding of why people are acting 
like they do, thereby hindering a deeper understanding of the situation.   
Second, as the country has so much potential with the abundance of natural 
resources such as minerals, rainforests, rivers and fertile land, this contributes to 
an image that if the government could only ‘get its act together’ the country could 
be an affluent country contributing to wealth and stability in the region (interview 
donor official, Kinshasa 2015-07-07). One of my interviewees referred to the 
‘hopeless potential of Congo’, saying the country had so much potential, but due 
to its politics, this potential was never realised (interview implementer, Kinshasa 
2015-07-07). Two of my interviewees considered that as Congo had natural 
resources and was not the victim of desertification and other natural catastrophes 
it made it easier to have a more negative view of the Congolese government than 
other similar fragile countries that lack the same abundance of natural resources 
(interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-07-07; and CSO Representative, 
Kinshasa, 2014-12-11).  
The reproduction of images 
So how do these images get reproduced within and among the donors? In the 
conceptual framework we saw that there are many different ways that images get 
reproduced. One such way is through the International media and reports by 
International advocacy organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Oxfam and 
the International Crisis Group which all contribute to homogenising the donors’ 
views on Congo and how problems should be solved. For example, Autesserre 
shows in her article ‘Dangerous Tales – Dominant Narratives of the Congo and 
their unintended consequences’ (2012) that the international media as well as 
international organisations have created a narrative that to a large extent has 
been guiding interventions in the conflict-affected areas in eastern Congo. This 
includes seeing the conflict-minerals as the main cause of conflict, the sexual 
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violence as one of the main consequences and state-building as the main solution 
(Autesserre, 2012). 
Apart from news and reports, there are also more direct and personalized ways 
in which images get reproduced from long-term staff members to newcomers to 
the country. Part of this happens prior to staff arriving in post through, for 
example, the sharing of images from international media and pre-posting 
briefings. 
Once in the country there are a variety of formal meetings that donors attend. The 
EU Ambassadors, for example, meet weekly and the EU Heads of Cooperation 
meet monthly. There are also monthly meetings of all Heads of Cooperation. 
Diplomats and donors discuss current political events and coordinate their aid 
programmes and this leads to a more or less harmonized view of the situation.  
The Ambassadors and Heads of Cooperation also meet at numerous receptions 
that are held in Kinshasa, where they mingle with each other and exchange the 
latest views on political developments.  
There are many other informal gatherings where donors interact together and 
where they influence each other’s views on the situation in the country. These 
informal settings can be referred to as a ‘bubble’, meaning that international staff 
live in particular parts of the city and rarely socialise outside their group. Although 
Kinshasa is a big city with an estimated 10 million inhabitants, the circles in which 
the donors move around are surprisingly small, and few donors leave the enclave 
of Gombe, the affluent district in the city. 
Staff that have been in the country for a longer time pass on their views to 
newcomers, as I experienced first-hand. Having just arrived in Kinshasa, I 
attended a conference on aid effectiveness chaired by the Minister of Planning, 
Mr. Olivier Kamitatu, who gave, what I thought, was a quite impressive speech. 
He mentioned all the ‘right’ things, such as the need for aid transparency, a call 
for better coordination and alignment and a greater focus on national ownership. 
When I returned to the office I enthusiastically reported back to my colleagues, to 
find that they were considerably less impressed than me. I was told that Kamitatu 
was a ‘donor darling’ who knew what to say but that there was little action behind 
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his words. I was told not to believe all I heard. Through interactions like this, 
narratives get reproduced and reinforced. 
The government’s perceptions of the donors 
We have seen how the donors view themselves in relation to the Congolese 
government. But what about the government? How do they experience 
engagement with the diplomatic and donor community? What are their 
perceptions of the donors and what narratives do they use?  
Just as the donors’ views of the Congolese government are bleak, so are the 
government’s perceptions of the international community. A recurrent theme, 
related to the relatively widespread critique of Western imperialism, documented 
by amongst others Baaz and Stern, is that Western engagement is often 
constructed as driven by greed with the ultimate aim of exploiting a country’s 
national resources (Baaz & Stern, 2013, p. 204). This frequently comes up in both 
informal discussions and in the media and is well illustrated by the following 
account of a solider interviewed by Baaz and Stern: 
“They [the foreigners] all have their interests. Congo is rich in minerals. All 
minerals that are found elsewhere can be found here - even those that 
were not yet known by name. The Congolese are systematically used by 
all countries. European, American, and African - all people who come here, 
the majority do not come to help, but to exploit” (Baaz & Stern, 2013, p. 
204). 
Considering the history of the country, with the exploitative interventions by 
external actors, starting with the slave traders from European and Arabic states 
in the 16th century to the abuses under the Belgian King Leopold and later the 
Belgian state, it is not strange that there are these fears. 
Another narrative that is closely connected with the greed argument is the idea 
of so-called 'Balkanisation'; that international actors are there to break up the 
large Congolese state in order to replace it with a series of smaller states more 
easily influenced and exploited by foreign powers. This idea is widespread in 
Congo and one of the major local newspapers ‘le Potentiel’ used to have on its 
front page a message stating 'Non à la balkanisation du pays’ (no to the 
balkanisation of the country). Large billboards with the same message can also 
at times be seen around Kinshasa. The idea that Congo is too big to be managed 
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and that it should be abolished as a unitary state has also been argued by 
academics, such as Herbst and Mills (2009a, 2009b). The same argument has 
been made for other large African states (Clapham & Herbst, 2006). The 
Balkanization rhetoric is partly used as a tool by the government to unite the 
country against foreign interference but there is a genuine fear that some of 
Congo’s neighbours are conspiring to take over parts of eastern Congo with the 
support of Western powers (Berci & Congo Research Group, 2016, p. 22). Behind 
this fear is the fact that neighbouring countries have indeed often interfered in 
eastern Congo and the second Congo war was, to a large extent, driven by a 
wish to exploit Congo’s resources.  
Hence, the fear of exploitation and ‘balkanization’ amongst the population is real 
and the government is using this rhetoric for its own aims. They might partly 
believe in it themselves but, as other authors have pointed out, governments are 
sometimes quick to evade responsibility and portray donors as the ‘bad guys’ 
when things are going wrong (Collier, 2007; Sjöstedt, 2013, p. 146). This, I would 
argue is the case with the Congolese government. One prime example is Lambert 
Mende, Minister of Media and Communications. His role is, like ‘Bagdad Bob’ in 
Iraq, to give the impression that all is well in Congo. Congolese people often refer 
to him as the ‘parrot’, saying that he repeats whatever President Kabila says. He 
is also often trying to delegitimize western actors. On one occasion when Human 
Rights Watch and Global Witness criticised the government for having closed the 
Radio station RFI, he retorted by denouncing the NGOs as ‘humanitarian 
terrorists’ whose aim is to destabilize and balkanize Congo for financial motives 
(Trefon, 2011, p. 111). As Trefon has pointed out, and as noted in chapter 3, 
propaganda is a key element in the political culture of Congo. The truth or 
falsehood of official information is only of relative importance (Trefon, 2011 p. 
112). As a consequence, the government often increase ‘noise’ to mask their own 
shortcomings. Mr. Mende was added in November 2017 to the EU sanction list 
for being “responsible for the repressive media policy” in Congo (Council of the 
EU, 2017).   
Being portrayed as particularly 'rich', endowed with exceptional mineral and other 
resources, Congo often emerges as more or equally important for external actors 
than external actors are for them. According to some of my informants this is one 
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of the main reasons why the government feels that it can be tough against the 
donors, but still anticipate that they will stay.68  
Amongst government officials that I interviewed who were engaged with donors 
there were fewer accounts of donors being there to exploit the country. Instead, 
their narratives, quite understandably, focused on what was needed and what the 
donors were not doing.  For example, donors were not giving them the necessary 
resources for conducting their jobs properly, by not providing computers and 
internet services (interview government officials, Kinshasa 2016-11-23; 2016-11-
29; and 2015-06-12). This might seem trivial but for people whose salaries and 
budgets are very low these issues often lead to hostile feelings towards donors. 
Interviews with staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Planning 
also revealed perceptions that donors were not coordinating or involving them 
sufficiently in their programmes (interview government officials, Kinshasa 2015-
06-12, and 2016-11-27).  
The views of the population 
Thanks to, among others, Berci and the Congo Research Group that are carrying 
out surveys and to the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and UNDP that are 
conducting perception studies in the eastern parts of Congo, there is some 
information about how people perceive the donors and the government. For 
example, in a poll from 2018, only 17% said that they could think about voting for 
a candidate from the President’s party (PPRD) and only 6% were thinking about 
voting for Kabila (Berci & Congo Research Group, 2018, pp. 4 & 12). The 
Congolese population, however, remains strongly attached to the democratic 
process, with 95% saying they plan to vote in the coming elections. Views of the 
opposition candidates are fragmented, with the most popular figure, Moïse 
Katumbi, likely to get around 24% of the vote (ibid, pp. 4 &10). 
The latest Berci report (2018) suggests that the Congolese broadly welcome 
foreign involvement in political affairs, despite the ruling party’s efforts to portray 
such actions as illegitimate meddling in domestic affairs. A large majority (68%) 
welcomed sanctions imposed by the European Union, and a surprising 77% said 
                                            
68 see for ex. INGO representative, Kinshasa 2016-11-01; independent consultant, Kinshasa 2015-07-04. 
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that they would support the creation of an international steering committee to 
support the holding of elections, much like the ‘Comité International 
d’Accompagnement de la Transition’ (CIAT) at the time of democratic transition 
between 2003 and 2006 (Berci & Congo Research Group, 2018, p. 17). These 
opinions resonate well with what Wrong argues to be a tendency in Congo; 
namely the belief that changes can only come about from the outside (Wrong, 
2001). Considering the history of the country, with numerous foreign 
interventions, and limited opportunities for Congolese people to demand change, 
these opinions are understandable, although unfortunate.  
The graphs below show the population’s approval ratings of various organisations 
and countries. Countries, like the USA, and institutions, like the EU, that have 
imposed sanctions towards the regime and taken a tough stance against the 
government regarding the elections and human rights abuses get the highest 
approval ratings. Belgium, which has been one of the staunchest critics of the 
regime, is the most popular bilateral partner despite the government’s virulent 
attacks on it (Berci & Congo Research Group, 2018, p. 17). The African Union 
and neighbouring countries, who are seen to have put little pressure on Kabila, 
receive considerably less approval (Berci & Congo Research Group, 2018, p. 17; 
ICG, 2017, p. ii).  
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Figure 5. Approval rating  Figure 6. Approval ratings countries69 
institutions  
 
It is worth stating that despite Belgium’s popularity, a majority (60%), disapproved 
of Belgium’s decision to put an end to international assistance provided through 
the Congolese government (ibid p. 18). Hence the donors might be right in being 
cautious about cutting aid: it might not only hurt the population but the donors’ 
reputation as well.  
When it comes to development aid, the picture is bleaker. Many Congolese feel 
that they do not benefit from foreign aid or humanitarian assistance. In a poll from 
2016, 31.3% agreed with the statement that Congo would be better off without 
aid (Berci & Congo Research Group, 2016, p. 35). Perhaps surprisingly, these 
responses are even higher in some of the provinces most affected. For example, 
in North Kivu, where a lot of INGOs are operating, 47.2% said they would be 
better without them (ibid). In a similar vein, Monusco, whose reputation has been 
tainted by sexual abuse scandals and by accusations of not sufficiently protecting 
the population is less popular in the eastern part of Congo, where most of its 
troops are deployed (Berci & Congo Research Group, 2016, pp. 32–33; Vinck & 
Pham, 2014, p. 54).  
                                            
69 Berci & Congo Research Group, 2018 p. 17. 
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During a visit to Goma in October 2016, I could personally observe the 
perceptions reported in the polls. I was, through my job, meeting with 
representatives from the political opposition and local CSOs who for the most part 
expressed frustrations by the fact that the EU had not yet issued sanctions 
against the regime like the USA had done. The frustrations with INGOs and 
Monusco also came up, and in some areas local self-help groups had put up 
roadblocks to prevent the distribution of humanitarian aid. North and South Kivu 
has seen conflict since the early 1990s, but despite all the aid and the 
peacekeepers, the situation hasn’t stabilised and the low approval ratings should 
be seen in the light of an aid fatigue and disappointment with what has been 
achieved. As one young man told me: ‘We just want to live in peace and go on 
with our lives, we don’t want to be dependent on hand-outs’ (discussion in Goma, 
2016-10-12).  
The negative views on aid might seem surprising, but are driven by a number of 
factors, such as resentment that despite all the humanitarian aid and peace-
keeping interventions life is still dire, and people don’t have a sense that their 
lives are getting any better. They are also disappointed with Monusco, who 
despite being the largest UN mission often fails to protect the local population 
against attacks by various rebel groups. Considering the large number of rebel 
groups and the large areas the mission is supposed to cover, it is an almost 
impossible task, but it understandable that people get frustrated. As Autesserre 
argues in her book ‘Peaceland’ feelings toward INGOs and UN staff in eastern 
Congo are also based on resentment regarding the inequalities in resources 
between foreigners and the local population, that interveners often don’t take 
local knowledge into sufficient account, and a feeling of humiliation about being 
dependent on aid (Auttessere, 2014, chapter 6). These resentments sometimes 
cause the local population to contest and even resist international programmes, 
such as by throwing stones at vehicles belonging to foreign interveners, or as in 
the example above, to hinder humanitarian actors from reaching their villages.  
Summary 
In the above section I have demonstrated that both the donors and the 
government have negative images of each other, and that little trust exists 
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between them. The donors constantly highlighted the lack of political will of the 
elite to develop the country and were frustrated at having to deal with a 
government that didn’t seem to care about its own population. This was explained 
as either they were simply not interested or because they were seen to be actively 
benefiting from the current fragile situation, perhaps even manipulating the 
situation in the country in order for it to remain fragile. The donors considered that 
they were the ones that wanted to see the country develop, whereas the 
government either believed or wanted to give the impression to the population 
that donors were not there for the good of the country. The donors rarely seemed 
to reflect on their own short-comings or even fully acknowledge the difficulties a 
‘well-meaning’ government would have in reforming a state that is so permeated 
by patrimonial structures. 
These images were partly based on previous experience and have led to an 
almost complete lack of trust amongst them. In the next section I will explore what 
strategies that the donors and the government used and how they were 
influenced by the partners’ perceptions of each other.  
4.3. Creating and using bargaining spaces  
In order to unpack how perceptions shape strategies, one needs to have a better 
understanding of how aid coordination and dialogue are organized and the 
possibilities for using conditionalities. Hence, this section will start with an 
overview as to how aid coordination and aid dialogue are organised in the 
country, and how the donors and the government tried to shape them. This will 
be followed by a discussion on the use of conditionality, before a consideration 
of other strategies that the government and donors have used and how the other 
party has reacted to it.  
Aid fragmentation and proliferation of development plans  
Aid coordination and alignment to the host government’s development plans is a 
key component in the aid effectiveness agenda, along with a focus on policy 
dialogue and the avoidance of conditionality. In Congo such aid coordination is 
rendered more difficult due to the fragmentation of government institutions and 
their competing interests, compounded by fragmentation amongst the donors.  
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On the Congolese side the responsibility of aid coordination is split across several 
ministries such as the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. In addition, many 
substantial discussions are undertaken by the different sector ministries such as 
the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Transport. During the time of the 
interviews, it was not clear which Ministry was in charge for overall coordination 
with bilateral donors. My respondents at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said they 
were responsible as they had the necessary overview and contacts with the 
international community, which the Ministry of Planning didn’t have (interview with 
a group of three government officials, Kinshasa, 2016-12-02). A number of 
bilateral donors are signing their overall bilateral development agreements with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which makes them consider themselves to be the 
main counterpart (government official, Kinshasa 2015-06-12). The Ministry of 
Planning argued they were responsible as they had the overall responsibility for 
the country’s poverty reduction strategy (interview two government officials, 
Kinshasa, 2016-11-23 and 2016-11-27). The donors on their side were, 
unsurprisingly, confused about who was in charge. According to those that I 
interviewed, they had the impression that the Prime Minister had decided that it 
was the Ministry of Planning that should have the overall coordination role, but 
they hadn’t yet seen any formal communication of this (interview with two Heads 
of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2016-12-02). This type of confusion and overlap is 
common in Congo, illustrating the lack of central control over the different 
ministries and a reflection of the competition between the ministries to have the 
lead relationship with the donors which provides influence over resources and 
increases their sphere of influence. This is consistent with what I reviewed in 
chapter 3.3 regarding political culture, and that there are no incentives for 
collective action.  
An equally fragmented and confusing situation was noted regarding development 
strategies and their status. Congo has no shortage of plans; there is, for example, 
the government’s plan for the stabilization of the country (STAREC)70 and the 
donors’ response to it (the ISSSS).71 There is also the Addis Ababa Peace, 
                                            
70 Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
71 The International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy.  
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Security and Cooperation Framework for DRC that sets out regional and national 
obligations as part of the Peace accord with the M-23 in 2013. There are the 
fragility indicators developed in response to the New Deal and finally there is the 
second-generation Poverty Reduction Strategy (DSCRP-2)72 that was 
accompanied by ‘le Programme d’Action de Gouvernement’ 2012-2016. During 
the time of my last field research the government had started to work on the 
National strategy for development (2017-2021) that was going to replace the 
DSCRP. The donors that I interviewed complained that it was hard to know which 
of all the different plans the government gave precedence to, if any. They also 
complained that the plans were seldom coordinated across different ministries 
and that they were long wish lists, not giving any ranking to what was prioritised 
and not. 
The lack of clarity regarding coordination and the proliferation of plans led to what 
one of the donors called ‘a culture of workshops’, saying that: 
“As a donor, if you are not careful you can easily spend 200% of your time 
running around at these kind of things” (interview donor official, Kinshasa, 
2015-07-07).  
It might have been the strategy of the government to keep the donors busy and 
to side-track the donors from policy dialogues that the government wanted to 
keep for themselves. However, considering the overall weak coordination within 
the government it seems more likely that the proliferation of plans was also driven 
by a competition between the ministries. Some donors also suspected that the 
‘culture of workshops’ was a pretext to receiving allowances, paid by donors to 
allow ministry staff to attend workshops and meetings. In this regard, the donors 
share some of the blame for providing incentives for having numerous plans and 
strategies. Donors also often provided support in the form of experts and 
consultants to develop plans and so a small industry built up around them.  
The donors are attempting to coordinate themselves through the donor 
coordination group (GCP). The group meets on a monthly basis and has become 
more structured over the years with a donor-funded staff member attached to it 
and being led by an executive group consisting of two representatives from 
                                            
72 Document de stratégie de croissance et réduction de la pauvreté. 
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multilateral institutions and three bilateral donor agencies. Some of those I 
interviewed and who had been in Congo for some years claimed that the group 
now functioned better than previously (interview Heads of Cooperation, 
Kinshasa, 2015-03-20; 2015-06-02). However, one representative of a major 
bilateral donor had become increasingly disappointed by the group and had 
stopped attending (interview Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015-07-02). Others 
said that progress was being made but that it was difficult to coordinate when 
there was no counterpart to work with (interview two Heads of Cooperation, 
Kinshasa 2016-12-02). As one of their colleagues expressed it: 
“How do you coordinate around something, when there is no one on the 
other side that ever has an opinion about anything” (interview donor 
official, Kinshasa 2016-12-02). 
A similar account was given by a donor involved in public financial management 
reforms in which progress had been more or less stalled: 
“They [the government] doesn’t seem to want what we are offering them – 
but can’t they then just say what they want and then we can work on that. 
But not even that is happening, they just don’t tell us anything” (interview 
donor official, Kinshasa 2015-07-01). 
These representations suggest a deep frustration by the donors regarding what 
they see a lack of a counterpart to discuss with. Several people with insights into 
the donor coordination group also complained about the behaviour of the donors 
themselves. One individual who attended the meetings on behalf of her Head of 
Cooperation was disappointed by what she saw as lack of seriousness: 
“People are coming unprepared for the meetings and nobody has any 
questions. The executive committee is regularly having lunch together but 
no information is ever shared from those meetings so there is no 
transparency. In addition, the person at the secretariat is far too junior and 
has no clout” (interview donor official, Kinshasa, 2015-07-01). 
Some Heads of Cooperation raised concerns over who could speak on behalf of 
the donor group noting that the EU Ambassador and the Head of UNDP, who 
were executive members in the GCP, were not well placed, as they were 
diplomats representing organisations that needed the buy-in from the 
government. Hence, they were not seen as always taking a sufficiently critical 
view towards the government (interview two Heads of Cooperation, Kinshasa 
2015-12-02). 
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In conclusion, donors are trying to coordinate themselves but this takes time and 
effort and few donors seemed to be willing to fully engage in it. The lack of a 
counterpart in the government was a major obstacle to coordination efforts, 
making it hard for donors to harmonise and align to government led plans. 
Political dialogue 
The lack of coordination was compounded by a lack of high-level dialogue 
between the donors and the government.    
The Ambassadors had their meetings with different Ministers but also they had 
problems with access, especially at the highest level. Kabila preferred to minimise 
his contacts. Some diplomats I interviewed complained that it was getting ever 
more difficult to gain access to him. One of them, representing one of the main 
donors to the country, reflected that perhaps this was not very surprising 
considering that those diplomats that actually had access were mainly there to 
urge Kabila to arrange elections, which he clearly had no interest in (interview 
Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015-07-02).73  
Another illustration of the lack of dialogue at the highest level is the political 
dialogue that the EU should have with the government according to the EU-ACP 
(Cotonou Agreement).74 Article 8 stipulates that there should be regular dialogue 
between the government and the EU; however, the EU had encountered 
problems in having these meetings. There had been one in 2014, which 
according to one of the participants who attended, a rather strange meeting 
(interview Ambassador, Kinshasa 2014-12-08). The Prime Minister had, for 
example, attended the meeting alone, which is rare for this kind of consultation. 
In early 2016 there had been another one, attended by several ministers, where, 
according to the EU there had been a rather frank and open discussion, perhaps 
as Congo around this time was asking IMF, the World Bank, the African 
Development Bank and the EU for budget support. Another call for an article 8 
                                            
73 In July 2018 he took this non-dialogue to new heights, by cancelling a meeting with the UN’s General Secretary, 
António Guterres and the AU Chairperson Mr. Moussa Faki just before the two top diplomats were due to travel to 
Kinshasa (Human Rights Watch, 2018). They were expected to deliver a harsh message to Kabila, requesting him to 
step down. 
74http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201306/20130605ATT67340/20130605ATT67340EN.p
df.  ACP stands for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. 
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consultation in 2016 had been left unanswered by the government for over half a 
year.  
Hence, making themselves unavailable seems to have been a strategy used by 
the very top of the Congolese administration, and it was often difficult for the 
donors to have high-level policy dialogue with the government. Considering that 
a number of decisions are taken not in the different ministries but in the close 
circle around President Kabila, such a lack of access matters. This strategy of 
avoidance is in line with the political culture of secrecy that surrounds the 
Congolese government. 
Not believing in conditionality 
Considering that dialogue and coordination with the government didn’t seem to 
get the donors very far in actively engaging with decision-makers, one might have 
expected the donors to resort to the use of conditionality. The use of conditionality 
to incentivise the government is, however, not always easy and often doesn't lead 
to the desired outcome, as the following example from DFID and their police 
programme, illustrates. 
In autumn 2012 when President Kabila had been forced to sign the Addis Ababa 
peace accord and was severely weakened, he pledged that he would eradicate 
the problem of street violence in Kinshasa. The so-called Kalunas, criminal 
youths, had become more aggressive and were perceived as a real problem. A 
brutal police intervention was launched. Several extra judicial killings took place 
and Human Rights Watch estimated that 51 young men and boys were killed 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014). The UN and the international community protested 
loudly, which led the government to expel the head of the UN and Monusco’s joint 
Human Rights bureau, Mr. Scott Campell. For those donors that had been 
involved in reforming the police sector, the whole thing was an embarrassment 
and a dilemma. Should one stay or should one go? DFID had been quite pleased 
with the results of its police programme and felt that they had started to reach a 
point of mutual trust (interview Donor official, Kinshasa 2015-06-24). As a first 
response, they initiated a discussion with the Ministry of Interior at the highest 
level. DFID made two requests in order for the cooperation to continue: a) officials 
involved in the operation should be suspended pending an investigation and b) 
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an internal investigation should be undertaken and the results should be made 
public.  
At the same time as the dialogue with the Ministry of Interior was being 
undertaken, DFID was working with other donors to agree upon a common 
response. Initially there had been good collaboration. The USA decided to 
suspend part of its police programme, France suspended a small programme 
they had and Belgium enthusiastically supported the suspensions (interview 
donor official, Kinshasa 2015-06-24). The EU Delegation, however, one of the 
major donors in the sector, didn't agree with this approach, considering that 
suspension would only hurt the police and emphasising that there was a need for 
a long-term view (ibid). In the meantime, DFID continued its dialogue with the 
Ministry, meeting the Minister of Interior on numerous occasions. A person 
closely involved in the discussions noted that the Minister didn't seemed to care 
whether DFID continued its support or not (interview donor official, Kinshasa 
2015-06-24; another donor official, Kinshasa 2015-03-20). Allegedly, the Minister 
had told them that Congo is a sovereign country, as is the UK, so if the UK wanted 
to suspend the programme it was their decision (ibid). It was not an easy decision 
for the UK. In the end, political considerations prevailed. 2015 was an election 
year in the UK and the government didn’t want a story in the domestic press about 
them supporting a police force that was engaged in extra-judicial killings. Hence 
the decision was taken to abandon the project. Tellingly, the day after the UK 
announced its decision to suspend the programme, the EU Ambassador went out 
in the Congolese press emphasising that the EU stood by the police in these 
difficult times (Le Potentiel, 2014). Understandably this led to a frosty relationship 
between the EU and the UK for some time (interview donor official, Kinshasa 
2015-06-24). 
It is difficult to tell whether the government did care or not about the cancelling of 
the police programme. The fact that the programme was in its final stages might 
have lessened the consequences of the decision. A new project had been 
planned but these discussions were cancelled as a result. Governors and police 
officers involved in the programme had been upset about the cancellation of the 
programme and DFID made field trips around the country to explain its decision 
(interview donor official, Kinshasa 2014-12-10; donor official, Kinshasa 2015-06-
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24). This was one of a few cases that I heard about during my fieldwork where a 
donor had actually tried to impose conditionality in one of their projects.  
During my interviews I had in-depth discussions with donors, and in particular 
with Heads of Cooperation as to what they thought about conditionality, and only 
a few had a somewhat positive view of it. One Head of Cooperation asked 
rhetorically: “as the government is not interested in the population, why would you 
put conditions?” (interview Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015-06-15). 
Interestingly, the donor officials that in general were more positive regarding its 
use were Congolese staff members.  
The overall scepticism regarding conditionality that has prevailed in the 
international discourse on aid was observable at the country level. Heads of 
Cooperation expressed scepticism both due to ideological reasons that it was not 
right and due to concerns that it wouldn’t work. They also objected to it for more 
practical reasons stating that they wouldn’t get their programmes implemented if 
they imposed sanctions. 
A different take was offered by one donor official, a local staff member who 
advocated for conditionality. As there was no political will, she thought that it could 
be one way to incentivise leaders. She emphasised that it would need to be done 
in a smart way by, for example, targeting lower levels of the administration that 
she believed cared more about the population. She believed that ‘micro-
conditionality’, where local government were asked to contribute financially would 
also have the added value of being easier to get approval for at the Embassy 
level. Her experience was that if you try to use conditionality at a higher level it 
gets too political and the Embassy staff will tell them not to do it. She had allegedly 
seen this happening, not only at her Embassy, but other embassies as well 
(interview local donor official, Kinshasa 2015-06-09). This reflects the view that 
diplomats are in general more reluctant to risk their relationship with the 
government than people directly involved in aid delivery tend to be.  
Limited image management and the Government playing the sovereignty card 
As I showed in the conceptual framework, some recipient countries are using 
various forms of image management, by for example: i) personalisation of 
diplomacy, i.e. by making themselves available to the donors on a personal level; 
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ii) using public relations firms; and iii) engaging with media and academia in 
important donor countries. Congo has done relatively little in this regard. As 
shown above, the personalisation of diplomacy has not been a favoured strategy 
by Congo. I found little evidence that the government were using public relations 
firms or engaging with media and academia in important donor countries to any 
major extent before the sanctions issued in 2016 and 2017 by the USA and the 
EU against certain individuals in the regime. After this there seems to have been 
increased lobbying efforts with representatives traveling to Europe and the USA. 
The government has also signed a 5.6 million USD contract with an Israeli-based 
consulting firm which allegedly will assist in setting up meetings with senior USA 
administration officers and key policy makers in various Congressional 
Committees (The Hill Newsletter, 2017a), to seek to increase the influence in the 
USA (The Hill Newsletter, 2017b). In a speech by Kabila’s special envoy at the 
US congress on 16 May 2018, he tried to portray an image of Kabila as standing 
for stability, peace and economic progress, by emphasising that the security 
situation is better today than when Kabila took over in 2001, and by highlighting 
the economic growth that has taken place during the last years. As donors usually 
like stability in a country, it was clearly a move to say that the donor community 
would be better off with Kabila in the lead, than an insecure future without him. It 
reminds about Mobutu’s threat – that after me there will be chaos. Only this time, 
Kabila seems to lack the ability to keep the country relatively stable and conflict-
free so the discourse is unlikely to work.  
The Congolese opposition has been far more active in deploying ‘image 
management’ strategies. One opposition leader, Mr. Moïse Katumbi, has actively 
engaged with foreign media. He has also hired consultancy firms, set-up a 
fundraising organisation in the USA and travelled extensively to the USA, France 
and the UK (Reid, 2018, p. 115).  
Hence, in contrast to some of its neighbours, the Congolese government has not 
tried to 'sell' itself to donors. Nor has it tried to portray itself as a friend to the 
international community by sending troops abroad,75 or by being a successful 
                                            
75 Congo did at one point sent soldiers to the UN’s peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic. They were, 
however, sent back after accusations of sexual violence. Congo was consequently banned from sending troops to the 
UN. 
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case in regard to delivering poverty reduction, although macro-economic 
improvements have been highlighted in the discourse. The strategy instead 
seems to rely on having a rather aggressive discourse against the donors, 
highlighting its colonial past and stressing that they are now a sovereign country.  
An illustrative example is how the government reacted to a criticism by the 
European Court of Auditors (ECA). In 2013 the ECA published a critical report 
telling the EU Delegation that it needed to be more demanding of the Congolese 
authorities. The ECA had reviewed the EU's support to key areas of governance 
in Congo and found that: ’While EU support is well-intentioned and achieving 
some results, progress is slow, uneven and overall limited’ (European Court of 
Auditors, 2013 p. 7). It concluded that the EU Delegation hadn't used 
conditionality and policy dialogue to a sufficient extent, which had contributed to 
the lack of implementation. The EU Delegation was criticised for not having 
analysed the context sufficiently and thereby underestimated the risks involved 
(ibid). The report also referenced high levels of corruption and the lack of effort 
by the government to address certain issues related to the governance agenda 
(ibid p. 11). 
The EU Development Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, tried a diplomatic 
approach highlighting positive results from EU cooperation, stressing that the 
country had more or less started from zero in 2002 and that development takes 
time. He was, however, cautious when addressing the criticism related to the EU 
Delegation being weak on dialogue and conditionality. He stressed, for example, 
the importance of having a close political and sector dialogue with the 
government to support mutual accountability. He also highlighted that aid needs 
to be predictable, particularly in a fragile state like Congo, concluding that 'while 
striking the good balance between policy dialogue and predictability of aid, the 
Commission considers that systematically using conditionality could be 
ineffective, or even counterproductive' (European Commission, 2013). The EU 
Delegation in Kinshasa tried to keep a low profile and did first not comment on 
the report.  
Radio France International (RFI), however, which is widely listened to in Congo 
highlighted the ECA report in one of its transmissions. The response from the 
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government was immediate. The government's Communication Minister, Mr. 
Mende, called a press conference where he condemned the EU for accusing 
them of being corrupt. In a long speech, he critiqued the EU Delegation for not 
following the aid effectiveness agenda by not involving them in programmes and 
for not transferring money through the state-system (Congolese government, 
2013), thus criticizing the EU for not following aid effectiveness principles. The 
EU Delegation considered that both the critique from the government and from 
the court of auditors was to a large extent unfair (EU diplomat, Kinshasa 2015-
06-15). The day after Mende’s press conference the EU Delegation went out with 
a communication highlighting the close collaboration it had with the government 
and distancing itself from the ECA’s conclusions (EU Delegation in Kinshasa, 
2013). Hence the EU tried to tread carefully in order not to upset the government 
but to little avail as they were still heavily criticized in a way that seems to be a 
strategy by the government to keep the donors under control. This is consistent 
with the political strategy of misinformation and noise to discredit opponents and 
hide their own shortcomings that is prevalent in Congolese politics.  
Whether this kind of lashing out by the government has any direct effect on how 
donors engage with the government is hard to prove, but it seems at times to 
have worked to avoid criticism as the example above suggests.  
As relationships between the government and donors have become more tense, 
an increasingly popular strategy by the government has been to refer to the notion 
of sovereignty as a way to minimize criticism over human rights abuses and the 
lack of progress in the election process. According to several diplomats the 
government was increasingly referring to sovereignty in their discussions with the 
diplomatic corps.76 Kabila, for example, invited several Ambassadors to an 
audience in mid-February 2015 shortly after he had tried to change the election 
law and violently clamped down a popular protest. He informed them that the 
Vienna Convention on diplomatic relationships says that diplomats posted in a 
foreign country should abstain from all forms of interference in the internal affairs 
of the host country (Le Potentiel, 2015). The government also used the language 
of sovereignty in the discussions regarding the future of Monusco, where the 
                                            
76 See for ex. interview Ambassador, Kinshasa 2015-06-10 and interview with Head of Cooperation, 
Kinshasa 2015-03-20. 
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government consistently demanded a reduction in the peace-keeping force, 
without presenting a plan on how they would take over the responsibilities 
themselves (interview Monusco representative, Kinshasa 2014-11-25). 
The strategy of using the language of sovereignty and colonialization has had 
some effect. For example, when the Belgian Development Minister, De Croo, 
visited Kinshasa in February 2015 he held a press conference upon arrival where 
he criticized the government for having closed down the mobile phone network 
as a response to popular protests against a proposed change to the election law. 
This led to a diplomatic quarrel in which the government spokesperson, Mr. 
Mende, publicly stated (Jeune Afrique, 2015): 
“your speech in a language, Dutch, which very few Congolese master, 
testifies to a lack of knowledge of the fact that the world has changed 
since the independence of our country in 1960 and that the frame that 
you view Congo from, through the childish fictions of Tintin in Congo, is 
outdated” 
 
He was hence referring to the Belgian colonisation of the country, and that the 
government saw the speech of the Belgian Ministry as an unwarranted 
interference.77 According to my interview with a Belgian diplomat, they had to 
work hard to convince Kabila to meet with the Minister of Development as had 
previously been planned. It was clear that she was not pleased by the behaviour 
of her Minister and what she referred to as the ‘war in the media’ that it had led 
to.  She believed that he was destroying their relationship with the government 
(interview diplomat, Kinshasa 2015-06-15). The Belgian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs also went out with a positive statement a few days later noting that he had 
seen progress in the democratic process from his last visit (Belga News, 2015). 
Again, the Congolese political culture of disinformation and creating noise proved 
to be rather successful. 
The Congolese government is also finding innovative ways to avoid pressure and 
resist interference from the donors. One case in point is the collaboration between 
the national army and Monusco – a collaboration that is not always welcomed by 
the regime. After the defeat of the M-23 by the national army and the UN’s special 
intervention brigade, Monusco and the army were supposed to work together to 
                                            
77 The cartoon Tintin in Congo has led to some heated debate, due to its racial portray of the Congolese.  
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fight the FDLR guerrilla group78 (the FDLR consists of soldiers from Rwanda 
accused of genocide and is perceived as a threat to the government in Rwanda). 
The Congolese government, who at times has been fighting the FDLR whilst on 
occasion collaborating with them, was stalling the operation (Vogel, 2015). The 
UN pushed but didn't get any responses until President Kabila suddenly 
announced that they were ready to move ahead and that he had appointed two 
generals to lead the offensive on behalf of the government (Le  Potentiel, 2015). 
There was one tricky detail though; the appointed generals were on the UN’s list 
of soldiers that have committed war crimes and whom the UN is prevented from 
collaborating with. Hence, Kabila managed to get the manoeuvre to fight (or not 
to fight) FDLR without the interference, and over-sight, by the UN. The UN, as 
anticipated, demanded that the two generals should be replaced. In reply Kabila 
publicly warned diplomats and UN officials against interfering in domestic affairs, 
such as army appointments (Vogel, 2015).  
4.4. Who needs whom? 
Considering the strategies used by the government, some Heads of Cooperation 
and diplomats had started to question whether the government wanted donors 
there. The following quote from an Ambassador illustrates this point: 
“The most painful thing is that the regime doesn't really care about the 
development assistance that they receive. As a matter of fact, they seem 
mainly to be provoked by it. Those that do seem to care are the civil 
servants who are dependent on the assistance” (interview Ambassador, 
Kinshasa 2016-06-10). 
In a similar vein, a Head of Cooperation said:  
“Some ministries, like mining, have their own resources. It is the ministries 
with the least resources, such as the Ministry of Planning, that are most 
interested in working with the donors. For them the donors are their 
minerals” (interview Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2014-11-21). 
These sentiments were also reflected in other interviews with donors and 
diplomats alike and it was clear that the donors felt that the elite was neither 
                                            
78 It is believed that the USA had managed to convince Rwanda to stop its support to M-23 in 2013 by 
promising that the UN would prioritise going after the FDLR (interview diplomat, Kinshasa 2015-06-10). 
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particularly interested in the population, nor in the donors, unless they relied on 
them directly for gaining access to resources.  
Some of the government’s behaviours do give rise to questions about who needs 
whom. One donor told me about a situation he had encountered a few years 
before. The German Development agency, GIZ, had at one point had their 
banking account frozen. When negotiating a new framework agreement with the 
government, the Germans wanted it to include a clause that the government 
should abstain from confiscating their account (interview diplomat, Kinshasa 
2014-12-11). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was in charge of the negotiations 
didn't agree and decided to not sign the new contract. The Head of Cooperation 
regularly went to the ministry to check on progress but never got any response. 
As the current agreement was to expire he came under increased pressure to get 
a new contract in place. His superiors at HQ started to ask whether Congo really 
wanted their aid (ibid). It was only when the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Thsibanda, visited Germany that the contract was finally signed. Considering 
that Germany is a large donor to the country, it does seem odd that it took the 
Congolese government over a year to sign the contract. To triangulate the story, 
I also talked to one of the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that had been 
in charge of the German contract. He confirmed that the agreement had taken a 
long time to negotiate. According to him, though, it was the Ministry of Justice 
(MoJ) that had blocked the account and that there was nothing that the MoFA 
could do about it (interview government official, Kinshasa, 2015-06-12). Although 
it could in principle be true, it seems unlikely especially since problems with the 
Ministry of Justice had not been raised with the German Embassy.   
Another recent example that emerged post fieldwork is the Congolese 
government’s decision not to attend a UN conference in April 2018 which was 
intended to raise humanitarian funding for the country.79 The motivation given by 
the government was that the UN had grossly exaggerated the humanitarian need 
in the country, which they said scared away possible investors (Reuters, 2018). 
The Foreign Minister also went out with an open threat saying that: ‘Money [for 
humanitarian aid] has been raised. The DRC government must now be involved 
                                            
79 The Conference was co-hosted by OCHA, ECHO and the Netherlands. The aim of the conference was to raise funding 
for the 13.1 million people that needed humanitarian assistance. The funding gap was 1.6 billion USD.  
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in its management. If not, there will be serious consequences’ (allAfrica, 2018). 
To get the government on board, the UN which had in the end of 2017 classified 
the country according to the highest alert, agreed to downgrade the classification, 
but in the end it was not enough for the government who still refused to come to 
the meeting (Reuters, 2018).  
Hence, it seems reasonable that the donors sometimes wonder if they are 
welcome. This has also led them to feel rather powerless in the relationship with 
the government, as I will show in the next section, where I will also explore why, 
despite them feeling powerless and unwelcome, they continue to engage. 
4.5. Donors without influence in Kinshasa  
It was clear from my interviews with diplomats and Heads of Cooperation that 
they felt quite powerless in their relationship with the government. My questions 
as to whether donors had any influence in the country were sometimes met by 
laughter and always followed by accounts of how little influence the donors had. 
Considering that we are talking about one of the least developed countries in the 
world and that donors are providing a rather substantial amount of resources to 
the country, these statements might seem strange.  
When I probed further into explanations, almost all highlighted characteristics of 
the government as the key explanatory factor. They stressed that there was no 
political will in the country and that the government wasn't interested in assisting 
the population. I frequently received rhetorical questions such as ‘how do you 
help a state that doesn't want to help itself?’ or ‘how do you influence a predatory 
state?'. This seemed to be the ‘million dollar’ question that they all asked 
themselves without having found an answer. A majority of the donor 
representatives I interviewed were clearly frustrated as how to go about doing 
development aid in the country, feeling at loss and finding that they didn't get 
much guidance and support from their national Headquarters.  
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One of them expressed this by saying that: 
“There is a lot of talk about the New Deal at the country level, but how do 
you deliver on it when there is no political will in the country you are 
working with? Then there is no guidance anymore. HQ does a lot of policy 
papers and conceptual work. But do we need it? There are tons of papers 
and policies, but no practical guidance” (interview Head of Cooperation, 
Kinshasa 2015-06-02).   
Another Head of Cooperation expressed a similar point of view stating:  
“The Paris Declaration and the New Deal are built on some core 
assumptions. It builds, for example, on the assumption that you have a 
government which is legitimate and is committed to reducing poverty. If 
these assumptions hold, then they [the government] develop a plan and 
donors align and provide technical assistance and money. On the other 
hand, if these assumptions don't hold, technical solutions will do more 
harm than good, with bad consequences for poor people. We need a more 
nuanced approach on how to deal with fragile states than there is today” 
(interview Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015-06-18). 
That Congo is not like other countries was also highlighted in some other 
interviews. As one senior diplomat that had working in the country for a long time 
and who had developed a certain level of cynicism told me that: 
“This is like a bad play, the international community pretends that this is 
a normal government, but it is not”' (interview diplomat, Kinshasa 2015-
06-29). 
A Head of Cooperation also talked about the problem of pretending that Congo 
was just like other developing countries, saying that: 
“It is important to see where the DRC is coming from. They come from a 
terribly weak base under Mobutu. But we tend to see it as just as one 
normal African country that is on the same level as the other countries and 
it is not” (interview Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015- 07-02). 
It was clear from the above representation, coming from four different embassies, 
that many donors found that Congo was somewhat different from other fragile 
states and that they didn’t have the right tools for how to deal with it. They felt 
that existing policies didn’t answer their questions on how to work with a predatory 
state and that they didn’t receive sufficient support from their HQs. 
Considering that donors thought they had little influence, and that the government 
lacked legitimacy, was there not a risk that they were being seen as complicit with 
the regime? As we saw in the conceptual framework, Uvin (1998) argues that in 
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countries where aid is substantial every move of the donors is being watched, 
both by the government and the population alike.  
As a response, one Head of Cooperation said the following:  
“If you don't believe it is a legitimate government and you don't think that 
they want to do poverty reduction but still provide them with funding then 
you become complicit. It provides an illegitimate government with 
legitimacy. So to engage or not engage that is the question. There is a 
moral argument, rather than a development argument’” (interview Head of 
Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015-06-25).  
Most of the people I interviewed didn't go as far as to see themselves complicit. 
However, rather few said that they were supplementing for the government in the 
sense of financing basic services that the government should pay for. They asked 
themselves how far they should go in supplementing for the government, and 
recognised that it might create a problem. As expressed by the same Head of 
Cooperation:  
“Donors are sitting at the centre of the social contract. So the government 
and the population can blame the donors for failures for which the 
government is really responsible. The government knows this and plays 
the game. We the donors are substituting for the government and 
sustaining their legitimacy” (interview Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 
2015-06-18). 
So why then are they staying? As we saw in chapter 3, most donors are of the 
opinion that Congo is too important to let fail. They worry about the humanitarian 
consequences of their leaving, and about what would happen to the neighbouring 
countries should Congo descend into absolute chaos. Some of these countries, 
such as Angola and Rwanda, are where some Western nations have close ties 
and don’t want to see affected by the chaos that would follow from a faltering 
Congo. The donors have also invested a substantial amount of money in 
humanitarian aid and in peace-building efforts. These efforts are not sustainable 
if the Congolese state is not stabilised and able to provide for its population. 
Hence, in the donors views the state needs to be strengthened but, as highlighted 
by amongst other Trefon (2011), the frustration for the donors is that the state 
that needs strengthening is also the one that resists being built. 
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4.6. Conclusions 
The aid relationship between donors and the government at the national level has 
been fraught with tension that has occasionally erupted in more or less open 
confrontation.  
As we saw in the conceptual framework, people tend to overemphasize 
dispositional factors when explaining the behaviour of others while stressing 
situational factors to account for one’s own behaviour. Basically, you are bad 
because you are evil, but I am inherently good, although I am occasionally forced 
by circumstances to behave badly. This kind of attitude came out clearly in some 
of my interviews with donors who were continually complaining of the lack of 
political will and seemed to give little weight to factors such as lack of capacity 
when explaining reform failures. The Congolese on their side, as noted by some 
observers, seemed convinced that the donors are more dependent on Congo 
than vice-versa. This goes back to the popularly held belief that donors are in the 
country to profit from the wealth of the country. President Kabila has also figured 
out that the West often comes with empty threats and he is continuously pushing 
the limits to see how the donors will react. This has been obvious in the election 
charade over the past few years, where Kabila has often got away in his stalling 
of the election process and where the donors have struggled to find an effective 
response.  
At the overall level, the government is trying to keep the donors at bay by using 
a variety of strategies to make them less demanding. This includes referring to 
international norms, including the norm of sovereignty. The country is proud, and 
the elite do not seem to need the donors. This attitude has probably made it less 
attractive for them to use fragility as a negotiation token. Neither has the country 
tried to ‘sell itself’ to the donors. It has not attempted to portray itself as a friend 
to the international community nor until recently, has the government tried to 
portray itself in a positive light oversees. Instead, the strategy of Congo has been 
to increase its negotiation capital by having an aggressive discourse against the 
donors.  
As we saw in the conceptual chapter, Whitfield and Fraser had found that some 
aid recipients which had successfully carved out policy space despite a high 
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dependency on aid had often done so by centralizing aid negotiations and by 
limiting the donors influence over policy discussions. On the surface it might seem 
that Congo was attempting to do something similar. The government was, for 
example, keeping the donors at a distance when it suited them, such as the 
planning of army interventions against FDLR. Other cases, such as not 
communicating clearly which ministry was responsible for donor coordination and 
which development strategy has priority, are probably less about keeping the 
donors at a distance than a sign of a weak government who lacks central control 
over the different ministries.   
Interviewing donors and Heads of Cooperation, a picture emerges of donors 
struggling how to respond and how to deal with a government that seemed rather 
uninterested in their aid. They had problems of getting a high-level dialogue going 
and they felt that international guidelines, such as the New Deal, didn’t accurately 
guide them in a country where the elite seemed to lack the will to develop the 
country. They also felt obliged to remain in the country by a mix of self-interest 
and worries about what would happen if they left. Their previous strategies of 
dealing with countries that are predatory, such as by-passing the state were no 
longer seen as acceptable strategies and they were under increased pressure to 
build state capacity and engage with the state. Norms, as well as previous 
experiences of using conditionality, deterred the donors from using conditionality 
but ideas on other ways to create incentives were lacking.  
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Chapter 5: Divergent Perceptions and Strategies in 
the Health and Justice Sectors  
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we saw how donors and the government engaged with 
each other at an overall level and how the relationships were tense. They had 
negative perceptions of each other and the government sought to keep donors at 
a distance using harsh rhetoric against them. The donors seemed at a loss as to 
how to react, failing to coordinate amongst themselves and being reluctant to 
make their aid conditional. As it became clearer in 2016 that Kabila was not going 
to hold presidential elections, some donors started to impose sanctions and 
began postponing parts of their support to the government.   
In this chapter I will explore how these dynamics play out in two different sectors, 
health and justice. Do the same perceptions and strategies used at the overall 
level permeate to engagement between donors and the government in certain 
sectors? And did the perceptions and strategies differ between the sectors, and 
in that case why? The two sectors were selected in the anticipation that the justice 
sector is more sensitive and important to the government, having a national 
sovereignty perspective, than health, which is about service delivery. My 
expectations turned out to be true, with the government happy to leave the health 
sector largely to the donors. This could be observed in the low amount of 
government spending in the health sector, the government’s willingness for 
dialogue with the donors, and in the Ministry of Health more or less blanket 
approval of donor programmes. The donors have benefited from this passing over 
of ownership being able to do virtually whatever they want in the sector, although 
it has also led to frustrations as they need a supportive national counterpart to 
make their work sustainable.  
As the justice sector is much more at the core of the state, the government has 
tried to keep much closer control over reforms and has proactively tried to change 
aid programmes to align better with their priorities, which focus more on extending 
the scope of the state across the country than to rendering the justice sector more 
independent from the executive and legislative power centres. Whilst accepting 
donor support, the government has tried to keep them at arm’s length, preferring 
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to deal with them on an individual basis. As a consequence, meetings in the donor 
– government coordination group, the ‘Comité Mixte de la Justice’ (CMJ), were 
infrequent and steering committee meetings for individual programmes were 
often avoided by the government, adversely impacting donors’ attempts to move 
programmes forward. This situation has led to deep frustrations amongst donors 
who repeatedly complain about what they perceived as a lack of political will by 
the government to reform the sector.  
I will also explore the relationship between the donors and the government at the 
local level. This relationship is quite different as few donors have any 
representation at the provincial or local level. Hence, a large part of the 
relationship between the donors and the government is left to implementing 
partners. It is also at this level that the hybridity and real governance become 
more apparent, a factor that I will focus on more in chapter 6.  
This chapter is structured as follows: I will provide an overview how the 
collaboration between the donors and the government restarted after the fall of 
Mobutu, as this is important in order to understand the contemporary aid 
relationship, and how it has changed over time. I will then assess whether there 
are overlapping or contradictory objectives between the donors and the 
government, paying particular attention to how ownership and political will have 
been perceived by donors and how it has informed their views and perceptions 
of each other. Thereafter, I will review the strategies that different parties have 
used and what consequences they have had on the outcome of negotiations. I 
will also briefly review relationship and engagement strategies at the provincial 
and district level. Finally, I will draw some conclusions linked to the conceptual 
framework and the lessons we can draw from my case studies. 
5.2. The return of the donors, and their engagement with the state 
After the withdrawal of aid in 1991, donor engagement restarted slowly, first in 
the health and then in other sectors, including the justice sector, as well. In the 
health sector, donors started returning in 1994 after the genocide in Rwanda, 
initially mainly for humanitarian work, frequently by-passing the state to provide 
this support. In the justice sector, donor re-engagement started from the 
installation of the transitional government in 2002 and had a strong emphasis on 
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state-building. These early beginnings had consequences for how the 
relationship with the government was formed.   
From humanitarian aid to state-building in the health sector 
Donors started to re-engage with Congo directly after the genocide in Rwanda, 
with the subsequent refugee crisis and outbreaks of violent conflicts in the east 
of the country.80  Hundreds of NGOs were involved, which contributed to a chaotic 
situation. Considering the acute crisis, the support naturally came to focus on the 
provision of humanitarian aid and life-saving interventions. Donors mainly 
channeled their support to organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières, the 
Red Cross and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), whose operations 
were guided by the humanitarian imperative of saving lives. These organisations 
provided local health centres with much needed medicines, equipment and staff 
members (Waldman, 2006, p. 9). Some even established their own health 
centres, thereby creating parallel systems and substituting for the state. The 
reinforcement of the health system had low priority both amongst the donors and 
the INGOs. Little attention was paid to issues such as the overall regulation of 
the health sector, data-collection, financing of health inspectors and support to 
provincial hospitals, i.e. things necessary for the effective functioning of a health 
system, but not for saving life in the immediate future. As a consequence, 
management capacity in the health system weakened and the critical link 
between the health centres, the health zones and central management, which 
was behind Congo’s earlier successes with community health care, further 
eroded. Instead hierarchies were by-passed and disrupted in order to distribute 
aid as quickly as possible. Consequently, gaining an overview and creating a 
common vision between health providers became increasingly difficult.  
As the humanitarian crisis continued and severe health crises such as outbreaks 
of measles, yellow fever, and Ebola kept re-occurring, the need to strengthen the 
overall health system and to engage with the government became increasingly 
evident. More donors started to supplement their access to health care projects 
with support to local health authorities. This nascent collaboration was facilitated 
by three factors: 1) the Ministry of Health’s adoption of a sector development plan; 
                                            
80 At least 1.2 million refugees arrived in the Kivus (Trefon, 2011, p. 19). 
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2) a functioning thematic coordination group in health; and 3) the establishment 
of an inter-donor coordination group. 
The national health policy and the health strategy developed by the Ministry of 
Health in 2009 (and updated in 2016) continues to provide a profound analysis of 
the challenges in the health sector.81 The policy has been widely praised, with a 
former UNICEF regional health expert considering it to be one of the best health 
strategies in the region (UN official, Kinshasa 2015-03-30). Implementation of the 
policy has, however, been limited by weak capacity at the Ministry of Health and 
limited enforcement at the provincial and local levels (DFID, 2012b; IMA, 2013, 
p. 3). The establishment of a coordination group between donors and the 
government also was intended to facilitate collaboration. The group, chaired by 
the Minister of Health, is frequently highlighted by donors as a model for other 
sectors. Donors also became more organised with the establishment of an inter-
donor coordination group called GIBS (Groupe Interbailleur de la Santé) (GIBS, 
2014a). The chairmanship of the group circulates between the members and the 
work is facilitated by a small secretariat which makes it more formalised than 
many of the other donor coordination groups in the country (GIBS, 2014b).  
The combination of the above-mentioned factors led to some important 
improvements in the collaboration. The donors, for example, pledged to align with 
the government’s national health plan and promised to adhere to the principle, 
advocated by the government, that there should be only one donor with a 
comprehensive support programme (called ‘appui global’) per health zone. 82 
These two principles - one donor per zone following the minimum standards set 
by the government - were important steps forward in facilitating a joint approach 
between the parties. They also made the administration for the health zone 
management teams easier as in principle there should be only one major donor 
to deal with. According to my interviewees, these principles were in general 
adhered to, although there have been instances where more than one donor has 
                                            
81 The policy was updated in 2016 by the Ministry of Health. 
82 The ‘Appui Global’ elements include essential medicines, infrastructure rehabilitation, in-service training, 
equipment, support for supervision, water and sanitation, solar energy equipment, community empowerment and 
operations research (Sida, 2013b, p. 1). To this can be added vertical programmes, such as vaccination programmes, 
support by, for example, UNICEF, or medicines distributed by the Global Fund. 
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been involved in a health zone and, perhaps more seriously, around half of the 
health zones do not receive any donor support at all (DFID, 2012b).  
With the increased interest of the donors in engaging with the state and the 
support structure that was put in place for increased coordination in the sector – 
guided by the national health policy – the collaboration gained impetus and led to 
improved relationships between donors and the government in the health sector.  
Focus on strengthening the state in the justice sector  
By contrast, donor re-engagement with the justice sector started during the 
transition period in 2002, and hence much later than in the health sector. Initial 
support was focused on transitional justice programmes often initiated by 
international organisations, such as the International Centre for Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ). Support was, however, mainly focused on strengthening the 
formal justice system, through capacity building and improving the functioning of 
the system. Donors saw legal reforms as a key area to address in order to support 
the country’s development. By supporting state-building in the justice sector, the 
donors hoped that they would contribute to: i) democratization (through the 
separation of powers); ii) respect for human rights; and iii) the rule of law 
(Vircoulon, 2009, p. 270). Donors put high hopes and expectations on the formal 
justice sector, and there were no attempts to by-pass the state as in the health 
sector. Considering the major role that the customary justice system plays in 
solving conflicts, donors had ample opportunity to provide support to other actors. 
However, for reasons that I will explore in chapter 6, this was not seen as a 
feasible alternative. 
In the early days of the re-engagement there was enthusiasm, with Congo seen 
as a 'good student' by the international community (Vircoulon, 2009, p. 270). The 
optimism was not unfounded; elections were being held and decisions on reforms 
were taken at an impressive pace. For example, a Constitutional Court was 
established and a new structure and hierarchy of courts was decided upon and 
enshrined in the new constitution. Initially there was a good dialogue between the 
donors and the government, and a coordination group, the ‘Comité Mixte de la 
Justice’, was established in 2004. In addition, there was a coordinated assistance 
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by the international community who cooperated well together (ibid p. 92-93). 
Hence, everything seemed to be set for successful cooperation.  
However, the relationship soon deteriorated. Reforms that the government had 
promised to undertake stalled. After an initially positive start, the donor - 
government coordination group never became fully functional. Meetings, to the 
extent that they were taking place, were held infrequently (Teikilazaya et al, 
2013b p. 29; interview government official, Kinshasa 2015-05-28). The road map 
for justice reforms developed by the government in 2007 soon became obsolete 
and almost forgotten (Ilac, 2009, p. 25), and it was not used by the government 
as a guiding tool for reforms (government official, Kinshasa 2015-05-28; EU, 
2014b, p. 13). This led to a lack of strategic direction, which made it difficult for 
donors to know what to prioritise in their reform programmes (government official, 
Kinshasa 2015-05-28; multilateral donor, Kinshasa 2015-03-30). In addition, 
donors, to a large extent, failed to coordinate themselves despite the existence 
of the inter-donor coordination group. This failure to coordinate was often blamed 
on the government for not giving clear directions. However, as I will show, the 
donors were partly to blame as well.  
5.3. Contextual factors framing the negotiations: Perceptions, political 
will and ownership 
In order to understand the different trajectories taken in the two sectors, it is 
important to understand and unpack the motivation of the different actors and 
what they wanted to get out of the negotiations, as well as their perceptions and 
their relationships with each other. I will put a special emphasis on the donors’ 
perceptions of ownership and political will as these tend to influence the 
perceptions the donors form of the government. In addition, I will also explore if 
there were some norms that influenced the behaviour of either the donors or the 
government. 
5.3.1. Perceived lack of ownership in the health sector  
People who had been working for a long-time in the health sector, both for the 
government and for international organisations, confirmed that the relationship 
had improved considerably over the last decade. This was to a large extent 
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attributed to the aforementioned conditions, namely i) increased realisation by the 
donors of the need to build the capacity of the state; ii) a health sector policy; iii) 
a donor-government coordination group; and iv) the establishment of an inter-
donor coordination group (SRSS, 2009).  
Policy documents such as the government’s policies and the donors’ strategies 
confirm a significant overlap between their interests and objectives. The national 
health policy, for example, stresses the need to i) revitalize and strengthen the 
health zones, ii) strengthen governance and leadership; iii) reform human 
resource policies; and iv) strengthen partnerships. These are all objectives and 
reforms that the donors also wanted to see. That there is such a strong overlap 
is perhaps unsurprising as the policies were developed by the government in 
cooperation with the donors during the transition period.  
Hence at the policy level, there was some alignment regarding goals and 
objectives. A major disagreement was – and remains - how the sector should be 
financed, with the government insisting on user fees, whereas donors want the 
government to finance a larger part itself. Regarding the implementation and the 
design of individual programmes, the weak capacity of the state and patrimonial 
system often leads to a separation of interests between donors and public health 
officials. This can, for example, be seen in the resistance at different levels within 
the administration to registration of health workers. The absence of an accurate 
number allows some individuals to benefit from these ‘ghost-workers’ to whom 
salaries are being paid despite the fact that they do not exist. Hence, even with a 
broad alignment on the need for reform of the health sector, disagreements on 
how the reforms should be carried out remain.  
Donors’ perceptions of political will and ownership 
There was a lot of discussion among donors regarding political will and 
ownership. All of the representatives I interviewed were of the opinion that the 
central government or more precisely the President, the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Finance who are the key figures that decide the state budget, do not 
care about the health sector. This perception was to a large degree based on the 
low budget allocations to the sector. Although the national budget had increased 
in absolute terms, the proportion allocated to health had remained more or less 
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the same since 2006, equating to 4.9 % of the total budget in 2016 (Ministry of 
Budget). Some believed that the large number of donors involved in the health 
sector made it easier for the government to avoid responsibility. They noted that 
in the education sector the government is spending more of its own resources: in 
2016 the amount allocated to education was 12.5 %. The reason might be that 
the government sees education as a more ‘productive’ sector to support (Ministry 
of Budget). Another plausible explanation is that the donors through the Global 
Partnership for Education (GPE) have put pressure on the government to 
increase the national budget for education as a condition for their support to the 
sector. Two of my interviewees mentioned that the Prime Minister often talked 
about the education sector, but less often the health sector (interview donor, 
Kinshasa 2015-07-07 and interview donor, Kinshasa 2015-03-12). 
Interestingly, donors’ perceptions of the Ministry of Health, and the Minister 
himself, were somewhat more positive.83 Several donors genuinely believed that 
the Minister was committed to carrying out reforms. The same conclusion was 
drawn in USAID’s Cooperation Strategy for 2015-2019 which states that: ‘The 
Minister of Health is demonstrating leadership not seen for a long time within the 
government’ (USAID, 2014a, p. 3). These perceptions were based on reforms 
being undertaken within the Ministry to reduce the number of departments, the 
successful handling of the Ebola crisis in 2014 and by the rather drastic reduction 
in under-five mortality rates.84  
Despite the fact that the government had made some progress and that the 
Ministry had developed a well-received health policy and strategy, overall 
ownership was considered to be weak. Several donors and CSO representatives 
considered that an aid dependency made it difficult for the Minister and staff 
within the health sector to take ownership and to provide guidance and 
leadership. For example, one CSO representative noted: 
                                            
83 The Minister, Dr. Felix Kabange Numbi Mukwampa was the Minister of Public Health from 2012 until 2018, when 
he was replaced in a government reshuffle by Dr. Oly Ilunga Kalenga. 
84 Then later also in early 2018. In August a new outbreak of Ebola happened in North Kivu. This is the 9th Ebola 
outbreak in the country since 1976 (The Economist, 2018c). This outbreak has been much harder to contain as it is in 
North Kivu, which is a more densely populated area where conflict is still ongoing.   
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“There is some political will, but everyone has to think about themselves 
first and foremost. You can have the will, but you need the funding as 
well” (interview CSO representative, Kinshasa 2015-04-02). 
The difficulty for the Minister to say no to donor funding was rather crudely 
expressed in the following way:  
“The Minister dances to the pipe of the donors, and just wants to maximise 
the funding he can get from the donors” (interview multilateral donor, 
Kinshasa 2015-07-06). 
Donors also expressed frustrations regarding the lack of ownership taken by the 
Ministry, as they felt that they had nobody to give them guidance on policy 
options, as suggested by an INGO representative, who had been working closely 
with the Ministry: 
 “It is difficult to strengthen ownership in the country. The government take 
what they can get and have few or no comments on the programmes you 
suggest to them. Although sometimes they have views on which health 
zones they would like us to support, but that is it” (interview INGO 
representative, Kinshasa, 2015-04-09).  
In a similar vein, donors also complained that their discussions with the Ministry 
tended to focus on technical details, and what was in it for themselves as 
individuals rather than what would be beneficial from a health system point of 
view. As one interviewee dealing with the Ministry of Health on a regular basis 
said: 
“The people at the Ministry only seem to want to discuss primes and 
salaries with us. It is very understandable that this is the main concern 
for them, but it would be nice if people would like to discuss something 
else with you as well” (interview donor official, Kinshasa, 2015-04-21).   
Hence, as these representations show, there was an understanding as to why it 
might be difficult for people in the health sector to take ownership and to get 
involved in discussions on policies and strategies when staff do not feel they are 
properly paid. At the same time, however, donors feel left without a partner in 
trying to find a solution for health care in the country.  
Donors having it their way 
This dependency on donors and the lack of ownership it leads to sometimes 
works to the donors' advantage as they can more or less suggest the approaches 
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they want without meeting any serious resistance. This was illustrated by one 
donor representative who said: 
“People joke about the Minister of Health and say that the Ministry 
never says no and doesn't refuse anything. If one part of the Ministry 
says no to your approach you can always go to another one and get it 
approved. It is pretty sad that it is like this, but it has been like this for 
a long time and it is understandable and rational in an underfinanced 
system” (interview multilateral donor official, Kinshasa 2015-07-07). 
As illustrated by this point, repeated by other donors involved in the sector, there 
is an understanding, and even some sympathy, that the Ministry did not have the 
resources to be able to say no. At the same time, it was used by at least some 
donors to push through things that the Minister was hesitant about. One such 
example is performance-based financing which the UNICEF and the World Bank 
promoted in 2013. According to one of my interviewees who had been closely 
involved in pushing the reform through with the Minister, the initiative had first 
met with resistance from both the Minister and from other donors, such as DFID 
and IRC, as they were afraid it would have a distorting effect with health workers 
focusing on some health indicators in disregard of others (DFID, 2010, p. 2, 
2012b, p. 19; interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-07-07). However, after 
some time, the Minister agreed to go ahead despite continued protest from some 
donors. My interviewee concluded the story by stating that: “the government is 
not stuck in ideological thinking” (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-07-07). 
One might, however, also see it as an example of where the Minister knew that if 
he continued to resist the approach, the Ministry might very well lose the 
financing. A risk that he couldn’t afford to take. 
Hence, in conclusion the donors were frustrated at not having a stronger and 
more visionary counterpart to deal with, but on the other hand profited from it by 
pushing through the approaches they preferred.  
The Government’s ambivalent perception of the donors 
We have now seen what the donors thought about the government, but what was 
the view of the government towards the donors in the health sector? Government 
officials acknowledged that coordination and dialogue with the donors had 
improved and there was recognition that donors made positive contributions to 
the provision of health care. However, the by-passing of the government, despite 
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a stronger focus on state-building, still happened and unsurprisingly upset the 
government as the statement below from a government official in South Kivu 
illustrates: 
“We are not happy with international partners who come to support the 
health system in the DRC, but who by-pass the Ministry of Health in 
order to invest directly at the local level. That resembles someone that 
enters your house and who installs themselves in a corner to do 
something without involving you or informing you about it. What results 
will that have?” (Ministry of Health official, quoted in Integrity Report, 
2014, p. 13). 
Government officials I interviewed also expressed frustration at donors’ failure to 
align to the government's plans. As one senior civil servant at the Ministry of 
Health put it: 
“Harmonisation and alignment is a problem. Although everyone in 
principle supports the PNDS [the government's health plan] - it is at the 
level of implementation that the donors are doing their own things. Some 
donors have more difficulties than others to align. There is really a lot 
that remains to be done in this area” (interview government official, 
Kinshasa 2015-05-28). 
Another government official expressed a similar frustration stating: 
“Donors’ inputs in the management of the health sector are laudable, but 
this does not give them the leeway to do whatever they like, as some do, 
they should not be taking political decisions on behalf of the state” 
(interview – in Bwimana, 2017, p. 1481). 
These representations show frustration with what the government feels is undue 
external interference and lack of respect for Congolese sovereignty.  
That said, the extremely low budget allocated to health care indicates a lack of 
prioritisation by the government, particular in areas where donors’ and INGOs’ 
programmes are strong, as this representation from a provincial government 
official in Goma illustrates:   
“There is no need for us to intervene in those districts as Médecins Sans 
Frontières is already operating in those areas” (recalled by an UN official 
in Goma, 2015-05-12). 
Considering the enormous needs and the almost non-existent budget it is easy 
to understand the government official. Why use scarce resources when someone 
else is willing to pay? 
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As we have seen, the interactions between donors and the government are not 
always smooth. From the state officials’ point of view, donors have the upper 
hand with the perception that donors imposed their views, and too often were 
simply by-passing and ignoring the government.  
5.3.2. Tensions and conflict in the justice sector – with the government 
keeping control over justice reforms 
In the health sector we saw that the government seemed relatively content for 
donors to substitute for them, although it led to resentment amongst staff in the 
health sector. But what was the experience in the justice sector? Was it the same 
there – or did the government have other ambitions? What was the dominant 
perception amongst the donors and the government? 
Divergent objectives in the justice sector 
Considering the similarly low budget allocations to the justice sector, one could 
think that the government would be happy to have donors substitute for them. 
There was, however, not the same level of tolerance for having the donors in the 
driving seat when it came to reforming the justice sector with deeper, more 
profound differences between the donors and the government. 
As we saw in section 5.2, donors’ objectives for supporting justice reform were 
focused on strengthening the rule of law, democracy and respect for human 
rights. These priorities have remained more or less the same since the transition 
period. For example, Sweden’s Development Cooperation Strategy for DRC 
2015-2019 stresses that: ‘Rule of law and respect for human rights are essential 
in order to establish democratic governance in DR Congo’ (Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 7). Likewise, the EU National Indicative Programme for 
2014-2020 highlights the need to: ‘improve access to a transparent, independent, 
impartial and efficient judiciary system, that protects human rights’ (EU, 2014a, 
p. 17).  
The government seems primarily interested in building the visibility of the state 
through the construction of court houses and prisons (Minister of Justice, 2015). 
They were also, at least partly, interested in training judges to work in the courts, 
as seen in the appointment of 2,000 new judges in 2010 and 2011 (Gopa 
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Consultants, 2016, p. 45). This was partly motivated by a desire to limit the 
influence of customary chiefs and to promote a modern vision of the state. The 
government prioritised the introduction of OHADA,85 a system of business laws 
and implementing institutions adopted by seventeen African states aimed at 
improving the business and investment climate in the region. In a speech the 
Minister of Justice re-enforced the need for more training of judges on OHADA 
rules and regulations (Minister of Justice, speech in Goma 2015-05-12). 
Considering the government's focus on economic development, the interest in 
the business climate seems logical.86  
Other reforms, especially those that related to making the justice system more 
independent were, however, less popular. For example, reforms that intended to 
render judges more independent of the state were resisted by both the 
Parliament, the Government and the Ministry of Justice. Although the 
responsibility for appointing and disciplining judges has finally moved to a 
separate body, the ‘Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature’ (CSM), there are still 
several obstructions to the CSM’s independence (Tekilazaya et al., 2013a).  
The harmonisation of objectives and policies between the donors and the 
government was made more difficult with the absence of a national political 
justice reform plan. A work plan had been developed in 2007, followed by a road 
map in 2008, but according to both donors and staff within the Ministry of Justice 
it was not being used. Donors had been pushing the government to develop a 
new policy, but it was only in April 2015 that a national conference, ‘Etats 
Généraux’, was held that led to the establishment of a working group involving 
donors and some foreign consultants financed by the donors to develop a new 
plan that was eventually ready in early 2017. The plan was intended to facilitate 
dialogue and discussions between the donors and the government but with the 
worsening political situation in the country justice reforms have been stalled ever 
since.  
                                            
85 Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires. 
86 This is not to say that much progress has been made. In the World Bank’s ease of doing business index the country 
was ranked of 178 out of 183 in 2012 and as 182 out of 190 countries in 2018 (Solf, Weltbank, & International Finance 
Corporation, 2012; World Bank, 2018).  
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Donors’ negative perceptions  
The lack of interest within the government to move forward with justice reform 
caused frustration amongst donors and to a rather difficult relationship between 
donors and the government. Most donors that I interviewed considered that there 
was no political will to address problems in the justice sector, as illustrated by one 
of my interviewees:  
“Political will – that is the whole problem. The country has competence 
and it has money. The leaders understand the problems, but it is the lack 
of political will that is the problem” (interview with a group of three donor 
officials, Goma 2015-05-15). 
Similar viewpoints were repeated by other donors, both that there was a lack of 
political will and that the problem was not a lack of capacity. The perceived lack 
of political will manifested itself, according to the donors, in the following factors: 
a) the slow implementation of reform initiatives, b) the low national budget for the 
justice sector, and c) the reluctance to update the government’s policy for justice 
reforms. The root cause for this according to most of my interviewees was that 
the government wanted to retain control of the sector, as an independent justice 
system would be a threat to the regime. Surprisingly, there seemed to be limited 
appetite amongst donors to learn more about where exactly the resistance came 
from and how it could be overcome. The Swedish Embassy that was involved in 
the PARJ and Uhaki Safi programme had, at one point, initiated the idea of 
undertaking a power analysis of the sector in order to identify the bottlenecks to 
reforms. This idea had however apparently been discouraged by the other donors 
involved in the programme and was never carried out (interview donor official, 
Kinshasa 2015-02-24). 
Despite recognising that there were deep-rooted political reasons for the 
government to move forward with reforms, one interesting finding was the extent 
that donors’ perceptions of the sector seem to have been largely based on 
individual, rather than systemic, issues. Since 2008 there have been three 
different Ministers of Justice that the donors have dealt with. Each one brought 
his/her own challenges from the donors’ perspective. Mr. Luzolo Bambi was 
Minister of Justice between 2008-2012 when the EU established its two justice 
programmes. He was seen as a rather grey figure and the donors were 
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discontented with the pace of reforms. The relationship was relatively tense, but 
there were no open conflicts (interview donor official, Stockholm 2015-08-10). 
When a new Minister, Mrs. Wivine Matipa, was appointed in 2012, the donors 
were initially positive. However, it did not take long for the relationship to sour, 
especially between the EU Ambassador and the Minister where disputes over the 
direction of the programmes apparently soon turned personal, with numerous 
accounts of open rows between them. The Minister was known for asking new 
consultants brought in by the programme as to what exactly they were bringing 
to the table, except for getting a high salary (interview donor official, Kinshasa, 
2016-11-17). This is part of a larger story, where government officials 
understandably often resent the use of consultants, whose salaries are several 
times higher than those of government employees.  
The Minister, according to one of her close advisors, felt badly treated by the EU 
Ambassador. Mrs. Matipa felt the Ambassador had been disrespectful and 
effectively undermined her authority in asking her to implement reforms that she 
had not signed up to and did not fully agree with (interview former advisor to the 
Minister, Kinshasa 2015-07-07 and 2016-11-18). She seemed to have taken a 
softer approach towards people in the Swedish Embassy, who reportedly had a 
somewhat smoother relationship with the Minister than the EU Ambassador 
(interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-02-24; interview donor official, Kinshasa 
2015-02-23). 
When a new Minister was appointed at the end of 2014, there was palpable relief 
in the donor community. Mr. Alexis Thambwe was a lawyer and a political 
veteran. The fact that he was also a millionaire and senior political figure was 
seen as positive. The EU had another reason to be pleased: the new Minister 
was the father of the head of COFED,87 which is the EU Delegation’s main 
counterpart in the government (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2014-12-11). 
They believed that this connection would smooth the relationship and make it 
easier to move reforms forward (ibid). 
The relationship did indeed improve, with Mr. Thambwe promptly extending the 
EU programmes, and joint strategic programme meetings were convened 
                                            
87 Cellule d'appui à l'Ordonnateur national du Fonds Européen de Développement en RDC. 
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(interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-05-27). The government also decided to 
proceed with developing the aforementioned strategic plan for the justice sector. 
The dialogue and the relationship significantly improved. One of the 
implementers lyrically described how the relationship had changed: 
“We went from hell to heaven! The former Minister just called us when she 
wanted to have a go at us, while he [Mr. Thambwe]), calls us on a regular 
basis to discuss the implementation of the programmes” (interview 
implementer, Kinshasa, 2015-05-27). 
While the relationship between the donors and the government improved, the 
personal conflicts with Mrs. Viviane and the initial unabated optimism for Mr. 
Thambwe indicates that many of the donors seemed to have forgotten that there 
were also deeper structural reasons as to why the donor-financed programmes 
were not being fully implemented. Instead, the Ministers became seen as either 
the main obstacle for reforms or the main guarantee for success. As one 
seasoned expert working at the EU Delegation told me: 
“Many people at the EU-delegation are really happy that there is a new 
Minister arriving, but I think they are fooling themselves. The problems in 
the justice sector are structural and are not just dependent on an 
individual” (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2014-12-05). 
As she rightly pointed out, the donors had been having a difficult relationship with 
Mr. Luzolo Bambi as well. The donors failed to look at their own actions and 
attitudes to see how they could improve the relationship. They ignored Mrs. 
Matipa’s points about foreign experts not always having the necessary skills, 
even though many donors and implementing agencies recognise this (interview 
donor official, Goma 2015-05-10; interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-03-12). 
Nor did they seem to fully accept that some delays to programmes were a result 
of complicated EU procurement rules and difficulties of the implementing 
agencies to find staff, instead putting all the blame on the Minister.  
Just as the seasoned EU expert had predicted, the good relationship did not last. 
It soon became apparent that the new Minister was more susceptible to political 
pressure than the previous one (interview Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015-
02-24). As the country was moving towards elections, Mr. Thambwe became one 
of Kabila’s closest allies. The justice sector became an important tool for keeping 
Kabila in power, for example, by prosecuting opposition members and controlling 
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the constitutional court. As a consequence of this instrumentalization of the 
justice sector, a planned EU programme for the justice sector, was postponed. 
As seen above, the former Minister, Mrs. Matipa, felt that the donors were 
imposing themselves, and there were also concerns within the Ministry regarding 
what they saw as lack of harmonisation amongst the donors and the lack of 
alignment to the government’s plans as indicated by this high-level civil servant:  
“Basically, the donors do just what they want to do. They do not align, and 
they impose themselves on us. They are all gathering in the East. I don’t 
understand why they are doing that. There is poverty in the whole country. 
There are needs in the whole country…They all do the same thing, they 
should harmonise themselves” (interview government official, Kinshasa 
2015-06-05). 
He added though that the collaboration between the EU and Minister Thambwe 
was working acceptably (ça va!). 
5.4. Engagement strategies 
As I have shown, the government takes very different standpoints on the two 
sectors. In the health sector, the government seems more or less happy to let 
donors lead despite some concerns, whereas in the justice sector the government 
seems determined to stay in control. In this section I will show how these different 
viewpoints and objectives translated into very different engagement strategies by 
the government.  
I will briefly outline some of the key issues of contention between the donors and 
the government in each sector, followed by a more detailed account of 
engagement with a DFID health sector programme (ASSP) and two justice 
programmes (PARJ and Uhaki Safi). When appropriate, I will make reference to 
other donors’ health and justice programmes. I will analyse the establishment of 
the programmes, to provide an indication of the involvement of different actors, 
the ownership of the programmes and what different stakeholders wanted to see 
achieved. I will then examine the strategies each actor used to get the 
programmes implemented in a way that aligned to their interests.  
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5.4.1. Strategies deployed in the health sector 
Below I will highlight some of the key issues of contention in the sector, including 
the donors’ failure to increase the aid budget, the lack of unity amongst the donors 
that to some extent limits their influence, and the discussion about sector budget 
support. 
Trying and failing to increase the health budget 
The donors tried to lobby the government to address one of the root causes of 
the weak health sector, namely the low level of financing by the state. The donors 
that were heavily engaged in the health sector, such as DFID and UNICEF, 
regularly raised the funding situation in their dialogue with the Minister of Health 
(interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-03-23, and donor official, Kinshasa 2015-
03-12; DFID, 2012a). In addition, the donors involved in the GIBs (the inter-donor 
coordination group) produced an annual policy dialogue paper (‘note sectoriel’) 
that highlighted issues that they wanted to raise with the Minister of Health which 
always included: i) the need to raise the national health budget, and ii) the need 
to increase the level of budget execution (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-
04-21, GIBS, 2013, 2014c). 
However, as one of my interviewees noted, it was not especially useful to apply 
pressure at this level, as the Minister was not perceived to be the obstacle 
(interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-03-23). On the contrary, he would most 
likely have been pleased to see his budget increased as it would enhance his 
power. The budget is determined by other actors as we saw earlier, such as the 
Minister of Budget and the Prime Minister, and donors to the health sector had 
limited interaction with them. The Ambassadors and the Heads of Cooperation 
should have raised the health sector issues in their high-level dialogue with the 
government but more pressing issues were usually on the agenda, such as the 
various conflicts in the country, security sector reform, and the macro-economic 
situation. In a country with so many challenges as Congo, health was not on the 
top of the agenda, neither for the donor community nor for the government.  
The health donors also felt constrained not to use conditionality as a means to 
force the government to increase the budget, as the following statements from 
donors illustrate: 
150 
 
 
“The donors are trapped between pest and cholera. If you stop the 
support people will die, but the government will still not change” 
(interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-07-06). 
“How can you be tough on a government that has one of the worst health 
indicators in the world?” (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-06-01). 
Hence, donors were afraid of the consequences that a withdrawal of aid might 
mean for the population.  
Lack of unity amongst the donors 
A lack of agreement amongst donors on health sector reforms was also apparent 
from interviews I conducted. Several interviewees who took part in GIB meetings 
said discussions rarely focused on strategic issues such as the level of health 
financing and policies. Instead they focused on what some referred to as endless 
discussions around technical issues such as the harmonisation of payments of 
top-up salaries and per diems.88 One interviewee noted that donors often were 
more focused on the implementation of their own programmes and were less 
interested in hearing about the government’s priorities or coordinating their 
programmes between themselves (interview donor official, Stockholm 2015-08-
11). Another interviewee added that:  
“The problem is that donors’ think out things on their side, without involving 
the government”. In addition, many donors have a specific ideology that 
they are pushing for such as performance-based financing or whether it 
should be an insurance-based system or not” (interview donor official, 
Kinshasa 2015-04-21).  
Many of the donors tried to push for the system that they had in their own country, 
which was one of the major reasons why they did not manage to coordinate 
themselves better. Belgium, for example, wanted an insurance-based system 
and DFID a public-sector financed health care system. 
Health sector financing - strong resistance towards using sector budget support 
Most of the funding for the health sector in Congo is off-budget, meaning that it 
is not reflected in the government’s budget, and most donors have their own 
implementation mechanisms and modalities, due to concerns about the capacity 
                                            
88 See for example, interviews with one donor official in Kinshasa 2015-03-12, another donor official, Kinshasa 2015-
04-21; and finally, an interview with donor official, Kinshasa 2016-11-25. 
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of the government to handle funds and the high risk of corruption. However, both 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the New Deal stress the use of 
country systems as a way to increase ownership and sustainability. In line with 
these principles headquarters staff at the EU wanted the EU Delegation in 
Kinshasa to provide sector budget support. A high-level delegation from EU 
Headquarters visited Kinshasa in 2014 to meet with the Heads of Cooperation 
from the EU countries to discuss the idea. The Heads of Cooperation argued 
strongly against it, noting the fiduciary system at the Ministry was not strong 
enough and that it would send the wrong political signal to the regime that was 
demonstrating more and more authoritarian tendencies (interview donor official, 
Kinshasa 2015-02-24). Donor representatives based in-country are often 
considered more lenient towards the host country as pointed out by, amongst 
others, Brown (2011) and, on that basis, it might have been assumed that they 
would have been more favourable towards providing sector budget support. 
However, ‘front-line’ workers in the donor community locally are also the ones 
who deal with the counterparts on a daily basis and notice first-hand the low 
capacity and the high levels of corruption and vested interest in the sector. In the 
end it was decided that there would be no sector support, at least not for the time 
being.  
Negotiating the ASSP programme 
In line with the overall thinking amongst the major donors, DFID wanted to change 
their support to the health sector in 2011. Their previous programme had been a 
mix of humanitarian assistance and a programme focused on free access to 
health care.  It had been deemed too expensive and as not providing a long-term 
sustainable solution, with a dependency on external financing (interview donor 
official, Kinshasa 2015-04-21). There was also an impression that DFID was 
building strong International NGOs rather than a strong government health 
system (DFID, 2011b; interview donor official, Kinshasa 201-05-20). 
DFID wanted to move towards an approach that better supported the 
development of the health system and its institutions, while at the same time 
maintaining the service delivery approach (interview donor official, Kinshasa 
2015-05-21; DFID, 2011b). Working more closely with national and local FBOs 
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was considered to provide a more sustainable way forward than working with 
international organisations (DFID, 2012a, p. 3; interview donor official, Kinshasa 
2015-05-20). An American faith-based organisation, IMA, with deep roots and 
contacts with FBOs in Congo was selected to be the consortium lead for the new 
programme. DFID also decided it would no longer support free health care, which 
the government had been opposed to, although special subsidized rates for 
children under five and pregnant women would be applied (DFID, 2010, p. 2, 
2012a). Both of these moves were welcomed by the Ministry of Health. The 
Ministry had long opposed free health care that they considered to be 
unsustainable and leading to over-use of scarce health services (DFID, 2010, p. 
2; USAID, 2006).  
DFID had worried that the government would object to FBOs being the main 
implementing partners and that they [DFID] would be told to de-prioritise health 
zones managed by FBOs, which had happened to other donors in the past (DFID, 
2012b, p. 26; interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-04-21). This as alternative 
service providers are sometimes perceived as a threat to the authority of the state 
as we saw in chapter 2. However, the government accepted the new approach, 
and officials at the Ministry of Health told me that they considered the FBOs to be 
part of the government (interview Ministry of health, Kinshasa 2015-03-17 and 
2015-04-23).  
In setting up the ASSP programme, DFID involved the government in the 
discussions, but kept many key decisions to itself. The government was, for 
example, not involved in the tendering process for the consortium lead or in the 
selection of provincial implementing partners or the technical partners that were 
included in the consortium. The Ministry of Health was not involved in the 
selection of health zones although DFID maintained a close dialogue with the 
Ministry, who also participated in all of DFIDs meetings with provincial and health 
zone leaders. One DFID official interviewed said that it would have been 
irresponsible for them to let the Ministry have a say in the selection as they would 
come under severe pressure from provinces and health zones politicians and 
leaders who wanted to be included in the programme. Hence, there would have 
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been no guarantee that the support went to the places most in need (interview 
donor official, Kinshasa 2015-04-21).89  
DFID's engagement strategy with the government seemed to have been quite 
successful. When asked who had been responsible for selecting the health 
zones, I was told by a senior government official that it was the Ministry that had 
made the decisions (interview government official, Kinshasa 2015-04-23). My 
interpretation is that they quite naturally want to be in control and perhaps felt 
somewhat humiliated by the lack of ownership. As a consequence, they were 
keen to give the impression to an external researcher that they were the ones 
deciding. However, this might partly be because to some degree they had felt 
involved in the decision. My impression during the fieldwork was that there was 
indeed a very close collaboration between DFID, IMA and the Ministry. This 
impression was confirmed by a senior person at IMA who, through his many years 
of working in Congo, had never experienced such a close interaction between a 
donor, the implementer and the Ministry. He was convinced that this was part of 
the programme’s success (interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-07-06).  
During my fieldwork I also observed in practice that it was not wrong of DFID to 
assume that there might be pressures on the Ministry regarding which health 
zones to engage in. When I was travelling with the local implementer in the former 
Kasaï-Occidental province, I observed the extraversion strategies being used, in 
this case by the provincial government. Sitting in the car with the implementer I 
overheard how he, politely but firmly, told a person that he was not in a position 
to give that person a car. Afterwards he explained that it had been one of the 
provincial Ministers, who had requested that some cars from the ASSP 
programme should be donated to some specific villages. The country was gearing 
up toward local elections (that in the end were never held) and the Minister 
seemingly wanted to ensure the support from these villages. It was interesting to 
note was that it was not even the provincial Minister of Health who called, but the 
Provincial Minister of Justice. According to the implementer, he received similar 
calls on a regular basis (interview implementer, Kananga 2015-04-16). This small 
                                            
89 The provinces that were chosen were provinces where the DFID’s former health programme had been operating. 
The health zones were selected according to a list of health care indicators.  
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episode gives an indication as to what kind of pressures implementers can come 
under. 
The close cooperation between the implementer, Ministry and donor could also 
be observed in the regular steering group meetings for the programme. I had the 
opportunity to participate in one of the quarterly meetings (26-27 March, 2015) 
and one of the annual meetings (6 June, 2015). The meetings were well attended 
with government officials from different provinces represented; and included frank 
discussions on the challenges encountered. 
The main discontent between the government and DFID, which was observable 
at the quarterly meeting I attended and in my discussions with staff at the Ministry 
of Health, concerned the capacity strengthening component of the programme, 
the so-called RCI Component (Renforcement des Capacités Institutionnelles). 
The objective of that programme was to strengthen the central Ministry of Health 
in its stewardship role (DFID, 2012d, p. 1). This component was attractive for the 
Ministry which received very little donor support. This part of the programme was 
added late in the process and some of the involved donor officials believed that 
the component had been added to ‘buy’ the support of the Ministry for the 
programme (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-03-23; donor official, 
Kinshasa 2015-05-21). There were disagreements both within DFID and between 
DFID and the government on what the funding should be used for. The 
government had developed a list, but DFID removed most items which were seen 
as recurrent costs, such as office equipment (interview government official, 
Kinshasa, 2015-03-17; interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-03-23). At the end 
of my second field visit I was told that IMA had come to administer most of the 
funding and activities that the RCI component was supposed to implement, such 
as reinforcing the health surveillance system and the identification of numbers of 
health staff in order to provide them with ID cards (interview donor official, 
Kinshasa 2015-05-21). Of the £5.2 million for the RCI component, £2.8 million 
had been contracted through IMA, and £1.2 are yet uncontracted. Some of the 
funds have also gone through UNICEF and some were used for paying for a 
public financial management consultant based in the MoH (DFID, 2018, p. 4). 
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Another explanation for the slow progress in the RCI component might be the 
siloed approach that donors operate. One of the leading health advisors was seen 
by some staff member as not being very interested in addressing the governance 
challenges in the health sector (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-05-21). A 
report also highlighted that the DFID people engaged in the health programme to 
a large extent had a background as medical doctors and that they were inclined 
to ‘prioritise saving lives today, rather than in the long-run’ (DFID, 2013, p. 6). 
This might also help explain why the programme was mainly engaging with the 
Ministry of Health and to a much lesser extent with, for example, the Ministry of 
Budget and the Ministry of Finance.   
5.4.2. Donors facing resistance in the justice sector  
As we saw in the section about perceptions, the relationship between the Ministry 
of Justice and the donors was not always cordial. This clearly had an influence 
on the negotiation strategies that were being deployed, especially from the 
government’s side. The government used different tactics to try to get what it 
wanted from the programme (i.e. funding for infrastructure) and avoid letting 
donors have much influence over policy directions and reforms.  
Collaboration between donors and the government was less successful than in 
the health sector.  Problems resulted both from the absence of an updated justice 
reform policy, as well as from a lack of regular consultation meetings. A joint 
coordination group, the CMJ, was established in 2004. However, the former 
Minister of Justice (Mr. Bambi) stopped the quarterly meetings, instead preferring 
to talk to the donors individually (interview donor representative, Stockholm, 
2015-08-10). The resistance to the CMJ continued under his successor, Mrs. 
Matipa, with meetings held at irregular intervals.  
The donors did not effectively coordinate amongst themselves according to 
several of my interviewees. The EU, UNDP and USAID had at times a particularly 
problematic relationship, which was confirmed in USAID’s evaluation of their 
ProJustice programme (USAID, 2014b, p. 40). From my interviews and from the 
evaluation, it appears to have been a personality clash and competition between 
the donors trying to take ownership of results achieved (ibid).  
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Negotiating the PARJ and Uhaki Safi Programme 
From the outset of the two programmes, it was clear that the EU and the 
government had different views on the programmes, and that there was a lack of 
ownership by the government. The programmes were developed by a team of 
international experts hired by the EU. There had been some consultations at the 
national level, in addition to a few visits at the provincial level. However, as 
pointed out in the mid-term evaluation of the PARJ programme, the lack of 
national ownership was a problem from the start (2013). The evaluation highlights 
three main reasons for this: i) there was no national reform plan that the 
programme could align to; ii) there was a total lack of involvement and ownership 
from the Congolese counterparts; and iii) conceptual weaknesses in the set-up 
of the programme made the programme more of a support programme for the 
justice sector than a strong reform-oriented programme (European Commission, 
PARJ mid-term evaluation, 2013 pp. 8-9). This critique is based on the fact that 
components of the programmes are related to infrastructure and capacity-
building activities, and there is much less in the programme documents about 
pushing for structural reforms (EU, 2014b). 
From the start it seems that the government was mainly interested in the 
infrastructure components, while they were less interested in the training aspects 
of the programmes (interview donor official, Stockholm 2015-08-10; Gopa 
Consultants, 2016 pp. 16 & 23). The Minister was particularly interested in the re-
construction of the Luzumu prison in Bas-Congo.90 The government wanted to 
construct it in order to lessen the burden on the central prison, Makala, in 
Kinshasa. Makala is currently housing around 9,000 people despite being 
constructed to contain only around 1,500 prisoners.91 The EU Delegation in 
Kinshasa had initially approved the construction, but it was blocked by the 
European Commission in Brussels. Allegedly, the Commissioner for development 
cooperation at that time, Louis Michel, a former Belgian Foreign Minister who had 
long experience of working with Congo, was personally against construction of 
                                            
90 He, and the following Ministers interest in the Luzumu prison can be noted in the fact that it was a key agenda point 
in four out of seven Steering Committee meetings (Gopa Consultant, 2016, pp. 16 & 23).  
91 In May 2017 the overcrowding of the Makala prison was partially solved, in a highly informal way, by a massive 
prison break, when approximately 4,500 of the 9,000 prisoners escaped from the prison overnight (Jeune Afrique, 
2017). This was followed by similar mass escapes at other prisons in a number of provinces around the country. 
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prisons and hence blocked the proposal (interview donor official, Stockholm 
2015-08-10). This was a great disappointment for the government (interview 
government official, Kinshasa 2015-06-19).  
Keeping the donors at a distance 
From the start of the PARJ programme in 2010 the Ministry of Justice pro-actively 
tried to keep the donors at arm’s length by avoiding having joint programme 
meetings.  
For example, the EU wanted the implementing team of Gopa, the German 
consultancy firm that had been contracted to implement both of the EU justice 
programmes, to sit at the Ministry of Justice to facilitate the collaboration between 
the team and the staff at the Ministry of Justice. However, once the Gopa team 
arrived the Minister told the EU that there was no space for the team in the 
building. That the experts were not sitting together with the staff at the Ministry 
hindered an effective communication, and Gopa staff members complained that 
they felt rather left on their own (interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-05-27; 
donor official, Stockholm 2015-08-10). One of the implementers complained 
about the lack of access saying:  
“The only time we had contact with the former Minister was when she 
wanted to have a go at us” (interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-05-27). 
Another example was the absence of regular steering committee meetings, 
where broader policy and implementation issues were going to be discussed 
between the EU, Gopa and the Ministry. These meetings were held on a very 
irregular basis, and for a period of two years they almost fully stopped with 
resulting delays to implementation (Gopa Consultants, 2016, pp. 23 & 59). For 
example, the first meeting in the Uhaki Safi programme did not take place until 
spring 2015 when Mr. Thambwe had been appointed to be the Minister of Justice, 
almost 2.5 years after the programme was initiated. This lack of guidance from 
the government caused frustration for the programme implementers who were 
unsure about what to do, as suggested by the following statement from one of 
the implementers:  
“We were left to our own devices – without any guidance on as to what the 
government wanted” (interview implementer, Kinshasa 2014-11-28).  
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The relationship between the EU and the MoJ deteriorated even further when the 
EU refused to continue financing for a coordinator for the CMJ. The person that 
had been appointed had been a friend of the Minister and had allegedly not had 
the coordination skills needed to do the job. Hence the EU wanted to replace her 
(Gopa Consultants, 2016; implementer, Kinshasa 2014-11-28). This led to a 
deadlock as the Minister allegedly threatened to end collaboration with the EU 
unless they continued to pay for the post (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2014-
11-14), and subsequently refused to sign documents that were necessary to 
move the EU justice programmes forward (interview implementer, Kinshasa 
2015-05-27; interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-05-09). The breakdown in the 
relationship was not only limited to the EU. The Minister also refused for more 
than a year to meet with the head of USAID, who wanted to discuss a new 
programme (interview Head of Cooperation, Kinshasa 2015-07-02).  
The full reasons for the Minister’s refusal to sign documents related to the 
programmes are not known, but it is possible, based on her negative perceptions 
of the EU and previous disagreements with them, that the decision not to finance 
the person was the last straw. However, there might also have been some more 
strategic considerations behind it. Just like the previous Minister, she was mainly 
interested in the infrastructure of the justice sector. She felt that there was too 
much focus on training activities and not enough on infrastructure and became 
frustrated with the EU when they were not forthcoming in making changes to the 
programme (interview adviser to the Minister, Kinshasa, 2015-07-07). By stalling 
parts of the programmes, such as a planned training of people in the Ministry of 
Justice, funding was freed up that later was directed towards infrastructure 
programmes. For example, the Luzumu prison that had been excluded in the 
PARJ programme is now later being reconstructed with funding from the PARJ 
programme and some extra funding from Sida (Gopa Consultants, 2016, pp. ii & 
116-117; interview donor official, Kinshasa 2016-11-15). The PARJ budget was 
also revised twice to increase the amount of funding going to infrastructure (Gopa 
Consultants, 2016, pp. 16 & 23). 
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Reluctance to use conditionality? 
Just as donors had been reluctant to use conditionality at the overall level, the 
same was true for the donors involved in the justice sector. EU officials involved 
in the programmes told me that: 
“If you want to get things done in Congo, you can't use conditionality' 
(interview EU official, Kinshasa 2014-12-02).   
What he meant was that if you add a condition and wait for it to be fulfilled, it will 
most likely never materialise, and your programme would never be implemented. 
In one of the programmes they had tried it, by having as a pre-condition for 
building a police academy that the government should pay for the road that was 
going to lead up to the building, but several months later there was no sign of the 
road being built. Another EU official added that even if they had applied 
conditionality to the programme, they would not have had enough staff to follow- 
up on it (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2014-12-11).  
However, just as I found at the overall level, Congolese staff members working 
for donor agencies, as well as some of the implementers, had a divergent view 
and amongst the ones I interviewed there was a more positive view on it. For 
example, one Congolese lawyer, working for a donor agency, said: 
“The donors should push the government more, and they need to speak 
with one voice. There are no conditionalities attached to the programmes 
and that is a big problem’” (interview donor official, Goma 2015-05-15).  
One of the implementers I interviewed compared it with the situation in some 
other countries where the EU was using as a precondition that the government 
should pay for parts of the programmes. She thought the same should apply for 
Congo (interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-05-27). 
Conditionality is, as we saw in the conceptual chapter, not only about sticks, but 
also about carrots. In an effort to incentivize the government to implement reforms 
the Swedish Embassy, which had a better relationship with Mrs. Matipa than the 
EU, at one point offered to top-up its contribution to the PARJ programme with 
an additional 8 MEUR (Sida, 2014b). According to one of the programme officers 
involved, the idea had been to complement the PARJ programme, which was 
seen as being quite infrastructure heavy, with more 'softer' issues such as training 
for prison wardens (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-05-31). However, 
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more than half of the top-up (53%) was earmarked for infrastructure (Sida, 2014c, 
2014d). According to a person with insight into the decision-making process, the 
main reason had been to improve its relationship with the Minister and thereby 
hopefully push the reforms forward (interview donor official, Stockholm 2015-08-
11). The decision-makers at the Sida HQ were not keen on granting additional 
funding to a programme that so far had not shown many results, and they did not 
approve the proposal. However, two years later the Swedish Embassy approved 
a smaller grant (1 230 000 Euro) for the reconstruction of Luzumu and training of 
prison guards, which made it possible for the PARJ programme to move forward 
with the prison (Gopa Consultants, 2016, p. 16).  
The result of the cooperation was somewhat disappointing. The mid-term 
evaluation of the PARJ programme, which the government had not taken part in, 
despite several requests by the EU and Gopa, had shown that only 15% of the 
activities had been concluded at the time of the mid-term evaluation (EU, 2014b). 
However, in the end 94% of the funding was spent, to a large extent due to the 
infrastructure work (Gopa Consultants, 2016). 
Preparing and postponing a new programmme 
Despite these difficulties in achieving results the EU, supported by Sweden and 
tentatively Belgium, was nonetheless keen to move on with a new programme. 
The idea was to put together Uhaki Safi and PARJ into one programme that would 
be implemented nationally, as the government had advocated for (EU, 2016, pp. 
1–2). However, following increased political tensions in the country in 2015 and 
2016 the donors decided to postpone the programme.92 The decision was 
controversial within the EU and the member states. Some member states, like 
Sweden and Belgium, which had supported the EU justice programmes in the 
past were pushing for the decision. The Belgian position was taken by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Brussels and not in Kinshasa where part of the Embassy, in 
opposition to their Ministry, continued to be in favour of a continuation. The EU 
Commission emphasised the need for continuing the collaboration to have some 
influence over the Ministry of Justice. As they said: ‘we need to pay to play’ 
                                            
92 See for example interview EU official, Kinshasa 2016-11-15; interview donor official, Kinshasa 2016-11-17. 
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(suggested in a confidential report). Within the EU Delegation in Kinshasa there 
were also different viewpoints. Some, who saw signs of things progressing in the 
sector were strongly against it (interview EU official, Kinshasa 2016-11-15), while 
others thought it was about time (interview EU official, Kinshasa 2016-11-17). It 
is easy to understand both sides – after years of struggle with reluctant Ministers, 
the EU finally had a Minister who took decisive actions to move the programmes 
ahead, such as leading the development of a new national plan for reforms. 
However, considering the key role the Minister of Justice played in supporting 
President Kabila’s efforts to hold on to power, it would have sent a conflicting 
message to launch a new programme at that particular time.  
5.5. Local level engagement through intermediaries 
Having examined the engagement strategies in the two different sectors at the 
national level, I will now review how the negotiations played out at the local level. 
As indicated earlier, the engagement at this level is rather different since almost 
none of the bilateral donors have any presence at the provincial and district 
levels. Instead the engagement with the provincial and local authorities is, to a 
large extent, being left to the implementing agencies contracted by the donors. It 
is also, as previously stated, at this level that the real governance is most visible, 
as I will explore in the next chapter.  
Before setting up the programmes, however, donors usually conduct 
consultations in various provinces and districts to inform the new programming. 
Both DFID and EU conducted local consultations before the start of the 
programmes. DFID especially conducted extensive local consultations in the 
provinces that they had chosen for the ASSP programme. The central 
government was accompanying them in all the consultations to keep them fully 
on board (interview government official, Kinshasa 2013-03-17; interview donor 
official, Kinshasa 2015-04-21).  
However, during my fieldvisit to Kasaï-Occidental (currently Kasaï central), it 
became clear that people at lower levels of the administration in both the health 
and the justice sectors felt excluded from the decision-making process as the 
following representation of a health zone team member in Kananga illustrates: 
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“People who are involved in the programme work at the central level don't 
understand. They are coming with pre-made concept and are not flexible 
for changes. I have participated at meetings and said what I think, but 
things never change. The programmes cannot be changed. They are 
agreed at central level and then it is just for us to implement them” 
(interview government official, Kananga 2015-04-15). 
Hence, he was frustrated by the donors, the central government and the 
implementing agencies whom he felt had all arrived with preconceived plans in 
mind and that nothing that the people at the local level said would change that. 
As a consequence, he felt that the local authorities were limited to implementing 
a programme that had been decided elsewhere. During the interview he said that:  
“Many people are afraid to speak up and highlight issues that are not 
working, as everyone wants the money to continue flowing” (interview 
government official, Kananga 2015-04-15).  
Hence, the same mechanisms that hinder the central ministry from saying ‘no’ to 
the donors are, unsurprisingly, also operating at lower levels of the administration. 
Considering that the local level receives almost nothing from the state budget, 
the pressures to ‘keep the money flowing’ are likely to be even stronger. 
Similar concerns were also brought up during my interviews in Goma. One 
provincial administrator within the justice sector expressed her frustration with 
being excluded by telling me: 
“Sometimes we are being consulted when the donors are developing their 
programmes, but usually not. It is usually at the central level that these 
consultations are taking place, and the central level does not always 
understand what the provincial level needs. It is important to listen to the 
local level [le bas] and see what are the needs that exist there” (interview 
government official, Goma 2015-05-14).  
The frustrations with lack of consultations with the local level were not limited to 
the provincial and local administration, but also included INGOs, as suggested 
by this head of an NGO collaborating with the Uhaki Safi programme in Goma:  
“Programmes like Uhaki Safi where the counterpart is the MoJ are based 
on an elitist system. It follows a model where the donors speak with the 
state, the INGOs with the local NGOs, and the local NGOs with the 
population. It would be important to make the consultation groups larger 
so that the implementers and the beneficiaries are part of the planning of 
the programme. But the donors are only speaking with the top of the 
pyramid” (interview INGO representative, Goma 2015-05-15). 
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Later on in the interview he returned to the issue saying: 
“The donors could have an important role to play in getting different 
stakeholders together to a dialogue. They (the donors) are not doing that 
sufficiently well. Instead they tell the NGOs to arrange some community 
dialogue when the programme is already up and running” (ibid). 
Hence, according to the above representations, there was a common perception 
that the decisions were taken elsewhere, and the provincial and district 
consultations were more of a ‘window-dressing’ exercise to pretend that the local 
levels have been involved. To make things even worse, customary chiefs don’t 
seem to have been consulted. This does not necessarily suggest that donors do 
not want to hear what people at the local level have to say, but that a) there are 
structures in place that make it difficult for people at this level to engage with 
donors when the opportunity arises, and b) donors are not putting forth enough 
time and effort to properly involve, and learn, from the local level.  
Limited interest in coordination 
Donors also left much of the aid coordination to the implementers at the local 
level. These were, in turn, expressing concerns that the coordination of aid was 
more or less being left to them. One of the local implementers in the health sector 
responded to my question with some annoyance saying that:  
“Why should I coordinate here, at the provincial level – it should have been 
done by the donors in Kinshasa” (interview implementer, Kananga 2015-
04-13).   
However, later he said that he did indeed coordinate with other implementers. 
But his message was clear, stating that he felt that it should be the donors at 
central level that are deciding upon the project that should be undertaken and 
ensure that the programmes are properly coordinated with other donors.  
Considering that some donors were implementing rather similar programmes in 
the eastern part of Congo, coordination in the justice sector could be seen as 
more urgent in the justice sector than in the health sector where there was in 
principle only one major donor per health zone. Some of the donors that I spoke 
to in Kinshasa were concerned about coordination and brought it up in meetings 
with the implementers on a regular basis. But one of my interviewees doubted 
that they paid much more than lip-service to it (interview donor official, Goma 
164 
 
 
2015-05-10). Her doubts seem to be confirmed in an interview I did later with one 
of the implementers of the Uhaki Safi programme, who told me:  
“My interest is to implement the results framework that I have been 
contracted to perform. I am not interested in coordinating with others in the 
province – but I do it because the donors are telling me to do it” (interview 
implementer, Goma 2015-05-13). 
He was referring to the fact that coordination takes time and effort, and his priority 
was to implement the results framework that was in his contract with the donor – 
and as coordination was not a key part in this naturally this had a lower priority.  
So what about coordination meetings between donors (or in this case the 
implementers) and the officials of the provincial and district levels? The 
government had in principle replicated the central donor – government 
coordination system at the provincial and local level both in the health and the 
justice sector. But the provincial health officials had problems in setting up the 
coordination groups due to lack of resources. The same could be observed in 
Goma in the justice sector. One senior civil servant in the justice department in 
Goma talking about coordination said that: 
“I have tried to coordinate but it is difficult as I don’t have internet 
connection to send around electronic invitations and no paper or fuel to go 
around and handing out the invitations” (interview government official, 
Goma 2015-05-14).  
She said that she had received support from a UN agency before, but when that 
stopped the coordination meetings stopped as well. Instead they were dealing 
with the donors on an individual basis. The lack of coordination mechanisms was 
confirmed by one of the implementers as well (interview implementer, Goma, 
2015-05-19). Hence, local coordination seems to function equally badly or in the 
case of the health sector worse than at the central level. This comes back to 
organisational factors, and of course makes it harder for the local level 
administration to provide input to and oversight over donor-funded programmes. 
In particular in the justice sector, alternative providers, such as the customary 
chiefs, seem to have been totally absent in the coordination fora and in the local 
consultations.  
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Sometimes not supporting the implementers 
Some of my interviewees who were working for implementers or who had worked 
in close contact with them expressed concern that donors were not always 
providing political support to them once the programme was operational. This 
seemed to be a concern of implementers both at the central and local levels and 
especially in the justice sector where there were political tensions (interview 
implementer, Kinshasa 2015-03-02; interview implementer, Goma, 2015-05-12). 
A former EU official told me about a situation she had experienced with the 
Rejusco Programme (the predecessor of the Uhaki Safi programme) where the 
head of the implementing office had asked the Minister of Justice to take actions 
regarding the threatening of rape victims. The Minister had been upset about 
being called up and had told the EU that this was unacceptable. Instead of 
backing up their implementer, he was threatened with being fired (interview 
independent consultant, Kinshasa, 2015-06-09). Her conclusion of the story was 
that donors cannot just ‘throw the implementers to the wolves’, leaving them 
alone to deal with deeply political questions and structures (ibid). In a similar vein, 
one of the NGO’s implementing the Uhaki Safi Programme complained about 
being left on their own by the EU in sensitive discussions with the authorities 
(interview implementer, Kinshasa, 201-03-02). 
In the ASSP health programme that I reviewed, this seemed to be less of a 
concern, probably both because it is a less politically sensitive issue, but also by 
virtue of the fact that there was an unusually close collaboration between the 
implementer, IMA, and the donor.  
This thesis is not about whether it is better to implement projects through CSOs 
or through consultancy firms. However, one observation is that the fact that DFID 
had chosen IMA as the consortium lead seems to have facilitated their work both 
at the central and local levels. IMA has deep roots in Congolese society through 
their long-term engagement in the country and through their engagement with 
Sanru (that is linked to the Protestant Church). In addition, many of their staff 
members were either Congolese, or were born or had lived for many years in 
Congo. The implementer of the EU programme was a German consultancy firm. 
They did not have an office in Congo and struggled with finding consultants with 
the right expertise, which led to delays in the programme. Several donors and 
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implementers also told me that when the EU programme had started to hire 
Congolese staff and was headed by a person with long-term experience of 
working in the country, cooperation with the central and local authorities became 
smoother (interview donor official, Goma 2015-05-10 and implementer, Goma, 
2015-05-13). Notwithstanding the importance of having staff members who know 
the context, which is more likely to happen with CSOs than with consultancy 
firms, there is an increasing trend amongst donors to contract consultancy firms 
rather than CSOs.  
5.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have reviewed the structural conditions and factors surrounding 
the negotiations and the strategies the different partners have used to get what 
they want from the engagement. As highlighted in the conceptual chapter, earlier 
frameworks of negotiations haven’t said much about the variance in different 
sectors. I found that there were significant differences between the strategies that 
the government was using in the health sector as compared with the justice 
sector. The government was unwilling to make the justice sector more 
independent as it would entail risks for President Kabila and his close allies, who 
depend on a biased justice system to stay in power. Hence the stakes were high. 
The donors had put high hopes on reforming the justice sector, which was seen 
as a prerequisite for other reforms. Hence, they were keen to stay engaged with 
the Ministry of Justice and sometimes went to rather great lengths to do so. As 
Habeeb (1988) pointed out, a country’s alternatives are key to understand how 
an apparently weaker partner manages to ‘win’ a negotiation. For the government 
the stakes were high, the survival of the state was at stake. The donors had in 
principle other alternatives, they could have worked with alternative justice 
providers, but as we will see in more detail in the next chapter, they were quite 
unwilling to do so. Hence, they saw few options than to try to stay engaged with 
the Ministry. It was only after the political situation further deteriorated that the 
donors postponed their planned new programme in the sector.   
In the health sector, the situation was more familiar to the donors, as here the 
government was not putting up much resistance to the donors’ reform 
programmes. The Ministry of Health seemed happy to let the donors substitute 
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for the state, although people working in the sector complained about donors 
trying to dictate too much. It is interesting to note that donors questioned the 
government’s political will and ownership in both the health and the justice 
sectors, seeming to a certain degree to downplay the ownership that the 
government had actually shown in the health sector. This is linked to the point 
made by Whitfield and Fraser about donors often reducing the concepts of 
political will and ownership to a question regarding whether the government is 
willing to take ownership of the implementation of the donors’ programmes, 
instead of listening closely to the viewpoints of local actors.   
The political will of donors is much less discussed, but how much effort the donors 
are willing to invest in state-building might also be questioned. In the health sector 
it was clear that the donors continued to prioritise the provision of health care, 
which is easy to measure, rather than going through the complicated process of 
reforming the health system. Hence, the low levels of funding going to the central 
ministry. In the justice sector, despite the bottlenecks faced, the donors still 
refrained from conducting in-depth political economy analyses to assess possible 
ways forward. Also, by not fully engaging with the local level, the donors missed 
opportunities to better find out local priorities and concerns.  
Finally, some academics, such as Whitfield and Fraser (2009), have been taking 
the normative approach that donors are usually imposing themselves and that 
the countries themselves know best what they need. This may be somewhat 
simplistic and naïve as one must also look into the motives of the state agents, 
which in a predatory state often are not aligned with what is best for the majority 
of the population. I also believe that donors, at least to some extent, wanted the 
government to take over and to give some clearer guidelines for what they were 
prioritising. However, having few resources, and having been forced to ‘fend for 
themselves’, the possibilities and opportunities for doing so might well be 
extremely limited. I also believe that the donors, at least to some further extent, 
would have wanted a partner with whom they could have frank and sincere 
discussions regarding policies and programme work. This explains their 
frustration over, for example, not being able to sit together with the Ministry of 
Justice or being able to discuss policy issues with health officials.   
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On the provincial and district levels a clear finding is the need for donors to 
engage more fully with the lower levels of the administration. The consultations 
that took place in the programmes that I reviewed were clearly insufficient, and 
often did not include alternative health and justice providers and hence failed to 
engage with the hybridity of the sectors. The choice of implementation partner 
also had a substantial influence on the programme and the engagement with the 
state from central level down to the local administration. DFID’s health 
programme was implemented by an INGO with strong local roots and it was not 
challenged by the Ministry of Health in the same way as the German consultancy 
firm without experience of working in Congo had been. This is not rocket science 
to understand; it is, however, a matter of concern that there is a trend in the donor 
community to work more though consultancy firms than through international or 
local NGOs.   
.  
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Chapter 6: Donors and State Struggling with 
Hybridity and Real Governance  
6.1. Introduction 
The Congolese state is in many ways the archetype for a hybrid and negotiated 
state. The absence of functional state institutions in various parts of the country 
and the subsequent reliance on non-state institutions has meant that in reality, 
public services have largely been provided through real governance and hybrid 
institutions (Titeca, 2016). While there has been rather substantial research into 
how this real governance works in for example the education and security 
sectors, there is less known about how the system works in the health and justice 
sectors. In particular, we know little about whether this real governance affects 
the negotiations and engagement between the donors and the government, and 
if so how? 
The fact that the relationship with the government has been a challenge for the 
donors, and that many of them see the Congolese state as being predatory, 
makes it especially interesting to see how donors have managed to recognize 
and respond to this real governance and ‘hybridity’ on the ground. Have they kept 
their state-centric lenses on, or has the predatory nature of the state made it 
easier for them to identify and work with other actors involved in the complex 
‘eco-system’ of Congo?  
In this chapter I will review how the real governance on the ground is functioning 
in the health and justice sectors and how the state co-exists with non-state actors 
like the Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) and the customary chiefs. As I will 
demonstrate, the state is working closely with the FBOs in the provision of health 
services, although the cooperation is not always smooth. The FBOs work within 
the framework of the state, and the collaboration between the government and 
the FBOs is regulated in an agreement called ‘Convention Cadre de Partenariat’. 
This includes, for example, the right to part of the income of the FBOs, while on 
their part, the FBOs agree to follow the government’s health policies. Thus, the 
government has managed to stay relevant in the health sector, although a large 
percent of health care is being provided by the FBOs. I will also show that the 
FBOs are not mere service providers, they are also performing functions that are 
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usually associated with formal state functions, such as the actual management 
of the health zones. Hence it can be argued that the health system is a hybrid 
system where the state and the FBOs are constantly negotiating the borders of 
their collaboration, cooperation and autonomy.  
By contrast, the justice sector is characterised by hostility on the part of the 
government towards the customary chiefs. Despite the fact that the government 
is not able to cover the country with courtrooms and prisons, the government has 
been less keen on accepting that customary chiefs and other non-state actors 
are providing justice to the population. This is mainly related to the power 
dynamics between the government and the customary chiefs, where the 
government has been keen to curtail the power and influence of the chiefs. 
However, it also seems to be driven by a wish to demonstrate the presence of 
the state in the country, by the building of courthouses and prisons. In addition, 
some informants believed that there was a desire by the government to be seen 
as ‘modern’ in the sense of having a written law and a judicial system similar to 
that of western countries. Whereas in the health system there are multiple 
linkages between the government and the FBOs, there are relatively few formal 
links between the government and the customary chiefs in in the justice sector. 
But where do the donors fit into this complex landscape? Do they recognize, in 
their state-building efforts that social services and justice are not always provided 
by the state, or at least not only by the state, and that there is a complex system 
of governance operating in the country? I will in this chapter demonstrate that 
there is a growing recognition on how real governance functions, and how donors 
are still struggling with how to work with this real governance. This, I will argue, 
is related to four main factors:  
 Donors’ somewhat limited understanding of the context. 
 Donors’ tendency to analyse the situation with ‘state-centric lenses’. 
 Normative considerations making some of the non-state actors difficult 
for the donors to deal with. 
 Political considerations as to whether it is feasible or not for the donors 
to work with other actors than the state.  
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These factors, to varying degrees, make it more challenging for donors to fully 
embrace 'the real governance' and hybridity in the two different sectors.   
This chapter starts by reviewing the background to real governance and hybridity 
in Congo in order to provide an overview of how the system has evolved over 
time. In section 3, I will analyse the contemporary linkages and interactions 
between the government and different actors. In section 4, I explore how donors 
have reacted and taken into account the hybridity and real governance in their 
state-building efforts in Congo, and whether it has influenced the negotiations 
between the donors and the government. Finally, I analyse the findings in relation 
to my conceptual framework of real governance and hybridity. 
6.2. The reasons for the dominance of real governance and hybridity 
in Congo 
Since Congo has long been hailed as a classic example of state failure, one might 
imagine that the plethora of public goods being provided by non-state actors is 
the result of such actors stepping in to fill the void left by a deficient state. This is 
true in certain cases, for example, in the number of self-defence groups that have 
emerged as a response to the state’s failure to provide security for its 
population.93 In other areas though, such as health, education and justice, the 
narrative that alternative providers have filled the void of the state is not entirely 
correct. Instead the hybridity and real governance that can be observed today in 
Congo often has its roots in the country's history and the legacy of colonisation 
as I will demonstrate below.  
Faith-based organisations and colonisation 
In the provision of health care and education the Congolese state, following the 
Belgian model, has a long history of encouraging FBOs to be the primary 
providers of health and education (Leinweber, 2012). Catholic and Protestant 
missionaries that arrived in the country in the 19th century were, in addition to 
‘saving souls’ by trying to convert people to Christianity, also early on engaged in 
providing health care and education as part of making the church appealing.  
                                            
93 In some instances these groups have also taken over taxation functions and other functions that are 
usually related to being the functioning of the formal state. 
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When King Leopold established the so-called 'Congo free state', he was generally 
supportive of these efforts by the missionaries, and even more so when they were 
carried out by Catholics from Belgium. He saw them as a useful tool for 
establishing control over the territory, and the Catholic Church in particular 
became part of the pillars of the colonial regime (Seay, 2009, p. 103). In exchange 
for the Belgian state’s ‘generosity’ in subsidizing their schools, the priests taught 
values of hard work, loyalty and basic literacy skills to Congolese whose labour 
was needed to build the state (Seay, 2009 pp. 103-104). In many places, Catholic 
services such as a dispensary or a primary school were the only social services 
available and the most visible manifestation of colonisation (Persyn & Ladrière, 
2004 p. 67). 
Though it is not unusual in Africa for church organisations to provide social 
services to the population, the historic trajectory and the close, formalised 
interaction between the state and the FBOs in Congo is rather unique (Baer, 2007 
p. 9; Seay, 2009 p. 45). As Seay notes, Congo was among a few countries where 
the government (both colonial and later independent) allowed first the 
missionaries and then the national Church to organize and administer schools 
and health for the rest of the nation (Seay 2009 pp. 103-105). Thus, the 
involvement of FBOs in the health and education sectors in close collaboration 
with the state is nothing new in Congo, and the fact that almost 50% of health 
centers are run by the FBOs is a continuation of a division of labour established 
during colonial times that has continued ever since.  
Justice sector and the customary chiefs 
In the justice sector the trajectory is a bit different, but as in the health sector 
developments have been closely linked to colonial rule. When the Belgians 
arrived in the Congo, the justice system was based on a customary system with 
institutions at different levels to handle conflicts, from the village chiefs up to royal 
courts.94 The Belgians didn’t outlaw that system but introduced a system based 
                                            
94 Basically, a territory is divided into groupement, chefferies and secteurs. Secteurs are local bodies by elected chiefs, 
while the chefferies are led by chiefs that are appointed by the national authorities (although usually the son of the 
former chief) and groupements. A chefferie is usually divided into different groupements, each one administered by 
a chief. The groupements are usually consisting of one ethnic group only  (ICG, 2013). 
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on civil law, that was used in Belgium (RCN, 2016 p. 81). As a consequence, a 
dual system in Congo, with two different legal systems has prevailed.95 The 
customary system is unwritten, where a settlement is negotiated with the goal of 
restoring social cohesion in the community. The formal one remains heavily 
influenced by the Belgian system. For example, many laws are still the same as 
those inherited from the colonial system (Tekilazaya et al., 2013b; interview 
government official, Kinshasa 2015-05-28).  
When Congo became independent in 1960 both the health system and the formal 
justice system were heavily dependent on Belgian administrators. The Belgians 
had, as we have seen in chapter 3, not allowed Congolese people to get higher 
education, so at independence there were no Congolese medical school 
graduates and with the abrupt withdrawal of the Belgians and missionaries the 
hospitals and centres found themselves without qualified staff (Ministry of Health, 
2009, p. 3). Some of the missionaries stayed on however, and they were 
complemented by Haitian and other French speaking experts who were called in 
to fill the gaps. Simultaneously, many Congolese medical assistants were 
nominally upgraded to physicians (Persyn & Ladrière, 2004 p. 67). Likewise, 
there was not a single Congolese judge. As a consequence, Congo continued to 
work through forms of real governance and hybrid forms of governance. 
However, as I will show in the next section the government has at various times 
tried to impose itself and to co-opt or get rid of these parallel systems.  
Mobutu tries to take control over the FBOs 
The Church had initially worked with the government to restore stability after the 
first five years of chaos that followed independence in 1960. However, growing 
tensions over President Mobutu’s ‘authenticité’ process, that I described in 
chapter 3, led to a deep divide between the state and the Catholic Church (Seya, 
                                            
95 As in other countries, the colonial administration manipulated the ‘tribal system’ and used it as a device for the 
functioning of their own, imposed, administrative system (H. Dunn, 2013). Regarding the legal system, the Congolese 
population was to be governed by indigenous law, unless contrary to public order or previous statue. However, in the 
case of criminal law everyone was subject to Congo’s penal code, created by the Belgian administration (Prinsloo, 
1993). As Englebert (2002) and others have observed the colonial boundaries united different governance systems 
and split important kingdoms. During the colonial time a dual-land system was installed in which state law governed 
state land (terres dominiales), and customary law governed indigenous land (terres indigenes). This legal dichotomy 
created a normative duality in the social significance of land. There was a de jure recognition of customary land 
tenure, but colonial interests always out ruled local ones (Bisoka & Classens, 2019, p. 194). The vast majority of land 
was declared vacant, which led to the expropriation of most of the authochtones communities (ibid). This duality of 
land rights still exists and is the root to many of the land conflicts in eastern Congo.  
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2009 p. 106; Callaghy,1984 pp. 304-305).  Tensions had built up since 1968 when 
the church officials had openly criticized the injustices and corruption under 
Mobutu (Callaghy, 1984 p. 305). This was followed by an expression of concern 
in 1969 over increased authoritarian tendencies of the regime. In 1972 there 
followed a major confrontation over Mobutu’s ‘authenticité’ policies, when 
Christian first names were banned (Callaghy, 1984 p. 305; Seya, 2009 p. 108). 
This disturbed the church, but larger issues were at stake. The church was 
worried by the state’s rapidly developing political religion which portrayed Mobutu 
as a Messiah. The state radio had for example declared in 1972 that people 
should believe in the party and not the Catholic Church (Callaghy, 1984 p. 305). 
In 1974 the government launched a major attack, announcing that all crucifixes 
and photographs of the Pope should be removed from church schools, hospitals 
and dispensaries and replaced by photos of Mobutu. But even more devastating, 
Mobutu announced that religious instruction in schools was to be abolished and 
replaced with courses in Mobutuism (ibid). The final blow came when the regime 
announced that it was taking over the entire school system. The effect of the take-
over was immediate and disastrous. The quality of education in schools 
plummeted as “their management was taken out of the hands of qualified church-
supported professionals” (Seya, 2009 p. 108). Parents and teachers requested 
that the churches be allowed to take back control over the schools (Leinweber, 
2012 p. 9). By 1977, Mobutu recognized that his attempt to nationalise education 
had failed and quietly negotiated a deal with the churches for them to take back 
control of the management on schools in return for signing a contract with the 
government, stipulating that the government was the lead in the sector. Today 
three quarters of students attend public ‘conventionised’ schools (Leinweber, 
2012, p. 9; Titeca & De Herdt, 2011).96   
In contrast, health centers were never nationalised. While difficult to confirm, the 
health centers were most likely ‘saved’ because they posed less of a threat to 
Mobutu as they were merely providing health care to the population. The schools 
on the other hand were ‘indoctrinating’ the children with religion. This was a 
                                            
96 Schools managed by the FBOs, under the leadership of the state (Leinweber, 2012 p. 9). 
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bigger risk to Mobutu’s rule and absolute influence than the administering of 
medicine in the health centers.  
An effort to take over control of the justice sector met with equal failure. Mobutu 
had, throughout his 32-year long rule, an ambivalent view regarding he customary 
chiefs. At one point he tried to incorporate traditional leaders into his network to 
consolidate his power. In order to do so, he reaffirmed his policy of returning to 
the Zairian ancestral authenticity and recognized that traditional leaders serve as 
an intermediate layer between the central government and the local population 
(Kyamusugulwa, Hilhorst, & Jacobs, 2018, p. 251). However, Mobutu was also 
interested in curbing the power of the traditional chiefs, and in 1968 he introduced 
a new law, which aimed to progressively replace the customary justice system 
with the written law. This would be done by expanding the number of the so-called 
‘tribunaux de paix’ i.e. local courts to cover the whole country. The idea was to 
establish a local court in all the territories, and in the major cities in the country 
(RCN, 2016 p. 20). However, as the law made clear, until such local courts 
existed in a territory, the customary system was allowed to exist (ibid). As we saw 
earlier, the progress on establishing the formal courts has been slow. Hence, 
large parts of the country have no access to the formal court system, and a large 
number of people continue to rely on the customary system.  
6.3. real governance and hybridity in today's Congo 
Having established the background to real governance in the country, I will now 
explore how the system functions today, and how the state and the non-state 
actors engage with each other. As I will show, the relationships between the state 
and the non-state actors are more amicable and more formalised in the health 
sector than in the justice sector.  
Cooperation and competition in the health sector 
FBOs, as we saw, are still very present in Congo, managing around 50% of the 
health centres in the country (Baer, 2007; DFID, 2012b, pp. 6–7). That faith-
based networks play a major role in providing health services at the community 
level is nothing new and quite frequently found in Africa. However, what makes 
the situation in Congo differ from other countries is that in addition to providing 
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direct services, the FBOs are also in principle co-managing around 40% of the 
health zones. Hence, as Leinweber (2012) argues, the relationship between the 
state and the FBOs can best be described as a form of hybrid organisation 
whereby both parties are closely inter-linked with each other in a complex set of 
negotiations. The largest Church in Congo is the Catholic Church and estimates 
suggest that it is present in approximately 50 percent of the health zones, 
followed by the Protestant Church (DFID, 2012a, p. 7).  
The hybridity of the system manifests itself in various ways. The first example 
being the complex system of co-management of the health zones. Although in 
principle co-management has been forbidden since 2007 it is still happening 
(implementer, Kinshasa 2015-03-05; FBO representative, Kinshasa 2015-05-26).  
Co-management refers to a situation when the church is in charge of the 
reference hospital with a head of hospital (which is the main hospital within a 
health zone), and where the health zone manager, who leads the administration 
of the health zone is appointed by the state. In principle these should be the same 
person, and when they are not the same this sometimes creates conflicts 
between the health zone manager, who represents the state, and the head of the 
hospital, who represents a FBO. In these situations, they usually try to find a 
compromise in which the state tries to find a health zone manager that is 
acceptable to the churches. In some cases, it is the churches that appoint the 
Head of the Zone. When a consensus cannot be reached it sometimes leads to 
situations where the health zone manager is literally chased away from the 
hospital by the Church (interview implementer, Kananga 2015-04-13; FBO 
representative, Kinshasa 2015-06-01). 
Second, hybrid governance is also manifest in the fact that the FBOs often 
provide key staff members to be part of the health zone team (Équipe Cadre de 
Zone de Santé), which is the local management unit that oversees the health 
centers. Hence the health zone team has clear regulatory and management 
functions. The fact that confessional staff members, hired by the church, work 
inside these units (and sometimes even heading them) is an illustration of 
hybridity. Another case in point is that a number of health staff working in health 
centres run by FBOs are paid by the state but follow the rules and regulations 
established by the FBOs (Ministry of Health, 2007, pp. 2–3). This sometimes 
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leads to conflicts regarding who has the right for example to fire a person. 
According to ‘convention’ the FBOs can’t fire a staff member who is financed and 
hired by the state, but they can ‘return’ the person to the state (Ministry of Health, 
2007, p. 3).  
Thirdly, as we saw earlier the relationship between the state and the Church 
organisations is regulated by a Convention97 (like a contract) that according to 
one of my interviewees dates back from the time of the colonisation when the 
Belgian king signed the paper and sent it to his administrator in the country 
(implementer, Kinshasa 2015-06-03). The Convention has been re-negotiated 
several times (ibid), and it is another indicator of the hybrid character of the 
Congolese state in the sense that the FBOs and the state are working together 
in close symbiosis. Basically, the Convention states that the state should facilitate 
the FBO-run health centres to function, and that it should respect the 
independence of the FBOs (Ministry of Health, 2007). It also states that the FBO-
run centres should follow national policies, and offer the government established 
minimum and maximum packages of services at their centres and hospitals.98 
The FBOs are also obliged to report health data to the state. The last revision 
had occurred in 2007, and it was being updated when I was doing my field 
research. The update was carried out within the framework of the DFID-financed 
ASSP programme. The main reason for the update was that the FBOs wanted 
the government to take a larger responsibility for the payment of staff at the FBO- 
run centres (interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-06-03; FBO representative, 
Kinshasa 2015-06-01). The state was, however, hesitant to do so, and feared 
that the FBOs might add people to the pay list that are not currently working at 
the centres (interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-07-07). Considering the 
situation in the Congo and the practice by both state actors and FBOs to add 
people to the centres, this doesn’t seem to be an unreasonable concern by the 
government.99 The sensitivity of determining the exact numbers of staff employed 
at different centres was underlined by a centrally placed FBO representative who 
rather dramatically, told me that: “it is dangerous to find out the exact number of 
                                            
97 Each church signs it individually with the state, although the text is the same. 
98 The minimal health package is based on the government norms for what services and standards the health centres 
should provide. 
99 The exact number of health workers is not known. Efforts are on-going to have a formal registration process, but 
reports about large numbers of so-called ‘ghost-workers’ are numerous.  
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staff, you can hang for that” (interview FBO representative, Kinshasa 2015-06-
01). Allegedly, many health zone managers often place relatives and friends at 
centres leading to overcrowding of health workers. As many of them are not on 
the official payroll, but are being financed by the out-of-pocket payment, it is hard 
to know how many they are. This practice apparently happens both at the state-
run and FBO-run centres (interview implementer, Kinshasa 2015-06-03; FBO 
representative, Kinshasa 2015-06-01). This malpractice is causing a lot of 
conflicts at the local health centres, as the fees the patients pay need to be shared 
by an increasing number of staff members. To compensate, the user fee is 
sometimes increased which in turn leads to less people being able to afford to 
use the centre, leading to a vicious circle.  
Some people in the government see the FBOs as part of the government system 
– ‘They are a part of us’ was something that one of my key government informants 
in the health sector insisted on (government official, Kinshasa 2015-04-23; and 
2016-11-24). That this attitude was rather common was confirmed by 
interviewees within CSOs and implementing agencies as well.100 It was also 
recognized that the FBOs were the ones who to a large extent, kept the health 
sector going, and that partnering with the FBOs was the only way to improve the 
governance and coverage of the health sector (Bwimana, 2017, p. 1481). The 
fact that many of the senior level health professionals have been trained by the 
FBOs also facilitates a more collaborative approach between the government and 
the FBOs (DFID, 2012b, pp. 26–27).  
Competition between the state and the FBOs  
Despite the Convention and the recognition, both from the state and from the 
FBOs, that they needed each other, there was nevertheless some tension and 
disagreement between them as well as among the FBOs themselves. For 
example, the FBO-managed centres have historically had better access to 
resources which has meant that they have been able to pay salaries to a larger 
extent than the state. They are also better organised and usually have better 
trained staff. As a consequence, where people have a choice, they prefer to go 
                                            
100 For example, interview with Multilateral donor, in Kinshasa 2015-03-30; and CSO representative, in Kinshasa 2015-
04-09. 
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to FBO-run centres (interview CSO representative, Kinshasa 2015-04-09; 
interview consultant, Kinshasa 2015-05-08). This creates a certain jealousy 
amongst people in the centres that are run by the state. 
The FBOs often complain that the state does not always facilitate their work, as 
they should according to the Convention. A common area of conflict is the 
collection of taxes. The FBOs are exempted from some taxes but not all, which 
creates confusion and opens doors for predation by state officials. It is, for 
example, not uncommon for state officials to try to collect taxes on medicines and 
equipment that the FBO centres received free of charge from donors. This 
sometimes takes absurd proportions where, for example, a thermostat that costs 
around 1 USD at the market can be taxed by up to 5 USD by state officials 
(interview with two FBO representatives, Kananga, 2015-04-17). Sometimes this 
predation puts people’s lives at risk. To illustrate, the hospital in Katoka health 
zone, managed by the Catholic Church, at one point had to cease operations as 
tax authorities had claimed tax for equipment at the laboratory. When they 
refused to pay, the lab was simply closed by the tax authorities. As it is impossible 
to run a hospital without a laboratory, the whole hospital closed down and the 
population found itself without its main hospital for weeks (ibid). The conflict 
ended when the governor stepped in and paid the requested tax himself (ibid) 
which also shows the limited power the governors have over tax authorities.  
The power balance between the state and the FBO’s is constantly changing. 
Many of my informants stated that in the past the FBOs often wanted to operate 
independently from the state, whereas there now seems to be a better 
understanding that they both need each other. One reason for the churches’ 
willingness to work closer with the state is that they receive less funding from 
abroad than they used to. Some of my informants noted that the decrease in 
funding had accelerated after the 2008 economic crisis in Europe and the USA 
(INGO representative, Kinshasa 2015-04-02; health official, Kananga, 2015-04-
15).101  
                                            
101 There are also significantly fewer foreign missionaries which, according to some, has further reduced the 
influence of the FBOs (interview donor, Kinshasa 2015-03-30). Two of my non-Congolese interviewees had 
actually been health zone managers in their early careers, showing that even foreigners could, in the past, 
take up posts managing the health zones. This was apparently not possible anymore. 
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Real governance and animosity in the Justice sector 
Just like in the health sector, non-state actors are playing a large role in the justice 
sector. As we saw earlier around 75% of cases concerning justice are being 
handled by alternative mechanisms outside the formal system (Sida, 2011, p. 4). 
The majority of these are handled by the customary system. However, other 
mechanisms, such as conflict resolution through FBOs, as well as international 
and local NGOs, also exist (Jacobs et al., 2017). 
As mentioned already, the relationship between the government and the 
customary chiefs has throughout Congo’s history been extremely complex and 
often ambiguous and hostile. The Congolese state’s weakness and lack of 
authority to enforce its power over the chiefs has led to a situation where the 
boundaries between state authority and customary chiefs are not always clear. 
In contrast to the health sector where there are formalized links between the 
FBOs and the government, this is less the case in the justice sector.   
One example of the unclear boundaries between the state and the customary 
chiefs is the control of land, which is the root cause for numerous conflicts. 
Despite the fact that according to Congolese legislation from 1973, the state is 
the owner of community land, the customary chiefs play an important role in land 
administration, which forms the economic basis of their legitimacy (ICG, 2013, p. 
8). They are, for example, the ones that collect land taxes and they also decide 
who in the village is allowed to use the common land. The customary chiefs have 
been able to retain this key role because the 1973 law still recognizes community 
rights over occupation and use of land. The situation needs to be clarified by a 
Presidential decree, but this has never been done (International Crisis Group 
2013; interview implementer, Goma 2016-10-14). The reason why Kabila has not 
done so is unclear, but concerns regarding how it would affect his relationship 
with the customary chiefs, as well as the feasibility of enforcing such a decree, 
are likely playing a considerable role in his decision (interview implementer, 
Goma 2016-10-14).  
Another illustration of the blurred boundaries between the state and the 
customary chiefs is the situation in which although it is the government that 
ultimately appoints or dismisses chiefs, it is in reality not always able to enforce 
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this role.102 This can lead to severe tensions as we can observe from the situation 
in Kasaï. In 2016 violent conflict began in the area after the death of a chief. The 
population wanted his son to take over, which would be the appropriate choice 
according to their customs. However, the government wanted to appoint 
someone else that they perceived as being more loyal to it. This effort by the 
central state trigged a violent conflict in the area that is still ongoing; to date more 
than 5 000 people have been killed and 1.5 million people are displaced.  
Finally, another area where the roles have not always been clearly defined is the 
role of the customary chiefs in the justice sector. As I explained in the introduction 
to this chapter, Mobutu tried in 1968 to limit the role of the chiefs in the justice 
sector. However, according to the law passed at that time, until a court had been 
established in a territory the chiefs could continue to solve legal conflicts. So far 
only around 20% of the planned number of courts have been built. Nonetheless, 
despite this slow progress in establishing courts, the government went ahead in 
2013 to effectively forbid the involvement of customary chiefs in dispute resolution 
in a move to curb their power. The new law says nothing about the local chiefs 
and the customary courts (Loi organique, 2013). This has widely been interpreted 
by people working in the justice sector that customary chiefs no longer have the 
right to solve disputes within their territories (RCN, 2016 p. 81; government 
official, Kinshasa 2015-05-28 and implementer, Kinshasa 2015-03-12). The civil 
law system, however, leaves the possibility for the main judge to be supported by 
two experts when presiding over civil cases. Hence, a judge can choose to be 
accompanied by, for example, two customary chiefs that can explain and interpret 
local customs (interview judge, Kinshasa 2015-05-02; Loi organique 2013). 
However, not every judge knows about this and of those who know, not all are 
using this provision (interview judge, Kinshasa 2015-05-02). 
Reasons for the persistence of real governance in the justice sector 
Despite efforts by the government to outlaw the involvement of the customary 
system, it still exists. There are several reasons for why this real governance 
prevails. One is, of course, the fact that not enough local courts have been built. 
Those that actually do exist often struggle to function as there are not enough 
                                            
102 It is the Minister of the Interior who is responsible for the customary chiefs (ICG, 2013, p. 3). 
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judges in the country to fill necessary positions. According to the 2013 law, local 
courts (tribanaux de paix) should have at least three judges in order to function. 
Many courts, especially in more rural areas which judges tend to avoid, are 
struggling to keep up with this requirement.   
There are, however, other reasons as well. For example, while customary courts 
had a presence at the subdivision level of chiefdoms and sectors, the local courts 
are only present in bigger towns, forcing people to travel long distances 
(Verweijen, 2016, p. 3). The fact that one tribunal might replace several 
customary courts representing different ethnic groups might also create problems 
(interview donor official, Goma 2015-05-15; interview donor official, Kinshasa 
2015-06-09). 
Apart from being far away and often seen as too expensive, the formal system is 
not well understood by the population. Courts have a punitive approach that is in 
many ways foreign to how many people in Congo perceive justice, which is to 
emphasise the restoration of social order and relationships (Tekilazaya et al., 
2013a; interview law professor, Kinshasa 2015-06-15). The winner-takes-all 
nature of western judgements often sits uncomfortably with African legal 
traditions, which tend to be more inquisitive, mediatory and restorative. It should 
be noted though that this presumption has been challenged by amongst others 
Crook, Asante & Brobbey (2011).103 Formal courts are usually also seen as being 
more corrupt than the customary system. A joint UNDP/Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative (HHI) that is regularly measuring people's perceptions of security in the 
eastern part of the Congo has found that customary justice remains the 
mechanism best known by the population. In addition, confidence toward 
customary justice remains higher than the confidence people have toward the 
formal court system, including legal clinics and mobile civilian courts. The 
differences are sometimes significant. In Masisi, where insecurity is high, 79% of 
                                            
103 In a study of dispute settlement institutions in Ghana they fund that users looked for fairness and a balanced 
process in their judicial institutions. The emphasis was on making sure the ‘truth should be established, and that the 
parties involved must acknowledge or accept it’ (2011, p. 64). Sally Falk Moore argues that although harmonious 
settlement of conflicts are not without foundation, the idea of colonial equilibrium is a mixture of African self-
idealization and colonial/anthropological political theory, and that within the local communities there are competing 
interests and some are more powerful than others (Falk Moore, 1992, pp. 32–33) . A study in 2008 by ICTJ also found 
that people in general had a rather punitive view on justice (Vinck, et al.,  2008). This study had, however, a strong 
focus on war crimes where one might reasonably expect people to have a more retributive view than for other less 
violent types of crimes. 
183 
 
 
respondents reported at least moderate confidence in the customary justice 
system, against 38% having confidence for the civilian justice system. Even 
where civilian courts are accessible geographically, confidence in customary 
justice remains higher compared to the civilian justice system (Vinck et al., 2015, 
pp. 1–2). Hence, the difference can’t be explained by distance only. Similarly, a 
poll conducted in 2014 showed that on average 65% of the population in eastern 
Congo had little or no trust in the formal court system, whereas for the customary 
justice system the same figure was 34% (Harvard Humanitarian Report, 2014 p. 
65). Part of the reason for low trust in the formal system is that most people 
believed that the courts are corrupt, that one must pay to have a court hear one’s 
case, and that the courts are unresponsive to their needs (Harvard Humanitarian 
Report, 2014 p. 67). As I will show later on in this chapter, there are differences 
between regions in how legitimate customary chiefs are considered to be. In 
Kinshasa, for example, they play less of a role than in rural areas. The conflict in 
the east have also tended to marginalise some of them, for example, when people 
are being displaced or in cases where they have been co-opted by various rebel 
groups, or have tried to sell communal land (Vlassenroot, 2012; Mushi, 2013). 
Fearing the consequences 
Considering the slow rollout of the formal system and the challenges it faces, 
many people working in or with the justice sectors were worried about the 
government’s hard-line approach towards the customary justice system and what 
consequences it would have. This was clearly expressed by a senior judge from 
Equateur province: 
“People can’t turn to the formal system because it is not existing, 
and they can’t as usual turn to the traditional chief because he is 
forbidden to rule so they are left in a vacuum. I am deeply worried – 
what will people do – will they turn to personal vendettas?” (interview 
judge, Kinshasa 2015-04-27). 
One key informant who had just visited a remote area in South Kivu voiced similar 
concern by saying: 
“The state imposes itself on people and they are sending judges to 
areas where they don’t speak the local languages. Nobody asks the 
people what they want. The justice system alters the social contract 
between the people and the state, and you have to mitigate the 
negative impacts of it. To forbid the traditional system to operate 
184 
 
 
will severely undermine people’s confidence in the state” (interview 
consultant, Kinshasa 2015-06-30). 
As seen from the above statements there was a clear worry amongst people 
working with the justice sector, both as to how justice would be sought and how 
it would affect the social contract between the state and the population.  
In a recent study conducted by Verweijen (2016) in eastern Congo, the judge 
seems to have been right to worry. She found that so-called ‘popular justice’, 
where a mob violently kills people, has increased in eastern Congo (Verweijen, 
2016 p. 1). Part of this is because of the dysfunctional state-led justice. However, 
as she convincingly argues the rise in popular justice is not only related to 
malpractices in the formal system, but also relate to a wider crisis of authority 
resulting in part from the eroding role of customary chiefs, religious leaders and 
elders (ibid). Some of the customary chiefs have also undermined their own 
legitimacy by selling out land despite protest from the population (ICG, 2013, p. 
8). 
Competition between the state and the customary chiefs 
We have seen that there is a hostility within the government towards the 
customary chiefs. But what are the main reasons for this? According to many of 
my Congolese respondents it is about a) curbing the power of customary chiefs; 
b) concerns regarding the image of the country, and c) professional norms.  
The desire to curb the customary chiefs was mentioned by my interviewees as 
one of the main reasons as to why the government had decided to forbid the 
customary courts. To exclude the customary chiefs from the justice sector would 
be one way to take control and to impose a government led justice sector in the 
whole country.  
Some of my interviewees also mentioned pride and images of the country as 
reasons why the government wanted to impose itself. As one of my interviewees 
pointed out:  
“The government wants to show that they are equally modern and as good 
as the West and hence they are imitating the western system” (interview 
Congolese Lawyer, Goma, 2015-05-15). 
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Another one of my interviewees, a Congolese lawyer working for a bilateral donor, 
made the following interesting observation: 
“Justice is a key role of the state. It is more political and therefore it is much 
harder to work with the Ministry of Justice than for example working with 
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health as they are primarily 
service providers and hence easier to work with. Justice is about the image 
of the country – and the government cares very much about the image of 
the country” (interview donor official, Kinshasa 2015-06-09). 
Finally, people trained in the written law and working in the formal justice sector 
often perceived the customary system as something unmodern, something that 
needed to be replaced. Many also complained that customary chiefs do not know 
the law and that they are discriminatory towards women. Only a few of the 
Congolese people that I interviewed in the formal justice sector saw a positive 
role for the customary system.  
6.4. Donors’ struggle with the real governance and hybridity 
How then have the donors reacted to this real governance on the ground, and 
the hybrid nature of the health and the justice sectors? Have they viewed them 
as important partners in the state-building process or as a threat to the authority 
and legitimacy of the state? As I will show in this section, the donors more easily 
engaged with the FBOs in the health sector than with the alternative providers in 
the justice sector. However, even in the health sector they tend to engage more 
with the state than with the FBOs, especially regarding the discussion of policy 
issues and the development of programme proposals. I will argue that the donors’ 
engagement with the real governance on the ground was partly impeded by a mix 
of the four following factors: a) lack of understanding of the context; b) state-
centric lenses; c) normative considerations; and d) political considerations. 
a) Understanding of the context  
An obvious challenge for donors is that fragile states are almost by definition 
extremely complex to understand. It might be almost impossible for donor staff 
that are normally in a country for only a few years to fully grasp the complex 
nature of the interactions between the state and the non-state providers and the 
linkages between them. Effective engagement with these different actors requires 
an in-depth understanding of how, and in what ways, they provide services; how 
186 
 
 
they exercise power within communities; and what kind of legitimacy they draw 
upon.  
My interviews with donor representatives involved in health reforms revealed that 
in general they had a good knowledge regarding the important role FBOs had in 
health care provision and that the churches had a high degree of legitimacy in 
Congo. It was also widely recognized that they were working in collaboration with 
the state, and that a large percentage of the health centres were being run by 
religious organisations. However, a deeper understanding of the complexity and 
inter-linkages between the state and the FBO, i.e. the real governance, was often 
neither very well understood, nor taken into account in the programming of 
development aid. Some of the donors I interviewed were, for example, not aware 
of the Convention between the state and the churches, and how deeply involved 
the churches are in the management of the health zones. Hence, they were not 
aware that they might accidentally undermine the FBOs to the advantage of the 
state by focusing mainly on the state in their interactions on state-building in the 
health sector. Considering that the health centres run by FBOs are considered to 
be better, and that the FBOs enjoy higher legitimacy in comparison to the state, 
it is not clear that such a weakening of the FBOs will produce better health care 
and increase the social contract between the state and the population. As argued 
by amongst other McLoughlin (2015) the link between the state’s performance in 
delivering services and its legitimacy is far from linear (Mcloughlin, 2015, p. 341). 
Compared to the justice sector, there was a much more open attitude amongst 
the donors towards working with non-state actors in the health sector. DFID, for 
example, in their ASSP programme, decided to implement the programme 
through FBOs rather than INGOs. This change was motivated by the fact that the 
FBOs would be staying in the country even after the donors and the INGOs would 
have left (DFID, business case, 2013 p. 1). However, even in this programme, it 
was mainly representatives from the state that were involved in the discussions 
on how to set up the programme, and the main leading implementer is an 
American FBO, although with deep roots in Congo. 
Most of the donors in the justice system that I interviewed were well aware of the 
limitations of the formal system, and that most of the justice cases were solved 
187 
 
 
by actors other than the state. From perceptions studies being conducted by 
UNDP and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, there was also an understanding that 
people had more confidence in the customary system than in the formal state 
structures. Nonetheless, moving from this realisation to actually working with the 
real governance on the ground seemed to be a leap too far for most of them for 
reasons that I will explore further below. There were only a few NGOs, such as 
the Belgian organisation RCN, working with alternative forms of justice, such as 
various forms of mediation and working with customary chiefs. There were some 
donors, however, that tried to include minor activities regarding customary chiefs 
within their overall justice reform programmes. This was especially the case in 
programmes that included land disputes, such as the EU's Uhaki Safi 
programme. However, the overall objective of donor funded programmes was still 
very much on strengthening the formal system. 
In sum, while there was some basic understanding on the real governance and 
the hybrid nature of the Congolese state, perhaps it was a step too far to move 
from a basic understanding of the system to accepting and actively working with 
the real governance, especially in the justice sector. Part of the problem was the 
state-centric view that many donors had, which we will analyse in the next 
paragraph.  
b) State-centric lenses 
That donors usually have a state-centric view has been highlighted by a number 
of scholars (IDS, 2010). Such state-centric lenses make it difficult for the donors 
to look beyond the state in their support to public services (ibid). This mind-set 
came out most clearly in the justice sector, which most donors see as a key 
function of the state. The Swedish aid agency, in expressing one of its motivations 
for supporting the formal justice sector, for example, stated that:  
“We cannot contribute to increased access to justice if there are no 
courts, no prison with adequate standards and no Ministry of Justice 
building to enter into” (Sida, 2014a, p. 4). 
In documents like the New Deal on Engagement with Fragile States, the 
introduction of a rule of law system has also been seen as a crucial step to stop 
violence in fragile states. It has also been viewed as a cornerstone for the 
establishment of democracy as well as being a prerequisite for economic 
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development. This viewpoint doesn't fit easily with a non-formal system that in 
many ways is characterised by a personal-based type of justice, ruled by 
unwritten laws. Most of the donors I interviewed simply could not imagine how a 
justice system could work if it was not based on a formal state-system with written 
rules and clear regulations. In the health sector the donors more intuitively 
seemed to understand that the government didn't have to be the only one 
providing health care, perhaps because it is not always the state that provides 
health care in their own countries. Nonetheless, they still struggled to understand 
the complex relationship between the FBOs and the state, and as a consequence 
how to engage with it.  
Instead they had a rather state-centric approach also in the health sector, in which 
they negotiated with the state, and mainly viewed the FBOs as key providers. As 
a consequence, FBOs were invited to training courses, and other capacity-
building activities. However, few of them worked directly with the FBOs and 
neither were the FBOs to any great extent involved in the conceptualization of 
donor programmes. According to some of the FBO representatives that I 
interviewed the donors tended to forget to invite FBOs to policy discussions on 
health-related matters, as the following representation indicates:  
“Sometimes we are invited to meetings with the donors and the 
government, but other times we just seem to be forgotten and the support 
we get from external sources is very small. I don't know why they forget 
us” (Interview FBO representative, Kinshasa 2015-06-01). 
This neglect of FBOs in programmes and policy formulation is problematic as 
they provide a lot of the health care and are also perceived to be closer to the 
population than the state. That the state, fully aware of the complexity of the 
arrangement, nonetheless preferred to keep the FBOs outside their discussions 
with the donors is not surprising considering the competition that exists between 
them. By leaving the FBOs outside the main discussions, the government gets 
an upper-hand and can try to control the donor resources. 
c) Normative considerations 
Working with non-state actors also poses difficult questions as to what kind of 
actors donors are willing to engage with. Engaging with non-state actors can 
mean dealing with unsavoury characters involved in dubious activities such as 
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various rebel groups or deeply conservative informal institutions (Denney, 2013, 
p. 17). As pointed out, for example, by Meagher and Hilhorst, there is a need for 
a nuanced discussion regarding the merits and demerits of building on informal 
and local structures. They rightly argue that the idea of development from below 
builds on an overly simplistic idea of communities as homogeneous, and that it is 
ignoring processes of inequality and exclusion within communities and local 
structures (Hilhorst et al, 2010; Meagher, 2012). For example, women and 
members of ethnic minority groups might find it difficult to get their voices heard 
and might find themselves excluded from certain services. Donors also need to 
be careful not to legitimise actors that enjoy very little recognition amongst the 
local population. 
Working with customary chiefs in the justice sector is, as we saw, not without 
difficulties and risks for donors. The role and the legitimacy of the customary 
chiefs has diminished in some parts of the country (Vlassenroot, 2012, pp. 4–5; 
Verweijen, 2016). In urban areas, like Kinshasa, they have more or less lost their 
influence (interview law professor, Kinshasa 2016-11-25). Much depends on the 
individual chief and what legitimacy he has amongst his population. Some of them 
have moved away from the villages and have lost contact with their population 
(INGO representative in Bukavu, via Skype, 2015-05-19). In addition, some of 
them are also actively fuelling conflicts in their territories by, for example, selling 
land without informing the communities (Vlassenroot, 2012, p. 4; International 
Crisis Group, 2013).  
There is also, as Scheye argues, often an assumption that alternative justice 
providers are backward and prone to human rights violations. Donors, however, 
often support state institution that have less legitimacy than, for example, 
customary chiefs (Scheye, 2008, p. 67). In addition, the norms influencing non-
state actors might not be so much different from norms impacting the practice of 
formal justice, when it comes to, for example, gender equality (Shearon, 2017 pp. 
43-44). 
In the health sector there were concerns regarding normative issues when 
dealing with the FBOs. For example, DFID's decision to involve FBOs more 
actively in their health programme was not without controversy. Some people 
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within the UK country office, as well as within Sida that financed a minor part of 
the programme, questioned whether it was a good idea to work with FBOs when 
issues regarding sexual and reproductive health were involved. It was feared that 
they would not guarantee women's and adolescents’ right to reproductive health. 
In Sida's assessment memo for its contribution to the programme the main risk 
identified with the programme was that the family planning/reproductive health 
component was going to be implemented by FBOs (Sida, 2013a, p. 11). 
d) Political considerations 
Engaging with non-state actors that sometimes openly challenge the authority of 
the state can be very sensitive, and can be seen as interference in domestic 
affairs (Derks, 2012, p. 22). Donors need to consider whether their relationship 
with the government is strong enough to withstand the potential fallout from 
support for non-state security and justice actors, who may be perceived as 
competitors to the state (Allouche, 2013).  
In the justice sector the reaction of the government was clearly a factor that 
needed consideration by the donors. It would have been hard for them to support 
a system that had more or less been pronounced illegal by the government. In 
addition, the relationship between the donors and the government had often been 
tense, and the donors faced major obstacles in moving their programmes on 
justice reforms forward. This made them, understandably, cautious of challenging 
the government, fearing that it might make the government even more 
uncooperative. 
In private conversations, some donor representatives recognised that it was not 
realistic to believe that the government would be able to cover the whole country 
with formal courts. As a consequence, they believed that it would be necessary 
to involve, and build on, the traditional system. However, because of the 
resistance from the government, donors found it hard to officially raise the issue 
with the government. One illustration of this was the organisation of the 'États 
Généraux de la Justice'. This was the first meeting held in years to discuss justice 
reforms and some donors suggested that customary chiefs should be invited. The 
government had shown limited interest and when the Terms of Reference for the 
event were finalised, the customary chiefs were not even mentioned amongst the 
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24 different groups to be invited (Ministry of Justice, 2014). Hence, at the largest 
conference ever in the country to discuss the future of the justice sector, the 
actors that deal with the majority of cases were largely excluded. Another 
example where the donors had tried to engage with the real governance was the 
PARJ programme, where a study on alternative justice providers had been 
foreseen but was cancelled due to lack of interest by the Ministry of Justice 
(implementer, Kinshasa 2014-11-28).  
Instead, the donors’ main response to the lack of access to justice amongst the 
population was to work with the formal system to establish so-called mobile 
courts, where judges go out to the villages to solve disputes. Although this to a 
certain extent improves the access for people that live far from the courts, mobile 
courts are fraught with a number of weaknesses. They suffer from lack of funding 
from the government, which makes the approach non-sustainable; and also have 
structural weaknesses such as how to follow-up on cases from a distance and 
getting people to accept the formal system (interview law professor, Kinshasa 
2015-06-15; Tekilazaya et al., 2013a). 
The willingness of the donors to work with the customary system seems, 
however, to have increased lately as a direct result of the increased political 
instrumentalization of the justice sector by President Kabila (as we saw in chapter 
5). Another consequence has been that some donors have started to look into 
the possibility of more actively engaging with alternative forms of justice such as 
mediation by NGOs, but also by finding linkages between the formal and informal 
system, for example by providing training for customary chiefs on the laws of the 
country. According to some of my interviewees, the Ministry of Justice had started 
to open up to the idea, apparently recognising that the move to the formal system 
perhaps had gone too quickly and that there might still be a role for the customary 
chiefs, although they were still more or less forbidden (interview donor official, 
Kinshasa 2016-11-16; donor official, Kinshasa 2016-12-01). 
In the health sector, donors didn't need to take the same political considerations 
into account. The Ministry of Health considered the FBOs to be more or less part 
of the government, and although there was some competition between them, it 
was nothing compared to the hostility that characterised the justice sector. The 
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cooperation between the donors and the government was also much more 
amicable. 
To summarise, my assessment is that donors are aware of the real governance 
on the ground, with the FBOs and the customary chiefs playing an important role 
in the provision of health and justice services to the population. However, they 
were clearly struggling to fully understand the nuances of the complex 
relationships between the state and non-state actors and how to react to the 
governance on the ground. In the health sector both the donors and the 
government were willing to engage with the FBOs, but they were being left out 
from some of the policy discussions. I would argue that this has mainly to do with 
the state-centric lenses that the donors are carrying, and which makes them 
overlook the full importance of the FBOs. There is also some reluctance related 
to normative issues such as worries that FBOs will not adhere to sexual and 
reproductive rights supported by donors. This might be a short-sighted way of 
looking at the issue, because considering the high legitimacy the FBOs have in 
Congo, significant advances could be made by working together with each other.  
In the justice sector there was a clear reluctance to accept the reality on the 
ground, both amongst the donors and by the government. This relates both to 
normative issues related to working with customary chiefs, state-centric lenses 
by the donors as well as political considerations. As the government has more or 
less forbidden the customary chiefs’ involvement in the justice sector, the political 
price for donors to insist otherwise might have been considerable, especially 
considering the volatile relationship with the Ministry of Health.    
6.5. Conclusions 
It has often been commonly assumed that it has been the weakness of fragile 
states that has left a void that non-state actors such as community-based groups, 
FBOs, customary chiefs and rebel groups have been quick to fill. As a 
consequence, it was further thought, by supporting the building of a stronger and 
more capable state, these other actors would become unnecessary and would 
eventually disappear, or at least no longer compete with the state for authority in 
areas such as service delivery. This would then, the theory goes, leave the state 
to provide public services which would increase the legitimacy of the state, and 
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the country would become Weberian and similar to the western powers. However, 
as academics such as McLoughling (2015) and Risse & Stollenwerk (2018) have 
shown, this simple link between service delivery and legitimacy is problematic 
and establishing virtuous circles of governance in areas where the state has 
limited outreach is more complex. Several conditions have to be met in order to 
link effectiveness and legitimacy, keeping in mind that the goals and values 
between the government and the population might vary and these divergences 
must be taken into account (Risse & Stollenwerk, 2018). 
The case of Congo illustrates some of the flaws in this state-building model. First 
of all, the state has never been strong and the other actors that have provided 
some services and stability to the population have not simply filled a void that has 
opened up due to the conflicts during the last 25 years; but many of them, such 
as the FBOs have been there since colonial time. The system of customary chiefs 
has been there even longer, pre-dating the colonial period. They are also, in many 
aspects, seen as having a higher legitimacy than the government. Although as 
Hilhorst (2010) and Meagher (2012) have pointed out, care must be taken when 
analysing which actors are seen as legitimate or not; and as Risse & Stellenwerk 
(2018) have rightly pointed out, there is no single source of legitimacy and there 
might be subnational variations in how legitimate an actor is perceived to be. For 
example, in Congo the legitimacy of customary chiefs varies substantially 
between one district to another, making it hard for external actors to choose which 
local actors to engage with.  
Despite calls for more engagement with the hybrid political orders and real 
governance, we only have limited accounts on how donors are trying to link their 
state-building efforts with the hybrid nature of many of the fragile and conflict-
affected states. The chapter has highlighted the key challenges that donors are 
facing in engaging more closely with non-state actors. These includes: i) lack of 
understanding of the context; ii) state-centric lenses; iii) normative 
considerations; and iv) political considerations. It turned out that in the justice 
sector the challenges of working with the customary system were to a large extent 
based on the donors’ state-centric lenses and the government’s wish to curb the 
system. That the government outlawed the customary system made it difficult to 
find entry points to initiate discussions with the customary chiefs. It took the 
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almost complete breakdown of cooperation between the Ministry of Justice and 
the donors for some of the donors to start exploring possibilities for collaboration 
with the customary system. In the health sector, where donors are more 
accustomed to work with other actors than the state, and where health care 
provision in their own countries is not always provided by the state, the main 
resistance seems to have been a clear understanding as to how linked the FBOs 
were with the state system. Since the churches are seen to have a high legitimacy 
amongst the population and larger outreach than the state, it is a missed 
opportunity for the donors not to engage more directly with them. 
Considering that many donors regard the Congolese state to be predatory, it is 
even more interesting to see that they still found it hard to take off their state-
centric lenses and fully embrace and engage with the real governance of service 
provision and justice on the ground.  
The findings show that more critical thinking is needed to explore the nature of 
‘state’ and the nature of ‘government’. Considering the interlinkages between 
state and non-state actors there would be clear benefits to stretching the idea of 
the ‘state’ in donors’ state-building efforts to incorporate more non-institutional 
models, and to carefully analyse which actors are deemed legitimate according 
to the local population and to build from that. This would also need to build upon 
an in-depth assessment of the interlinkages that exist between the non-state and 
state actors, as any foreign intervention will change the dynamic between the 
two.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1. Introduction 
With an increased concentration on poverty in fragile states, together with the 
security threat some of these countries are perceived to pose, development aid 
to fragile and conflict-affected countries has risen sharply during the last 
decade.104 This has led to an increased focus on state-building and efforts have 
been made to make the delivery of this aid more efficient, such as through the 
development of the New Deal. However, donors still struggle with how to engage 
with fragile and conflict-affected states.  
Congo provided a highly relevant case for exploring aid negotiations in a hybrid 
and predatory state. The country is a typical fragile state in the sense that it has 
weak capacity to provide services and security to its population; the political will 
to introduce development reforms is complicated by neo-patrimonial structures, 
and it is a country in which many different actors are competing with the state for 
legitimacy and authority. In addition, it was also one of seven pilot countries for 
the implementation of the ‘New Deal'. Congo shares these characteristics with a 
number of other fragile states. There are, however, some factors that 
distinguishes Congo from many of the other fragile states, most notably the fact 
that Congo is of major importance for the donors. Congo is, however, not unique 
in this sense, and there are a few other fragile states that spring to mind that are 
of equal, or even greater strategic interest for donors, such as Afghanistan, the 
Sahel countries and Somalia (due to the potential risk of terrorism), and South 
Sudan (due to oil). The one factor that perhaps separates Congo from these other 
countries, is its abundance of natural resources which make the ruling elite to a 
large extent independent from the Western donors. 
Within this specific context this thesis explored the relationship between the 
donors and the government through the lens of aid negotiations. To recap the 
research questions that guided my research were as follows: 
                                            
104 As we saw earlier, 50% of the world’s poor are expected to live in fragile states by 2030. 
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What explains the strategies the Western donors use when engaging with the 
hybrid and predatory Congolese state to advance their state-building agenda and 
how does the Congolese government respond? 
o What strategies are the donors using to create incentives 
amongst the ruling elite to implement their state-building policies 
and programmes in the health and justice sectors, and what 
strategies does the government use to secure their autonomy 
and to secure the influx of aid? 
o What explains the different strategies that the Western donors 
are using in the two sectors and how the Congolese side has 
reacted to it? 
In this concluding chapter, I provide a summary of the thesis, outlining its key 
findings. I highlight the contributions made by this thesis to literature on aid 
negotiations and hybridity and provide suggestions for future research. I end with 
an epilogue on the current relationship between the donors and the Congolese 
government up to September 2018. 
7.2. Summary of the key findings 
Looking at the situation from a distance one might easily have thought that donors 
were rather powerful and influential in Congo. The country has been plagued by 
conflict and the state apparatus is weak and ineffective. The national budget is 
small, approximately 5 billion USD, whereas the annual amount of aid is 
approximately between 2 and 2.5 billion USD. However, contrary to what one 
might expect, donors are relatively weak and the government is stronger than 
one might think.  
In the conceptual chapter I identified a number of gaps in the literature on aid 
negotiations that I aimed to address in this thesis, including a) the necessity of 
examining both the agency of donors and the government and how they have 
tried to change the structural factors to their advantage; b) the need to look at 
negotiations in different sectors and at different levels to get a full understanding 
of the negotiations and engagement strategies; and c) the need to look at the 
hybridity of the sector and how that might affect the engagement between donors 
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and the government. Consequently, I developed an alternative conceptual 
framework. 
Applying the conceptual framework, I found that the negotiation strategies in 
different sectors varied substantially and that very little negotiation was taking 
place between the donors and the authorities at the provincial and district levels. 
Instead, the interactions on aid at these levels were, to a large extent, left to the 
implementers of programmes, with consequences for ownership of the local 
administration and with a potential risk of making the programmes less attuned 
to the reality on the ground. Finally, I also found that the donors were not 
engaging fully with the hybridity of the sectors, partly because of their own state-
centric views and partly due to resistance in the government to work with the 
customary chiefs in particular. 
An analysis of the structural factors gave a mixed picture regarding the power 
between the donors and the government. Congo is in many ways dependent on 
aid although the absolute elite around President Kabila is not affected since they 
can rely on revenues from the country’s vast natural resources, just like Mobutu 
used to do to sustain his 32-year long dictatorship. That China is investing heavily 
in the country further contributes to making the ruling elite less dependent on 
development assistance from the West. The donors believe that Congo is too 
important to abandon due to its geo-strategic location; the high levels of poverty; 
the wealth of its natural resources; and a fear that if they can’t get the state to 
take over certain functions, Congo will continue to be a humanitarian crisis for the 
foreseeable future. Hence, I found that the donors are caught between 
geopolitical considerations and the challenges of supporting a predatory state.  
Regarding structural factors at the meso- and micro level, I found that 
organisational factors played a certain role in the power balance between the 
parties, although not in the way suggested by the existing aid literature. While it 
is true that the donors to a large extent have the upper hand when it comes to 
resources and technical expertise, the government often uses non-participation 
as a negotiation strategy. As has also been noted by, for example, Davis (2009) 
and Trefon (2011), I found that the government preferred to deal with the donors 
on an individual basis, which was facilitated by the donors not effectively 
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coordinating themselves and sending out contradictory signals to the 
government. 
Looking at perceptions, I found a very low level of trust between the government 
and the donors which has deep historical roots. The persistent negative attitudes 
and historic abuse made a frank and open relationship more difficult. 
Interestingly, the government to a certain extent had the attitude that Congo was 
more important for the donors than vice versa which made it easier for them to 
take a harsh attitude towards the donors. Donors seemed to have more or less 
capitulated and, as Marriage has pointed out, it is as though ‘they have come to 
expect failure’ (2010). An evident risk with these negative perceptions is that 
donors might neither fully explore the root causes of problems, nor manage to 
identify opportunities when they arise. It also leads to a more ‘projectised’ version 
of aid. In some fragile states with equally strong patrimonial systems, such as 
Afghanistan and Somalia, the donors have been more willing to experiment with 
multi-donor trust funds, where donors pool their resources to provide a much 
more coherent way to support the state structure. The multi-donor trust funds 
often also provide support to recurrent government expenditures such as 
teachers’ salaries. This is not to say that aid to Afghanistan and Somalia are 
successful cases of development assistance for state-building, but it is interesting 
that donors have been more willing to provide a joint and coherent support to 
these other extremely weak states, but not to Congo. 
I found that personal relations mattered which is unsurprising considering that aid 
negotiations usually take place over a long period of time. Individual relationships 
can, as the case of the justice sector showed, obscure the analysis of deeper 
structural factors. Relying on a few individuals to push through reforms is, 
however, a risky endeavour as progress may come to a halt as soon as key 
people move on.  
I found that the government was using different strategies to secure resources 
and avoid donor-imposed conditionalities. When faced with demands from 
donors, the government often reacted with hostility, drawing on past injustices 
(colonisation), sovereignty and (mis)-using the wording in the aid effectiveness 
agenda. Whereas countries such as Rwanda and Uganda have carved out policy 
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space by using different ‘image management’ strategies, Congo has not done so. 
The main reason for this appears to be the independence of the elite who have 
access to more profitable resources than aid. The politics and incentives of the 
elite in Congo also differ quite substantially from those of a country such as 
Rwanda, which despite also having strong patrimonial structures has a 
leadership that is much more focused on a developmental agenda. The recent 
efforts to portray Kabila abroad as a guarantee for growth and stability is a 
reflection that the sanctions are actually hurting the elite by freezing access to 
their foreign bank accounts. Another reason the government hasn’t used ‘image 
management’ is a lack of capacity and the diplomatic skills to do so. I was working 
in Congo when M-23 took over Goma, and could observe the well-oiled publicity 
machinery that Rwanda, accused of supporting the rebel group, launched. 
Donors that threatened to withdraw budget support were targeted by major 
persuasion campaigns and the head of the UN expert group, who had led the 
collection of evidence against Rwanda, was vilified as being a genocide supporter 
in an effort to disqualify the report. The Congolese government, however, didn’t 
launch any diplomatic efforts to benefit from the situation. Hence, whilst Rwanda 
met with sympathy from Western embassies in Kigali where some even 
questioned the findings of the UN experts, the Congolese government, which was 
allegedly the victim of foreign aggression, met with relatively little sympathy 
amongst the donors in Kinshasa. This is also a reflection of the negative images 
that the donors have of Congo.  
I found that donors have been struggling on how to engage with a counterpart 
that sometimes seems to be deliberately avoiding them. They have had 
difficulties in starting and maintaining a dialogue with the government at an overall 
level. The donors’ strategy seemed to be to try to keep a tight control over the 
funding, using implementing agencies rather than channeling funding directly to 
the government. I found donors focusing on consultations rather than 
negotiations during the design phase of programmes, with the government 
having little influence on the design. This approach might reduce the risk of ‘elite-
capture’ of funding, but also limits the buy-in from the government. The donors 
also, on the whole, have refrained from using conditionality to drive reforms and 
progress, considering it not to be in line with the principles of the aid effectiveness 
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agenda and assessing that it would not work in a country where the government 
doesn’t seem to care about its population. The few times where some donors had 
tried to take a stand, like DFID with its support to the police, they had failed to be 
united and the outcomes had not been the ones sought. That said, I found that 
some Congolese donor staff members and implementers thought it would be 
worthwhile to explore various forms of conditionality, including requesting the 
government to co-finance part of the projects.   
As Reno (2015) has pointed out, predatory states usually have little to gain from 
building an independent and strong administration and can be quite forceful in 
fighting to stay in power should they be challenged. This partly explains the 
different strategies the government has taken in the health sector compared to 
the justice sector. In the health sector, I found that the government had decided 
that it was comfortable with letting the donors substitute for the state. As a 
consequence, the government has shown little interest in taking over a larger 
share of the funding. Donors, fearing that the government wouldn’t step up its 
funding for health, have been reluctant to threaten to withdraw aid. In many ways 
the situation in the health sector was much more like a ‘normal’ aid situation, 
where an aid dependent recipient is trying to secure resources and the donors 
are more or less dictating the terms. However, I found that for areas that are 
sensitive for the government, such as the justice sector where it has a vested 
interest in keeping it dependent on the executive branch, the strategy changes. 
The government tries to keep the donors distant, paying lip service to reforms 
and stalling implementation, with the aim of diverting funding to areas that the 
government prioritises, such as the building of courthouses and prisons which 
increase the visibility of the state but do not contribute to the independence of the 
judiciary. Sometimes the topic does not even have to touch on sensitive sectors 
for the government to react with a certain degree of hostility. For example, the 
conference arranged by the UN in April 2018 that sought to raise increased 
humanitarian funding to the country was boycotted by the government as it was 
unhappy at being portrayed as a high alert humanitarian crisis. Hence pride was 
part of its decision not to take part in the conference.  
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Within this context the donors feel quite powerless about how to deal with the 
government and feel frustrated as they lack the tools for how to engage effectively 
with a predatory government.   
The question on hybridity/real governance 
I found that non-state actors have played an important role throughout the history 
of Congo, in taking up roles that are usually associated with the state, such as 
providing justice, security and social services to the population. As I 
demonstrated, non-state actors and the government, especially in the health 
sector, have collaborated closely in co-producing governance in the sector. This 
puts into question the sharp distinction that donors often make between the state 
and non-state actors. The fact that these actors have been there for a long time 
and are not simply filling the role of the state after the conflict years at the end of 
the 1990s also challenges the idea that this is a new phenomenon in fragile 
states.  
Despite the real governance on the ground, and the donors’ struggle to engage 
with the government, I found that donors have, to a large degree, disregarded 
non-state actors. They have built on the Weberian notion of statehood and 
focused on building state-capacity instead of taking into account all of the actors 
that are providing real governance in the sectors that they are engaging with.  
In the health sector I found a greater acceptance, both by the government and 
the donors, to engage with the FBOs. However, they were seen mainly as a 
service provider and their role in managing part of the health zones was not fully 
recognized. As a consequence, I found they were rarely invited to policy 
discussions or programme identification processes.  
In the justice sector I found a clear reluctance by the government to engage more 
closely with non-state actors, such as the customary chiefs. The donors also took 
a state-centric view of justice provision and very few engaged with the customary 
system. Only after a major disruption with the Ministry of Justice did some donors 
open up to the possibility of engaging the customary system. This is somewhat 
surprising considering that donors have engaged with alternative justice 
providers in other countries, such as Afghanistan, although it is consistent with 
the scepticism many donors have towards alternative justice providers. I found 
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that a major hinderance in Congo was in fact the government’s objection to 
collaborating with the customary chiefs. Had the donors chosen to work with 
them, it would have been taken as a major provocation. To work with customary 
chiefs, however, would also entail risks. Perception studies show that the 
customary chiefs enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy than the state justice 
system, although this is quickly eroding in some geographical areas (Vlassenroot 
2012; Verweijen 2017). Hence the legitimacy of the chiefs in different locations 
must be examined so as to not legitimize an actor that does not have the support 
or approval of the population. Donors would, therefore, need to accurately 
analyse the context before engaging with various actors at the provincial and 
district levels. This would require in-depth local knowledge that donors often lack.  
7.3. Contribution of the thesis, policy recommendations and areas for 
future research 
In Congo the donors find themselves between a rock and a hard place. For geo-
political reasons Congo is too important to abandon and working primarily through 
humanitarian actors and by-passing the state is not a sustainable solution in the 
long run.  
The New Deal that the donors, together with developing countries, came up with 
has not been successful, which should come as no surprise considering that it 
builds on the flawed assumption that the donors and the recipients share the 
same goal. The principles say little about what can be done when these systems 
are simply too weak to channel aid effectively or when the incentives of the ruling 
elite are stuck against making the system work. One might argue that the aid 
effectiveness agenda can be described as a form of organized hypocrisy in which 
there is an inconsistency between rhetoric and action due to conflicting pressures 
(Brunsson, 2003, pp. 202-204). Hence, we get a situation in which donors might 
not publicly want to be seen as being sceptical towards local ownership and 
hence sign the declaration. On the other hand, through their actions they maintain 
control over the funding.  
The ones left to deal with the contradictions between the reality and the principles 
are the ‘frontline donors’, that is the staff based at the country level. I found that 
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to a large extent they felt left to their own devices on how to solve this, without 
getting much guidance from their Headquarters.   
The literature on predatory states also offers few guidelines on what the donors 
can do, except to engage with the political settlement in these countries to make 
the settlement more inclusive (see for example Kelsall, 2016). There are, 
however, some emerging discussions that might offer a way forward, such as the 
work by APPP that questioned the good governance agenda and advocated for 
the need to focus on pragmatic solutions (Crook & Booth, 2011, p. 3). Recent 
years have seen a sharp increase in concepts of doing development differently 
and adaptive ways of working by amongst others researchers linked to ODI (see, 
for example, Booth, 2012; Overseas Development Institute, 2016; Rao, 2014; 
Rocha Menocal, 2014; Tulloch, 2015). These ideas of doing development 
differently reject blueprints and best practice models and rest on: a) working in 
problem-driven and politically informed ways; b) being adaptive and working in 
incremental ways, as well as c) supporting changes that reflect local realities and 
that are locally led. This means taking a pragmatic approach and working with the 
grain by recognizing and adapting development to existing institutional 
arrangements, instead of exporting blueprints on how donors think the state 
should work. 
Building on these recent debates on doing development differently, and on the 
findings from my research, some key recommendations for the donors are as 
follows: 
1. Work in politically informed ways at both central and local level: Despite 
recent focus on thinking and working politically, there seems to be a general 
decline in using political economy analysis (Yanguas, 2018). This seems to 
be partly due to the difficulties in translating broad country or sector analysis 
into practical recommendations (ibid). Consistent with this finding, I found that 
few political economy analyses were being undertaken in Congo, One notable 
exception was DFID, that did conduct a number of studies including one in 
the health sector. In contrast, and despite the problems faced by the donors 
in the justice sector, no such analysis of justice provision was conducted. The 
political economy analysis would need to take into account political structures, 
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power relations and how historic legacies have shaped the motivations of the 
different stakeholders. The analysis should be about understanding both the 
formal and informal processes, agreements and practices. It is important that 
the political economy analysis is carried out at the sector level, and not just at 
the beginning of a project but throughout the implementation period. In 
addition, possible ‘islands of effectiveness’105 (Crook, 2010; Leonard, 2010) 
should be identified that could serve as an entry point for commencing 
reforms. This would mean that donors need to substantially increase their 
local knowledge, and would require more staffing in fragile states as well as 
staff that stay longer in their posts (Allouche & Lind, 2013, pp. 34–35). Few 
donors seem to take into account country contexts when deciding on staffing 
allocations. It is instead the level of funding that determines the number of 
staff. This despite the fact that fragile contexts require a much closer 
monitoring on what is happening on the ground, as the context tends to be 
much more complex and the risk of creating harm larger. In such a large 
country as Congo, where the majority of the donor interventions are taking 
place in the east, posting more staff in the eastern provinces should be 
considered. Today only a few donor and Embassy staff are based in the 
eastern provinces making the relationship building with local actors difficult.  
Donors should also become better at engaging with local organisations either 
directly or by engaging implementing partners that have a strong local 
presence and in-depth experience of working in the country. This would be 
preferable to repeatedly relying upon international firms that many donors 
tend to use. Those firms might well have the thematic skills, but they often 
lack local and context-specific knowledge that are crucial for building local 
support and ownership. The examples from the health sector and the justice 
sector point in this direction, where the implementing agency for the ASSP 
had much more local linkages than the consultancy firm used for the justice 
programmes, PARJ and Uhaki Safi. In addition, and consistent with working 
iteratively the implementers should not be strictly bound to a pre-set 
                                            
105 It is well established that even in countries that have poor governance and weak public sectors, exceptional well-
functioning government and government-supported agencies do exist. 
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implementation framework but have leverage to adapt the programme as 
circumstances change.  
2. Work with the real governance: This means recognizing the hybridity of the 
state and integrating the non-state actors into the state-building process 
(Boege, et al., 2009, p. 19). The findings from this research show that more 
critical thinking is needed to explore the nature of the ‘state’ and the nature of 
‘governance’. Considering the interlinkages between state and non-state 
actors, there would be clear benefit in stretching the idea of the ‘state’ in the 
donors’ state-building efforts to incorporate more non-institutional models. 
This would require the donors to abandon their state-centric lenses where 
donors, in the word of Duncan Green (2018) often tend to assume that there 
is a state that is interested in the development of the country, and instead 
increase their understanding of how the real governance is actually 
functioning. In other words, they need to get a fuller understanding of how the 
various actors interact with each other in a weblike society rather than using 
a simple and false dichotomy between state and non-state actors. This means 
that working with non-state actors might actually be a way to reinforce state 
capacity and increase the legitimacy of the state.  
When working with the real governance and local actors one would not only 
need to identify the non-state actors that are providing services to the 
population and how they relate to formal state institutions, one would also 
need to assess their legitimacy. As Risse and Stollenwerk (2018) point out, 
the legitimacy of an actor in one location can be quite different from the 
legitimacy of the same actor in another geographical location (see for example 
customary chiefs whose legitimacy varies sharply from one place to another). 
This difference in legitimacy was apparent for customary chiefs in Congo. As 
a consequence, and as pointed out in the first policy recommendation, donors 
need to substantially increase their local knowledge and avoid having a 
blueprint that is expected to work in the whole country. Finally, as working 
more closely with alternative service providers such as customary chiefs might 
lead to uneasy discussions with the government, it would be important for the 
donors to do so in a coordinated manner. 
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3. Don’t abandon state-building efforts at the central level: Working more 
with the local level and building state-capacity from below and up should be 
undertaken as a complement to central state-building as not all of the 
functions of a state, such as security and larger infrastructure work, can be 
provided by local actors. As Mushi points out from his study on insecurity and 
governance in South Kivu: ‘when the state is totally incapable of assuming the 
security of its own population against external threats, when its own protective 
services live off the people, it is difficult for social mechanisms and local 
institutions alone to substitute for the lack of a decisive body capable of 
assuming the role of the Leviathan’ (Mushi, 2013, p. 35). The main challenge 
is instead to link central state-building with state-building from below as 
pointed out by amongst others Autesserre (2013). Also, as the health sector 
in Congo shows, when there is no support to the health system and its 
regulatory institutions, things start to fall apart. Hence, donor assistance to 
help strengthen the regulatory framework will continue to be necessary, which 
is neither the same as saying that the service itself has to be provided by the 
state nor that non-state actors can’t be involved in the administration of the 
health system. 
4. Don’t be too afraid of conditionality: As experience from Congo and 
elsewhere has shown, conditionality is a difficult tool to use. Donors need to 
have the political will to enforce it, and it needs to be done in a coordinated 
manner together with other donors to be successful. It is often more tempting 
for donors to pretend that reforms are happening in order to retain access to 
leaders and keep the aid flowing, as the case with police reforms showed.  
Ideally there should also be some domestic constituency that the donors can 
work with. Despite these difficulties there are certain advantages with 
conditionality. As Uvin (1998) and Yanguas (2018) point out, aid is often seen 
as legitimating certain actors. Whatever form aid takes, it will have a profound 
effect on national and local actors, legitimising some and delegitimising 
others. Hence, by virtue of their presence in a country, donors often become 
sources of legitimation in the eyes of local actors, whether the donors want 
this responsibility or not (Yanguas, 2018). As a consequence, continuing 
giving aid to an institution that is not considered to be legitimate might 
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delegitimize the donors. This might explain why Congolese working for donors 
had a more positive view on conditionality than the international staff, and why 
the donors that had taken a tough stand against Kabila enjoyed high approval 
ratings. An interesting idea brought forward by some Congolese working for 
donor agencies was that local conditionality could sometimes be a tool to 
increase local ownership. 
5. Don’t try to reform on your own: This means engaging with a diverse array 
of relevant actors, including those that may be outside donors’ traditional 
comfort zone, and trying to reconcile them into shared positive outcomes. 
This, as highlighted in the doing development differently literature, could mean 
working through local conveners that could mobilise those with a stake in 
progress to tackle common problems and introduce relevant change. It also 
means that donors should overcome their own coordination problems and the 
skilful way in which government leaders play them off against each other. In 
countries such as Afghanistan and Sudan the donors have managed to pool 
resources which facilitates the negotiations between the government and the 
donors. Such funds should also be considered in Congo, either at the national 
level or at sector level. Discussions have been on-going on whether to create 
such a fund in the health sector, but no concrete steps have so far been taken. 
6. Possible role of the private sector: Finally one might ask oneself, could the 
private sector be a mean to by-pass the state and kick-start economic growth 
that could transform the state? Experience particularly from Asia, but also 
some emerging examples from Africa, shows that neo-patrimonialism can 
sometimes be compatible with strong economic performance (Kelsall, 2013 
p. 46). This is particularly true in countries where leaders have managed to 
centralize the management of economic rents and orient that rent 
management to long-term development goals (ibid). 
Considering the history of Congo, and the predatory nature of the state these 
favourable conditions for a private-sector led development are not present in 
Congo today. Instead decentralised and short-horizon management 
characterize the Congolese economy and there is no long-term vision for the 
development of the country. Lack of political stability, rampant corruption, 
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extremely poor infrastructure and limited access to electricity all make 
investing in Congo risky and expensive, both for international and local 
entrepreneurs. The country is ranked 184 among 190 countries in the World 
Bank’s ease of doing business ranking (World Bank Group, 2019, p. 5).106 
Should, however, Congo one day change into a more developmental form of 
a neo-patrimonial state, there is great potential in the country’s natural 
resources for a private-sector led growth that could benefit the whole 
population, and not as today, only a few. 
Areas for future research: 
The thesis contributes to enhancing our conceptual understanding of aid 
negotiations. I have shown that there have been gaps in previous aid negotiation 
literature and I proposed a new conceptual framework that covers structural 
factors divided into macro, meso and micro-level. It emphasises the importance 
of comparing negotiations between sectors and between different levels (central, 
provincial and district), and highlights the importance of taking into consideration 
the real governance in the negotiation process.   
One interesting research area would be to test the conceptual framework 
proposed in this thesis, in order to see how donors and governments in other 
predatory states have negotiated with each other. It would be especially 
interesting to review countries without the same strategic geo-political situation 
and the wealth of natural resources of Congo. Countries such as for example the 
Central African Republic or Chad spring to mind. It would also be interesting to 
dwell more on perceptions and how trust can be built even in precarious 
situations. I found it, for example, rather astonishing that donors seemed to have 
more confidence in governments in Somalia and Afghanistan than in Congo.  
I consider that more research on how real governance is being co-produced by 
the government and the non-state actors in fragile contexts is also needed, and 
especially on how these relationships are affected by donor interventions. There 
are major obstacles for donors to fully grasp how to effectively engage with non-
state actors in such contexts and research into areas where it has worked would 
                                            
106 The World Bank Group’s ease of doing business index ranks countries against each other based on how the 
regulatory environment is conducive to business operations, such as protection of property rights. 
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be valuable. Of special interest would be studies that examine how the social 
contract has been affected by donors by-passing, or engaging with, both 
governments and non-state actors. This is an area that deserves much more 
attention, which also leads us back to the need to look in-depth at the legitimacy 
of all actors involved to identify which actors have high versus low legitimacy in 
the eyes of the population, and how this can be built upon in the donors’ state-
building efforts.  
So is there any hope for Congo? I would definitely say so, but it will take time to 
turn the situation around. The conflicts in the eastern part of the country continue 
to result in significant loss of life and the displacement of large numbers of people. 
There is also the risk that conflict spreads to other parts of Congo, as shown by 
the conflict which erupted in the formerly calm Kasaï Central province in 2016. 
Ebola is affecting parts of the county, and the international community and the 
government are struggling with how to contain and stop the spread of the 
outbreak. Corruption remains rife and politically there are many challenges to 
overcome in order to establish a more inclusive political settlement that is 
conducive to development and not only to predation by a small elite. The election 
of a new President, Mr Tshisekedi at the end of 2018 and thus after the 
completion of my thesis offers the possibility of a new type of leadership that is 
more transparent and less corrupt. Time will tell if he will succeed. 
A key reason why I still remain hopeful for the future of the country is the energy 
and resilience of its population that has been through so much but continues to 
demonstrate incredible resourcefulness. That the country has an abundance of 
natural resources, which so far has mainly been used to enrich the elite, can, with 
the right leadership, be turned into an immense resource for financing critical 
public services such as health care, education, and support further investments 
in the development of the country including critical infrastructure that could 
encourage further investments to help it get on the right track.  
The onus for development and change needs, as always, come from within the 
country itself. Assistance from the international community will, however, remain 
crucial for the foreseeable time. Hence it is important that the donors engage in 
a way that helps nudge the country in the right direction.  
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Epilogue 
Since my fieldwork in 2014-2016 the relationship between the donors and the 
government has deteriorated further. This is largely due to the postponement of 
the Presidential and Parliamentary elections, which has led to an increase in 
human rights violations and a violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrations. 
At the time of writing (September 2018), it is still uncertain whether there will be 
any elections on 23 December 2018. How the elections unfold will be key for what 
will happen with the relationship between the donors and the government. The 
government has so far been taking some measures that, by the optimists, could 
be interpreted as signs that elections will indeed take place on 23 December 2018 
as announced (ICG, 2018, p. i). On August 8, President Kabila, after years of 
speculation, finally announced that he would not stand again. Instead the PPRD 
will be represented by Mr. Shadary, the Permanent Secretariat of the party, and 
former Minister of Interior (The Economist, 2018b). 
Although elections are just a few months away, there are still numerous ways in 
which President Kabila and his entourage could obstruct the elections. There are 
signs pointing in this direction. The government has started to hint that there 
might be problems with the electronic voting machines, which the government 
insisted on buying despite concerns raised by both the international community 
and the opposition who feared that the machines would be easy to manipulate 
(ICG, 2018, pp. 3–4). Another way to postpose the elections would be to refer to 
the costs of arranging them. Donors have been hesitant to finance elections that 
they believe will not be free and fair, and the government has several times stated 
that it intends to finance the elections on its own (e.g. Kabila’s speech to the 
nation, February 2018). However, the amount set aside for the elections in the 
budget is far from enough to cover the cost (ICG, 2018, p. 5). This, together with 
the constrained budget, might prompt the government to declare that it is 
postponing the elections. This would put the donors in a difficult spot, as it is 
doubtful as to whether they would be willing to fill the gap. Finally, the volatile 
situation in Congo, with violent conflicts in several parts of the country, might also 
be used as a pretext for postponing the elections in the last moment.  
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Even if elections were to be held in December 2018, it would be questionable as 
to how legitimate they would be perceived, both by the Congolese population and 
by the international community. The playing field is not levelled, and the 
President’s party (PPRD) holds most of the ‘trump’ cards. The majority party is 
the only party that has a presence in the whole country with nearly total control 
over the security forces, CENI and the judiciary (ICG, 2017). Thus, President 
Kabila and the ruling party can calibrate how much political space it allows to the 
opposition in different parts of the country. At present, the civic space has been 
severely restricted, and opposition leaders and human rights activists are 
frequently arrested (CIVICUS, 2018). One of the front figures of the opposition, 
Moïse Katumbi, is not able to return to the country for fear of being arrested for a 
court judgement that most observers see as entirely politically motivated (Reid, 
2018, p. 107). The opposition is trying to unite behind one leader but has so far 
struggled to do so. To add to the uncertainties, the ICC in June 2018 overturned 
the prison sentence of Bemba, Kabila’s main opponent in the 2011 elections, 
stating that he could not be held responsible for the behaviour of his soldiers in 
the Central African Republic. Upon release Bemba returned to Kinshasa 
declaring that he aimed to stand in the elections. CENI, however, quickly banned 
him from running, justifying its decision on the grounds that Bemba had still been 
convicted at the ICC for witness tampering (Jeune Afrique, 2018b, 2018d).  
Should the elections be postponed or considered to be affected by fraud, the 
situation might turn more violent. People are increasingly frustrated and angry 
about their precarious living conditions (Berwouts, 2017 p. 160). Most people 
seem to hold the regime responsible for their poverty, and people are very vocal 
about the fact that they want Kabila to go. Beneath the surface, the discourse is 
violent. In a study conducted by Berwouts in 2016, a large number of people 
interviewed considered violence an inevitable outcome of the current situation 
with stalled elections (Berwouts, 2017a). The survey also found that there was a 
lot of anger and frustration towards Tutsis and Swahili speakers in the capital. I 
heard similar things in my contacts with Congolese friends and acquaintances; 
some of them even argued that Congo is being occupied by Rwandan Tutsis and 
that free elections will only be possible once the alleged occupiers are gone. This 
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rhetoric is indeed worrying, especially considering the extrajudicial killings of 
Tutsis that took place in Kinshasa in 1997. 
In sharp contrast to the elections in 2006, and to a certain extent in 2011, the 
appetite amongst western donors to get involved in the elections has been 
limited. Donors have instead tried to push African actors, such as the African 
Union, to put pressure on President Kabila. The AU-led mediation effort in 2016, 
however, failed, and African leaders have been reluctant to, at least openly, 
criticise President Kabila. There are signs, however, that they are stepping up 
their efforts (ICG, 2017). 
Frustrated by Kabila’s holding on to power, the USA issued sanctions against 
certain individuals in the regime in 2016. Later the same year the EU followed 
suit, after having solved a disagreement between its member states.107 The 
number of individuals on the sanctions list has over time increased, and the USA 
has also included a number of enterprises on its list.  
The reluctance of the western donors to get too involved in Congolese politics 
should be seen in the light of both: i) a Congo fatigue; and ii) the reality that 
although Congo does matter for donors for reasons that I have reviewed in this 
thesis, it matters less than people in Congo generally tend to believe. Unlike other 
fragile states such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where the international community 
has been heavily involved, Congo is not posing any major security risks for the 
West – hence from a security and military point of view, Congo is not a top priority. 
Trade with Congo matters relatively little as far as Western investors and 
businesses are concerned. With the exception of Belgium, formal trade between 
Congo and its donors is relatively small, and only a relatively small number of 
western enterprises have large investments in Congo.108 Hence the main 
engagement with the country is in the form of diplomacy and development 
assistance. Donors want stability in the country for geo-political reasons as well 
as from poverty alleviation and humanitarian perspectives. The importance, 
however, of the mineral wealth should not be underestimated as western 
                                            
107 Allegedly one member state that was bidding for a large hydro-electronic project in Congo had stalled the decision. 
108 The major destination countries for Congolese export was in 2018 China (40.9% of total export), South Africa 
(30.8%), United Arab Emirates (9.2%, mainly gold export) and Tanzania (5.6%). The major countries of origin of 
imports 2018 were South Africa (20.9%), China (19.6%), Zambia (7.1%) and Tanzania (5.2%) (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2019, p. 6).    
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companies need the minerals from Congo and there is also the aspect of 
competition with China. A more stable Congo, with a stronger rule of law would 
make it easier for western companies to invest in the country. Due to these 
reasons, western donors continue to inject resources while persisting in their 
diplomatic efforts and negotiations. However, as President Kabila is well aware, 
there is a limit as to how much they are willing to invest scarce efforts and 
diplomatic energy into forcing him to leave. Hence, he can play the donors 
because he knows that they often come with empty threats. The pressure that 
the donors have mustered and the recent sanctions, however, seem to have had 
some effect as President Kabila has decided not to run. Whether he intends to 
do a ‘Putin/Medvedev’ change, or whether he genuinely will step down remains 
to be seen.  
So what will the donors do in the case of further postponement or widespread 
fraud in the elections? The US Congress is apparently working on a bill that would 
extend the sanctions (speech by representative Karen Bass in Washington 2018-
04-16), but whether further sanctions would have an effect is an open question. 
Donors, who to a large extent have continued to work in a ‘business as usual’ 
mode (with the exception of Belgium that has withdrawn aid to state institutions), 
would probably have to revise their strategies and further minimise their contacts 
with the state. We might see a situation like the one in the early 1990s when 
donors stopped their development assistance to the Congo and only focused on 
humanitarian assistance. So far, most donors have rejected such a way forward, 
as they believe that withdrawing all aid but humanitarian aid, would mainly hurt 
the population but not the political elite. The next few months will be a turbulent 
time. Let’s hope for the sake of the Congolese people that they will get the chance 
to elect the leaders they want. Nobody will be able to miraculously change 
overnight the predatory system that permeates the Congolese society, but a new  
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leader might be a small step towards a better future for the hard-pressed 
Congolese people.109   
 
 
 
 
  
                                            
109 After two years of delay, a general election was finally held in Congo on 30 December 2018. It was 
marred by election fraud and intimidation. Mr. Bemba, who had been released from the International 
Criminal Court, was banned from running as was the popular Mr. Katumbi who was not allowed back into 
the country. The opposition failed to put up a common front. As a consequence, UDPS went into the 
election with Mr. Félix Tshisekedi as its candidate, whereas most of the opposition united behind Mr. 
Martin Fayulu. President Kabila’s chosen successor, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, was so unpopular that 
it would have been impossible to declare him the winner even with massive election fraud. According to 
the Catholic Church (which has a large network of election observers), Mr Fauylu won the election, 
followed by Mr. Tshisekedi who received approximately half the number of votes that Mr. Fauylu got 
(Englebert, 2019, pp. 130–132). The official Election Commission (CENI) nonetheless declared Mr. 
Tshisekedi the winner, which has led to rumours that President Kabila had struck a deal with Tshisekedi 
(ibid). After initial protests by the international community, large donor countries like the USA, ended up 
acknowledging Tshisekedi as the President (ibid pp. 133-135). The main reason for this was apparently 
concerns that rejecting the election results might spark more civil strife and violence in Congo. Hence, 
they concluded that a peaceful transition of power, however fraudulent, was the least bad option 
(Englebert, 2019; Gramer & O’Donnell, 2019). After months of discussions with Kabila, whose supporters 
still control the senate and thereby have the right to appoint the Prime Minister, Tshisekedi could, in the 
end of August 2019, present the new government. The new government has 67 ministers and whether it 
will be effective in governing remains to be seen (Jeune Afrique, 2019). This footnote was added after the 
viva and before the printing of the thesis. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Profile of respondents110 
 
Group of respondents Number 
Bilateral Donors, Multilateral 
Donors and diplomats 
(including national staff 
members) 
46 
Government (national and 
local levels) 
25 
Implementing Agencies 
(INGOs and private 
companies) 
18 
CSOs, FBOs 15 
Academia, independent 
consultants etc.  
13 
 
 
Annex 2. Attended events 
 
Event title Date Convening 
Institution 
Location Type of event 
Quarterly 
Review Meeting 
of the ASSP 
Programme 
26-27 
March, 
2015 
Minister of Health 
and DFID 
Kinshasa Quarterly Review 
Meeting of the ASSP 
programme 
Provincial health 
meeting 
 
 
17/4, 2015 Provincial Ministry 
of Health 
Kananga Provincial annual review 
and planning meeting for 
all the health zones in 
the province 
EU consultation 
with the MoH 
24/4, 2015 Minister of Health 
and the EU 
Kinshasa Meeting between MoH 
and EU consultants that 
were visiting the DRC to 
develop a new EU 
funded health 
programme. 
Les Etats 
généraux de la 
justice 
27 April to 2 
May 2015 (I 
attended on 
the 27th of 
April and 
the 2nd 
May) 
Ministry of Justice Kinshasa A national meeting with 
around 300 participants 
to analyse the problems 
in the justice sector and 
to develop a road map 
for reforms. 
Comité de 
pilotage, Uhaki 
Safi 
21/5, 2015 Ministry of Justice 
and the EU  
Goma Review Meeting for the 
Uhaki Safi Programme 
with the Minister of 
Justice, donors and key 
provincial and local 
stake-holders. 
                                            
110 A complete list with names, organization, date and place has been shared with the examiners. 
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Annual Review 
Meeting, ASSP 
programme 
12/6, 2015 Minister of Health 
and DFID 
Kinshasa Annual Programme 
Review meeting of the 
ASSP programme 
 
